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Tax minimisation is a corporate financial strategy which can improve profitability 
by retaining earnings, thus lowering the need for external capital. The resulting 
tax minimisation, while often legal, represents a loss of revenue to the government 
and shifts the cost of public services to others. Governments, including the UK, 
have tried in recent years to take a stronger line on such activities, with mixed 
results. However, the overall effect of tax minimisation on firm value is still 
obscure. To understand tax minimisation in greater depth, this study examines two 
primary questions: Firstly, how does the relationship between tax minimisation 
and firm value vary across different methods of tax minimisation? Secondly, do 
corporate governance mechanisms affect the level of tax minimisation and in 
consequence, firm value? The results of this research contribute to knowledge by 
shedding light on both the extent of variation and evaluation regarding the 
relationship between different components of tax minimisation and different 
measures of firm value, with reference to corporate governance characteristics in 
UK FTSE 350 companies. Additionally, the results of this research support 
shareholders and tax authorities in recognising, observing and monitoring tax 
minimisation activities in one side and support managers to understand the 
consequences of utilising different components of tax minimisation in promoting 
profitability. This study investigates the association between different components 
of tax minimisation and firm value, and examines the moderation role that 
corporate governance mechanisms play on this relationship. The findings help in 
providing evidence that tax minimisation valuation by investors varies across 
different components and different indices. The study furthers the understanding 
of the reason underlying the difference in the findings of the relationship between 
tax minimisation and firm value by shedding light upon firm value from different 
angles by studying both investors and managers perspectives towards firm value. 
This differentiation in both viewpoints is considered to be one of the research 
contributions to the existing body of knowledge. The results of this research show 
that it is significant to examine the indices separately to understand the behaviour 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This research examines the relationship between tax minimisation and firm value 
while considering also the moderating role of the external and internal corporate 
governance mechanisms in this relationship. As the information relating to tax 
may be considered as somewhat opaque, this study utilises book tax differences 
components to measure tax minimisation to examine whether this relationship is 
significant. This examination controls for some firms’ specific features such as 
leverage, foreign sales, dividend, earnings management and capital intensity. The 
investigation of this research begins with an examination of the relationship 
between tax minimisation components and two measures of firm value namely 
Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA) and then examines whether corporate 
governance mechanisms moderate this relationship.  
The results of this research provide evidence that investors’ value tax 
minimisation components differently in different indices and suggest that it is 
important to examine the indices separately to understand the behaviour of the 
trends as every index has different characteristics and perceptions, thus different 
outcomes. This study distinguishes itself from  previous studies by focusing on 
international companies listed on FTSE 350 for the period  2014 to 2016, which is 
the period after the financial crisis and during the reduction of the tax rate from 28% 
to 21% and then to 20%. This is to examine whether the period after the financial 
crisis and during economic prosperity along with the reduction of the corporate 
tax rate have led to different outcomes of this relationship. In addition, this study 
utilises two different measures of firm value, namely Tobin’s Q and ROA, to 
identify whether different measurements provide evidence of different outcomes 
and to explain those differences. Furthermore, this study is the first to be 
conducted in the UK that examines the relationship between three different 
components of tax minimisation and two different measures of firm value. This is 
done simultaneously by considering two different corporate governance 
mechanisms, of which one is internal and the other is external, namely total 




examine the moderating role that corporate governance mechanisms play in this 
relationship. The reason behind choosing those two mechanisms is that both of 
them reflect the agentic behaviour. For example, CEO remuneration links to 
managers who are self-serving (traditionally), in which agency theory states that 
managers are self-serving and are ignoring shareholders interests. Thus, managers 
are more likely to get paid more and capture the board, for these reasons CEO 
remuneration can be used as a proxy for self-serving managers and as an example 
of week board and agentic behaviour.    
This research contributes to various fields; literature, methodology and practice, 
which is explained briefly in this chapter and in details in chapter 8.  This chapter 
is designed to paint an outline portrait of the study, starting with a brief depiction 
of the background and motivation that underlies the rational for its undertaking. 
The structure then moves on systematically to present the dilemma inherent within 
the study by pointing out two salient questions and sub-questions in addition to 
the objectives. The research methodology and the construction of the chapters 
provide an overall view of the contents of the thesis. In addition, the chapter 
contains a list of presentations conducted by the researcher. Finally, the chapter 
outlines the limitations of the study and articulates a conclusion. To the author’s 
knowledge, this research is thought to be the first research that examines, 
interprets and explains the difference in the results between FTSE 350 
constituents, namely FTSE 100 and FTSE 250, and then presents an explanation 
of this difference for each individual index. 
1.2 Motivation of the Study  
Since 2005, all listed companies in EU countries are required to prepare their 
consolidated financial statements under the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). As a result, the UK large companies are required to prepare two 
types of reports; a tax report prepared under IAS 12 (considering both current and 
deferred tax expenses) and a financial report under the IFRS. This leads to the 
inclusion of both expenses (current and deferred) in income tax expenses in the 
financial statements. The preparation of the two different reports under the two 
different rules leads to create book tax differences (BTDs), which comprise; 




component results from the normal differences in treating expenses and revenue 
for both tax and book purposes such as the allowance and depreciation for 
doubtful accounts, it can also be utilised for earnings managements purpose. In 
addition, tax minimisation can be considered as a continuum that involves less 
aggressive legal transactions such as municipal bonds investments and more 
aggressive transactions such as transactions that their legality are less certain 
(Blaylock, et al, 2012).   
The concern of tax minimisation issue has risen since the financial crisis of 2007 
to 2009 and the subsequent of strain on public finances, and an increase attention 
has been paid to government agencies such as Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs, (HMRC), non-government organisations (NGOs) and the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This attention calls to 
attenuate the deleterious effects of efforts to minimise taxation. In addition, this 
concern has led to an explosion of interest and research from a wide range of 
academic fields, especially after the Chancellor of the Exchequer declared in the 
pre-budget report in 2007 that a review designed aimed to investigate how anti-
avoidance legislation can achieve the purpose of simplicity of the tax law and 
ensure revenue protection (Tracey, 2009). 
 
Taxation in general is considered as the main financial resource of the UK. Over 
the decade 2006 to 2016 Income Tax (IT), Capital Gains Tax (CGT) and National 
Insurance (NICs) contributed 56% of the UK government’s total receipts with 
Value Added Tax (VAT) and Corporation Tax (CT) contributed an average of 
20% and 10% respectively (HMRC, 2016a). This research concentrates only on 
corporate tax, which contributes to 10% of the government total revenues as 
mentioned above. Tax minimisation practices by individuals and corporations are 
recognised as an important issue in most countries, resulting in strategies of 
cooperation between nations such as the OECD’s base erosion and profit shifting 
(BEPS) initiative (OECD, 2013) the EU’s Anti-Tax Avoidance Package (ATAP) 
(EU, 2016). These procedures could contribute to the reduction of billions of 
pounds the government loses every year through the corporate tax minimisation 
activities of large companies. On the other hand, the priority of any business is to 




resource in funding investments and increase shareholder wealth. This motivates 
companies to enhance their profitability by legally reducing tax liabilities through 
tax minimisation strategies. The difference in both parties’ interests; government 
and companies generate a strong objectives’ conflict, which leads to information 
asymmetry dominated by the companies.  
 
The UK tax authority has increased its attentiveness to tax minimisation issues 
and has increasingly tackled the reduction in companies’ tax payments. For 
example, implementing tax risk classification is one of the strategies that the tax 
authority applies to limit annual losses in the UK’s revenue. Hence, companies 
could be evaluated via tax risk assessment whether or not they have been involved 
in tax minimisation before the HMRC investigation (Hampton, 2005). The 
purpose of using this assessment is to reduce the variation in payment of corporate 
tax by companies, and to tackle the tax minimisation that costs the government 
£400 bn every year (Stiglitz, 2019). 
 
It is thought that multinational companies (MNCs) are using complex tax 
arrangements to reduce their tax liabilities. This might be because of the 
ambiguity of legislation and/or the characteristics of those companies. This 
focuses the awareness of shareholders on the benefit to be expected from tax 
minimisation activities. Although there is a lack of tax information disclosure 
amongst companies, shareholders could evaluate tax minimisation differently (De 
Simone and Stomberg, 2012, Inger, 2014). Managers avoid disclosing to 
shareholders the full tax information relating to their risk management activities 
for tax purposes, which can generate a shelter for manager’s opportunism and rent 
diversion reasons (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009). Thus, in their evaluation, 
shareholders should consider both the benefit and the risk of the engaging in tax 
minimisation activities (Chyz, 2010, Desai and Dharmapala, 2009).  
Many studies have been conducted into tax minimisation activities, involving 
large numbers of companies, to investigate the impact of tax minimisation 
activities on corporate value (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009, Chyz, 2010, Kim et 
al., 2011). Few studies however consider the evaluation of different components 




context (Abdul Wahab, 2012, Inger, 2014). While lowering the tax bill would 
seem to leave corporations with more resources to invest in the business, a 
growing amount of evidence collected in recent years suggests a counterintuitive 
outcome: that tax minimisation can be ineffective in increasing firm value and 
promoting shareholders’ wealth (De Simone and Stomberg, 2012, Wilson, 2009). 
While some studies assume that the relationship between tax minimisation 
activities and firm value is primarily positive, Desai and Dharmapala (2005) 
indicate that tax minimisation activities do not associate directly with firm value. 
Relationships between corporate governance, managerial equity incentives, and 
tax minimisation are integrated; hence, there are ambiguous conclusions in the 
existing literature. Scholars have observed that various components of tax 
minimisation by firms are still vague, and suggest further exploration in the 
accounting literature, utilising the knowledge of financial statements and 
institutional details to provide significant contribution in the coming era (Hanlon 
and Heitzman, 2010). 
Many studies investigate the relationship between tax minimisation and firm 
value, such as Desai and Dharmapala (2009), Wilson (2009); however, they do 
not record whether investors distinguish the different methods used in these 
activities and value them accordingly. Desai and Dharmapala (2009) indicate that 
tax minimisation is positively associated with corporate value in cases involving a 
high institutional ownership. In addition, tax minimisation is considered as 
leading to augmented after-tax earnings, thus, to be in the interest of shareholders. 
This is naturally taken to enhance firm value.   
 
Wilson (2009) demonstrates that a firm engaging in tax savings reveals a 
considerable subsequent book-tax gap (the difference between taxable income and 
book income) in US multinational companies. Examining the relationship 
between tax minimisation and the relative rigour of corporate governance, he 
finds that companies with strong corporate governance show a positive, abnormal 
return during the period of engaging in tax saving. This result supports the view 
that tax minimisation activities increase shareholders’ wealth in well governed 




(2011) explores how uncertain tax minimisation positions 1  resulting from 
disclosure of contingent tax liabilities that are subsequently disputed at tax return 
audit are positively associated with the investor’s evaluation. He demonstrates that 
tax-related contingent liabilities and other liabilities are perceived in different 
ways. Moreover, investors use past uncertain tax minimisation as a sign for future 
uncertain tax minimisation.  According to Chyz (2010), tax minimisation is, on 
average, positively associated with firm value, where managers exhibit tax-
aggressive behaviour. Moreover, this increase in firm value corresponds with 
aggressive managers’ behaviour which is possibly related to increases in agency 
costs. This is consistent with the agency view of Desai and Dharmapala (2009) 
that the increase of firm value with the existence of aggressive management is 
notable only in companies with better governance. Although these studies confirm 
that investors value tax minimisation activities positively, there is a lack of studies 
that examine the investors’ valuation behaviour with considering different 
perspectives of tax methods, thus, increase suggestion to study this subject from 
different angles (Inger, 2014). This study widens the knowledge base, by 
investigating the investors’ evaluation of different components of tax 
minimisation measured by book tax differences components, namely permanent 
and temporary differences together with overseas tax rate differences as these 
components require further explanation (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). 
 
Inger (2014) explains that different methods of tax minimisation are evaluated 
differently, and its impact on firm value varies according to factors such as; tax 
risk, degree of permanence, tax minimisation activity cost; implicit taxes, and 
diversity in disclosure of tax reduction in financial statements. Every method of 
tax reduction has different features: some for example generate permanent tax 
savings, such as share option tax benefits (with assumption of the rules and 
regulations are not changed). While others have timing effects, as can be seen in 
accelerated tax depreciation deductions. From the investor's point of view, the 
significance of permanent tax reductions exceeds that of temporary ones. She 
 
1 Firms are required by financial reporting standards to separately report their contingent liabilities 
for tax positions, which might be disproved in the tax audit. The disclosure provides information to 
investors about the size of tax minimisation activities by firms via uncertain tax minimisation. Tax 
position indicates the determination of whether and/or when a transaction is deductible or taxable, 




finds that temporary difference has no impact on firm value; however, deferral of 
residual tax on overseas earnings has negative impact on firm value. In contrast, 
Abdul Wahab and Holland (2012) suggest that in line with agency theory of tax 
minimisation and because of the existence of information asymmetry, 
shareholders do not value permanent difference as it can lead to moral hazard or 
fear of it. However, they do not examine the interaction between corporate 
governance mechanisms and both temporary difference and statutory tax rate 
differences.  
 
This study differs from the previous studies by concentrating on two components 
of book tax differences, permanent differences and temporary differences, 
together with considering statutory overseas tax rate differences as a component 
of tax reduction. This is to examine whether investors (in FTSE 350 in general 
and FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 separately) distinguish between different tax 
minimisation strategies in their companies valuation, while considering other 
factors that could influence the valuation decisions, such as corporate governance 
mechanisms and companies’ specific features.  
Tax minimisation is considered to be one of the most significant topics relating to 
tax issues. There are several reasons underlying conducting this study. First, 
corporate tax is a fundamental revenue resource of most nations; in the UK, it 
counts for 10% of the UK government’s revenue. Thus, government is responsible 
for monitoring over companies to ensure the fairness in their tax payment, which 
has increased the scrutiny of both tax legislation and the amount of tax paid by 
companies over the last decade (Whiting, 2006).  
Second, the HMRC’s anti-avoidance strategy aims to reclaim billions of pounds 
the government loses every year through the tax minimisation activities of large 
companies. Third, tax minimisation is a significant ethical issue, which the public 
consider MNCs, and economic experts are required to address. In addition, tax 
minimisation can make MNCs appear to be socially irresponsible, as the higher 
the level of social responsibility performance, the lower the level of tax 
minimisation (Lanis and Richardson, 2015, Hoi et al., 2013). Apart from 
corporation tax, firms also need to be recognised as making their contribution to 




employment, supply chain ethics and environmental policies (Dowling, 2014, 
Fisher, 2014). 
This research differs from previous research by focusing on the variables of tax 
minimisation, which are measured by book tax differences and its components: 
temporary differences, permanent differences and statutory overseas tax rate 
differences, along with control variables, such as capital intensity, earnings 
management, leveraged, foreign operation and dividends. Firm value is measured 
by Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA), and corporate governance is measured 
by institutional ownership and executives’ remuneration. The literature review of 
this research in chapter two outlines the existing evidence linked to tax 
minimisation research, and will identify any gaps related to knowledge. This 
confirms the area that needs more investigation and exploration, which concerns 
the impact of different tax minimisation components on different firm value 
measures. In this part, the relevant literature was reviewed and analysed regarding 
the selected variables of the research. From the analysis of different literature 
sources, it is identified that MNCs not only play a vital role in the host country’s 
economy, but they also go beyond that, to the economy of the wider world. The 
question remains whether the impact is positive or negative; thus, the impact of 
tax minimisation, corporate governance and the association between them are 
analysed in this study. Therefore, the motivation of this research is to provide 
evidence concerning the impact of different tax minimisation components and 
corporate governance mechanisms on two different measures of firm value in 
order to explain that investors value these components differently in their firm 
valuation in the UK setting. The MNCs referred to are the companies that are 
listed on FTSE 350 index in the London Stock Exchange.  
In regards to considering corporate governance mechanisms as a moderating role 
in the relationship under investigation. Arguably, corporate governance plays a 
significant role in regulating companies’ tax minimisation strategies, as it has 
obtained its international significance after the financial crisis in 2008. This is as a 
result of rising corporate scandals and public protests on large remuneration for 
executives. In addition, both corporate governance mechanisms applied in this 
research namely institutional ownership and executive compensation can be 




costs comprise monitoring expenses undertaked by principle such as the cost of 
control and evaluate agent’s behaviours which can be seen in managerial 
compensation, budget restrictions and rules operation. Moreover, agency costs 
comprise the agent bonding costs whether monetary or nonmonetary costs to 
guarantee that principle are remunerated by the agents in case of any harmful 
actions made by the agent. Besides, residual losses, which comprise costs, 
occurred as a result of the differences between agent decisions and the decisions 
that could lead to maximise principals’ value. Regards to agency theory, the 
existence of information asymmetry between shareholders and managers motivate 
managers to maximise their wealth instead of shareholders wealth, due to manager 
can have more access to the information than shareholders, which limit the ability 
of the latter in monitoring the former performance. In this context, Desai and 
Dharmapala (2009) state that the agency contract could not be at the ideal level 
for shareholders for tax minimisation related reasons. Those reasons are CEO 
remunerations are not attached to their genuine effort and to prevent the manager 
from engaging in tax minimisation and reducing tax liabilities companies should 
have a reliable internal control system, due to any tax minimisation plans would 
be run privately by manager. Regards Institutional ownership, the nature of 
ownership structure in the UK is widely dispered (Short and Keasey, 1999; Faccio 
and Lang, 2002) and agency problems occur in dispered ownership structured 
companies as a result of the existence of information asymmetry and the conflict 
between managers and shareholders(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Hart, 1995). 
Bird and Karolyi (2017) argue that companies with high institutional ownership 
tend to engage aggressively in tax minimisation in particular international tax 
minimisation strategies, such as transfer price and the use of tax heaven. In 
addition, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) find that institutional ownership plays a 
moderating role in the relationship between tax minimisation and firm value 
measured by Tobin’s Q, in which the relationship is positive for the companies 




1.3 Research Objectives and Questions  
1.3.1 Research Objectives 
The main purpose of this research is to examine the influence of different 
components of tax minimisation namely; permanent differences, temporary 
differences and foreign statutory tax rate differences on investors’ valuation in the 
UK FTSE350 generally and FTSE100 and FTSE 250 separately. While at the 
same time, examine the moderating role that corporate governance mechanisms 
play on this influence. The research objectives can be stated in detail as follows:  
1. To examine whether the relationship between tax minimisation and firm 
value differs according to tax minimisation methods in the FTSE 350 
companies in general and FTSE100 and FTSE 250 in particular. 
2. To identify the alternative methods of tax minimisation activities and 
determine whether investors consider the differences between these 
methods in their valuation.  
3. To examine whether different firm value measurements have different 
influence on tax minimisation activities. 
4. To examine whether corporate governance mechanisms play a moderating 
role in the relationship between tax minimisation and firm value measured 
by different measurements. 
5. To develop a new methodological model, grounded in the current models, 
which have a broad impact on relevant fields of publication and a positive 
impact for students, business, universities and HMRC. 
1.3.2 Research Questions  
The main aim of this research is to examine the extent to which the relationship 
between tax minimisation measured by book tax differences and firm value varies 
across alternative methods in the UK large companies defined by FTSE 350 
generally and FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 separately.  
The research questions are as follows: 
 




To extend the evaluation of tax minimisation methods, an examination of the 
book tax differences (BTDs) components is conducted, using the following 
questions: 
1- How does tax minimisation generated by temporary differences affect firm 
value? 
2- How does tax minimisation generated by permanent differences affect firm 
value? 
3- How does tax minimisation generated by foreign statutory tax rate 
differences affect firm value? 
Answering the above questions will expand our understanding of the components 
and their relationship with investors’ valuation.  
Question Two: How is the investors’ evaluation of tax minimisation activities 
related to corporate governance characteristics in the UK large companies defined 
by FTSE 350 generally and FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 separately?  
To answer this question two sub-questions have been set as following:  
1- How do external and internal corporate governance mechanisms (proxied 
by institutional ownership and executive remuneration) affect the 
relationship between tax minimisation and firm value? 
2- How do external and internal corporate governance measurements 
moderate the relationship between tax minimisation and firm value?  
These questions are hypothesised in alternative outlines forms, which are 
elaborately explained in chapter 5.  
1.4 Importance of the Research 
This study is significant in several respects: 
1- This study has made a methodological contribution by extending the 
research conducted by Abdul Wahab and Holland (2012) and utilising the 
framework of calculation tax minimisation components (book tax 
differences components) that used by Abdul Wahab and Holland (2015).  
2- This study contributes to tax knowledge in the UK by contributing to the 




3- This study contributes to investor’s valuation by using two key 
performance measurements of firm value, namely Tobin’s Q and ROA, the 
former represents market knowledge and the latter indicates a degree of 
asymmetry between investors and management.  
4- This study sheds light for the benefit of different users; tax authorities, 
stakeholders and academics about the effectiveness of tax disclosure and 
the influence of corporate governance in the tax minimisation debate.   
1.5 Research Methodology 
This study is a positivist in nature and adopts a quantitative approach. The sample 
of this study is limited to FTSE 350 non-financial companies for the period from 
2014 to 2016. The data is archival annual reports, which are hand- collected from 
companies’ websites, DataStream and Minerva Analytics Company. Moreover, 
market capitalisation data is from London Stock Exchange website.  
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The balance of this thesis is structured for eight chapters as follows:  
Chapter Two 
This chapter reviews the literature and knowledge background concerning 
taxation and the generation of tax minimisation. This chapter is divided to 10 
main parts; the first represents taxation background worldwide and in the UK, the 
second provides some information about the nature and dynamics of multinational 
companies, then the third, provides some insights about corporate tax in the UK 
sitting. Besides, presenting the significance of accounting and taxation knowledge 
with providing an understanding of the tax counting and financial accounting and 
the difference between them, which creates book-tax differences. This leads to 
understanding the different resources of book tax differences, which are tax 
minimisation and earnings management part of them. Finally, this chapter 
provides some tax minimisation background and finishes with a conclusion.  
Chapter Three 
This chapter discusses corporate governance and provides insights about corporate 
governance definition. It also discusses agency theory and presents the corporate 





This chapter provides information regarding different shareholders perspectives 
and its impact on firm value and it also represents different measures of firm value 
along with market efficiency theory. Finally, it provides a debate concerning the 
influences of tax minimisation decisions and corporate governance on firm value. 
Chapter Five 
This chapter considers research philosophy and formulating of hypotheses that are 
tested, as well as the model of the study is developed in detail. This study is a 
positivist in nature and adopts a quantitative approach. This study is objectivist 
and is considered to be value-free.  
Chapter Six 
Data collection and Variables Measurement are described in this chapter, also, the 
sample selection criteria are outlined and the sources of data from different 
database are mentioned.  
Chapter Seven 
After measuring independent and dependent variables along with control variables, 
this chapter includes data analysis and Findings. Descriptive statistics are 
provided with other analysis and robustness tests. The results of examining the 
relationship between tax minimisation and firm value are outlined and a 
discussion of the research findings and a review about the results of the data 
analysis are provided.  
Chapter Eight  
This chapter provides conclusions and discusses the knowledge contribution that 
this thesis makes to the literature on tax minimisation, firm value and corporate 
governance. This chapter represents the conclusion and a summary of the 
limitations and recommendations along with avenues for further research. Also, 
some practical implication of the findings are suggested and some reflection idea 
for new researchers are represented  
1.7 The Research Conclusion and Contributions 
This research examines the relationship between tax minimisation components 




governance mechanisms on this relationship.  It utilises a panel dataset of non-
financial companies listed in FTSE 350 in general and FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 
in separate for the period from 2014 to 2016. This study provides evidence that 
investors value tax minimisation components differently in different indices.  
Tax minimisation components have no impact on firm value measures by Tobin’s 
Q in both FTSE 350 and FTSE 100 when considers this relationship solely, which 
is consistent with Abdul Wahab and Holand (2012); however, permanent 
differences and overseas tax rate differences positively impact on Tobin’s Q in 
FTSE 250, which is in line with Desai and Dharmapala (2006) who find a positive 
relationship between tax minimisation and firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. In 
contrast, tax minimisation components have a positive impact on ROA in both 
FTSE 350 and FTSE 100, whilst, only permanent differences and temporary 
differences have a positive impact on ROA in FTSE 250.  
Considering corporate governance mechanisms in the above relationship model 
did not change the results and only executive remuneration has a negative impact 
on the firm value measured by Tobin’s Q in all indices and there is no significant 
impact of institutional ownership on the firm value measured by both Tobin’s Q 
and ROA.  
In contrast, when adding the interaction between tax minimisation components 
and corporate governance, the positive impact exists between institutional 
ownership and temporary tax differences in FTSE 350 and firm value measured 
by Tobin’s Q, which explains that shareholders value tax minimisation strategy 
that underlying timing saving, as its less risky and, will revise in the future. 
Besides, the positive significant impact between both permanent and temporary 
tax differences in FTSE100 with both firm value measures, which indicates that 
shareholders trust tax minimisation strategy decisions by the managers, as these 
companies consider with well governance practices. However, those shareholders 
do not value permanent difference when it interacts with executive remuneration 
utilising both measures of firm value.  Contradictory to FTSE 100, shareholders 
do not value permanent different in FTSE 250, which might indicate that the 




minimisation as it underlies a high level of risk and it might lead to managerial 
opportunism. 
The contribution of this research is as follows:  
1- This research provides evidence that tax minimisation components have 
different impact on firm value in the UK base context and extends the 
literature that examines the relationship between tax minimisation and firm 
value.  
2- This is one of the first research (to the researcher’s knowledge) that 
empirically examine the impact of different tax minimisation components 
on firm value measures by both Tobin’s Q and ROA.  
3- This research contributes to the knowledge by examining the relationship 
on FTSE350 collectively and further the examination on both FTSE 100 
and FTSE 250 separately.  
4- This research contributes to the agency perspective upon tax minimisation 
activities and predicts that the engagements in these activities depend on 
managers’ attitude towards risks.  
5- This research provides empirical evidence that investors value these 
activities when there is a high level of institutional ownership, however, 
they do not value these activities when there is a high level of executive 
remuneration.  
6- This research contributes to the methodology by utilising a panel dataset 
of non-financial companies in FTSE 350 and split the sample to FTSE 100 
and FTSE 250 separately. Besides, developing a model for the relationship 
between tax minimisation components, corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm value.  
7- This research utilises two measures for firm value as dependent variable; 
Tobin’s Q and ROA.  
1.8 Limitation and Recommendation of Research  
The limitations and recommendations for further research are provided as follows:  
1- This research did not consider Brexit decision and its impact on stock 
markets prices, so further research that can understand this impact and 




period after. Also, the period of coronavirus lockdown and its impact on 
tax minimisation as many businesses have been affected by those 
decisions. Such events might lead to aggressiveness on tax minimisation to 
prevent losses and might have either a positive or negative impact on firm 
value. 
2- The generalisation of the FTSE 350 results on all the UK large companies 
could be constrained, however, the results of this research provide some 
lessons to learn and compare with other similar contexts whether in the 
UK or in other countries that share similar economics and corporate 
governances regulations such as European countries.  Moreover, it would 
be beneficial to consider different sectors such as banking and financial 
companies and compare the results with this research results to identify the 
similarities and variances.  
3- Although this research attempts to take a holistic approach in identifying 
the relationship between tax minimisation components and firm value with 
considering corporate governance as a moderating factor in FTSE 350 
non-financial companies, the sample might not be completely 
representative.  Hence, further research may extend the scope of the 
examination to include different sectors and indices.  
4- The theory and framework that underpins this research are agency theory 
and Scholes-Wolfson framework where the relationship is examined and 
analysed and the results are interpreted, which could be a limitation of the 
research. Further research may be required to adopt another theory or a 
combination of different theories and frameworks.  
5- There are some issues could be in limiting factors in this research such the 
research relies upon secondary data in collecting the data of control 
variable that may disguise material matters of concern. However, 
verification upon sample crosschecks to data was made between data from 
the secondary and original sources to ensure their validity such as 




6- This research is a positivist in nature and adopted quantitative approach, 
further research is required to focus on this subject from different 
approaches such as qualitative approach or mixed approach to understand 
in depth human behaviour towards tax minimisation and grasp the 
characteristics of managers that might be more driven to engage in tax 
minimisation. In addition, a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches could be more beneficial as can lead to understanding the 





1.9 Research Paradigm  






1.10 List of Author’s Conference Presentations  
Various working papers have been presented at different conferences and doctoral 
classes as following: 
1- Tax minimisation on the UK MNCs, Annual PGR five minutes thesis 
presentation, Bournemouth University, UK, May 2016. 
2- Tax minimisation, firm value, corporate governance: an evaluation of 
different methods on the UK MNCs, British accounting and finance 
association (BAFA SIG), Kingston University Business School, London, 
UK, December 2016. 
3- An evaluation of the effect of Different Methods of Tax Minimisation on 
the UK MNCs, a poster at Bournemouth University the 9th PGR annual 
Conference, March 2017. 
4- Tax Minimisation and firm value: An Evaluation of Different Methods 
(UK’s Multinational Companies) BAFA annual Doctoral Conference, 
Herriot-Watt University Business School, Edinburgh, UK, April 2017.  
5- Tax Minimisation and firm value: An Evaluation of Different Methods 
(UK’s Multinational Companies) at Tax Research Network annual 
conference, hosted by Bournemouth University Business School, September 
2017. 
6- How does good governance affect the outcomes of corporate tax strategy? 
BAM corporate governance conference, hosted by the University of 






1.11 Conclusion  
This chapter describes the research background and explains the purpose and 
significance of the research. In addition, it provides an overview of the aims and 
objectives of the research and presents the formulation of the research questions. 
This is followed by the importance of the research and a brief description of the 
research methodology used in the study and an outline of the rest of the chapters 
of the thesis. Moreover, a discussion of the research findings and contributions are 
provided with a significant part of this research, limitations and recommendations 
are also provided with the research diagram. Finally, a list of conferences 
presentations attended by the researcher during her PhD journey is been stated. In 
the next chapter an overview of the UK accounting and taxation nature with 




CHAPTER TWO: ACCOUNTING AND TAXATION  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the orientation to the extant knowledge concerning Taxation 
and corporation tax in the UK. It is structured and informed by the knowledge 
available around accounting and taxation literature, which fill the gaps in current 
taxation knowledge. This chapter represents the theoretical frameworks in relation 
to accounting and taxation in the UK setting. It begins with a background of 
taxation in the UK and provides an overview of the international company’s 
nature and dynamic. It also discusses the UK taxation accounting system, presents 
the association between accounting and taxation and the needs, requirements and 
developments. Besides, it highlights the information knowledge about book tax 
differences and their components and resources. Finally, it provides an 
understanding of tax minimisation conducts by multinational companies. 
2.2 Taxation Background 
UK tax policy currently seeks to tighten the loopholes for the exploitation of the 
law, to make tax minimisation activities more difficult to engage in. Governments 
have established a variety of rules against the minimisation schemes of individual 
and companies (HM Treasury, 2017b). Since the announcement of the pre-budget 
report by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 2007 for a review planned to 
discover how anti-avoidance legislation can encounter both the purpose of tax law 
simplicity and revenue protection (Tracey, 2009). The responses have been the 
formulation of new and different policies to tax avoidance law, which 
consequently has led to new legal formulations. This has effectively been a 
competition between the legislature and revenue authorities on one side, and the 
taxpayers encouraged and facilitated by the accounting companies, on the other 
side. The UK tax policymakers have responded to tax minimisation by creating 
anti-avoidance regulations to prevent those activities, and more recently a major 
piece of general anti-avoidance legislation (HMRC, 2014a). In addition, the gap 
between US and UK corporation tax rates makes the UK appear to be a tax haven. 




rates, so the UK is not a tax haven but there are considerable disparities in 
corporate tax rates among the G20 nations. The US corporate tax rate was a lot 
higher than those of other countries before the tax reform act that signed by 
Trump in 20172. As a result, in 2013 a lot of US companies were considering 
ways to change their domicile to outside the US (OECD, 2013; Desai, 2014). 
Many US large companies have shifted their headquarters abroad through 
corporate inversion in the late 90s and early 20s, which allow companies to 
reincorporate to tax havens countries to reduce their tax liability (Webber, 2011; 
Desai, 2014). This movement called tax inversion, which involves changing 
position between parent company in the US and subsidiary in tax haven country in 
a way does not change the legal operations in both countries, however, changes 
the nationality of the headquarter (Desai, 2014). The White House (2012) policy 
changes are precisely designed to encourage companies not to change domicile 
and help in rebuilding the economy for the future.  The government took a 
different approach making it costly for firms to use tax inversions or similar 
mechanisms to escape US corporate tax rules (The White House, 2016). A 
country’s tax regime has a considerable effect on where global firms locate to 
retain more earnings and expand. Not only the rate of core corporate tax, but  
simple incentives like low tax rates for top organisations and enterprise zones can 
shift location decisions in favour of one country over another (Chan, 2014, 
Armstrong, 2014).  
In 2014, a US-based baby clothing business called Destination Maternity sought 
to acquire the UK-based chain Mothercare, in a reverse takeover that is known as 
tax inversion, to escape a US corporate tax rate of around 40 percent. The UK was 
attractive for the US company, not just because Mothercare was a struggling 
business and thus inexpensive to buy, but also because among the G20 countries 
(a global forum of the largest economies in the world) the UK has one of the 
lowest rates of corporation tax. In addition, the tax incentives of the UK Treasury 
are linked to authentic investment in  business and creating more jobs (HM 
Treasury, 2017a, Inman, 2014). The UK is an ever more attractive destination for 
 
2    It called Trump tax reform and was supported by congressional Republicans and Trump 
presidency. This tax cut has been signed by Trump in December 2017 and implemented in 2018, 
which leads to creating a single corporate tax rate of 21%.  This change happened after the period 




international organisations in addition to being one of the most sophisticated as it 
is at the cutting edge of innovation and technology and is an attractive destination 
for investment in research and development compared to other countries such as 
Germany , France and China (May, T., et al., 2017). 
This literature review has been structured firstly to analyse the related variables 
and then to give an outline of the existing proof linked to tax minimisation 
research, and to identify any gaps related to the knowledge. 
2.3 The Nature and Dynamics of International Companies 
Multinational corporations 3  (MNCs) are defined by Harrod (2009), Williams 
(2009), Muchlinski (2009) and Li (2011) as complex, multi-layered organisations 
operating and incorporated in several jurisdictions. A consequence of this 
definition is that such organisations are subject to a variety of different tax 
regimes, creating potential administrative and financial problems, but also 
providing paths to exploit for gain the tax differences between regimes.   
Robbins and Stobaugh (1973, p:140) define MNCs from a profitability 
perspective as being:  
 “A system operating in a multiplicity of economic environments with varying 
tax rates, costs of money, and currency value.” (Robbins and Stobaugh, 1973, 
p:140). 
 
They conclude that MNCs have exceptional possibilities due to an underlying 
capability to transfer funds – revenues and costs, assets and liabilities – between 
jurisdictions and thus exploit the benefits of a diversity of tax, capital markets, 
and currency relationships in a global context. Moreover, every company can 
concentrate on the specific financial practice that achieves their perceived 
advantages for their operating system and fulfils their development. 
 
MNCs play a vital role, not only in the host country’s economy, but also beyond 
that, to the wider world economy. The global gross domestic product GDP 
contribution of those companies can be much greater than the GDP of some 
 
3  Writers on corporations seem to use the terms ‘firms’, ‘companies’, ‘enterprises’ and 
‘corporations’ almost interchangeably. This thesis does so as well, though it may qualify their use 




countries (Hansen, 2008).  MNCs have traded successfully since the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, with a dramatic subsequent diaspora after World War II, 
based upon technological advancement. 
Almond et al. (2003) state that MNCs have played a significant role in the 
development of a corporate governance system that emphasises individual 
responsibility via a complying or explaining requirement, which provides unique 
strategies to flourish. Almond explains that the UK business framework has light 
touch regulation and liberal choices for MNCs, which makes it unique compared 
with other countries.   
Every country has specific income tax policies, rules, and rates. A company’s 
diversion strategy maybe to migrate the operational office to a country with a 
lower tax rate; this may negatively affect the local business and economy as a 
consequence of job losses, outsourcing and income inequality. Contractor (2016a) 
cites the US tax authority’s permission of uncertainty on deferral of foreign 
earnings tax, if those revenues are not repatriated to the US, as one of the reasons 
underlying the removal of businesses abroad. Furthermore, MNCs take advantage 
of tax minimisation strategies like transferring price and property charges to a 
subsidiary. Recently, technology companies are increasingly utilising transfer 
price programs to minimise their taxable income. This is  done by focusing on 
patent right, as it is a handier asset to shift than tangible assets (Campbell and 
Helleloid, 2016).  
From the perspective of foreign direct investment (FDI) decisions, according to 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNCTAD (2016) FDI 
flows have fluctuated massively over recent years, especially in some sectors such 
as utilities, telecommunications, business consulting, investment banking, , legal 
and accountancy services. This was due in large measure to MNCs engagement in 
mergers, acquisitions, and assets disposal. The UK, with an FDI above $72 billion 
at the end of the 1990s, was the largest recipient country in Europe.   
 
MNCs have attributes that differ from those of domestic enterprises. For example, 
their critical mass is considered highly significant for economies where the main 




industrialisation, and their product evolution. They are likely to take a pro-active 
stance concerning innovation and exploit opportunities globally. Furthermore, 
MNCs can gain privileged access to governments in acquiring advantageous 
conditions to safeguard local investments and as such minimise risk.  
 
Habu (2016) defines MNCs as companies that have entities (parent, subsidiary) 
abroad. For the UK, it can be divided to two types: domestic multinationals, with 
headquarters in the UK, and foreign multinationals, headquartered abroad but 
listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). This classification will be considered 
in this research, taking in account some MNCs listed in LSE namely FTSE 350. 
 
Although MNCs account for a small proportion of the number of business entities 
in the UK, they participate in approximately one-third of the UK’s gross value 
added, i.e. those companies registered for VAT and/or PAYE (Office For National 
Statistics, 2016).  GVA or gross value added is the scale of the increase in the 
economy’s value because of goods and services production (Inger, 2014). It is 
measured at current basic prices, which involve the impact of inflation, except 
taxes on products. Furthermore, UK-based MNCs are clearly different from their 
counterparts in Germany and America in the extent to which they give preference 
to outsourcing from global markets for the facilities of production and services, 
which are located abroad (Mitchell, 2015). 
2.4 Corporation Tax in the UK  
Corporate tax, in United Kingdom is defined as the amount of money, which is 
levied on this country based on profits obtained by the companies established 
within the UK territories as well as the profits made by the overseas registered 
entities, which having the permanent establishments within the UK revolving 
powers (Corporation Tax Act, 2009, Practical Law Tax, 2020).  
The government of United Kingdom was adopting the special method of taxation 
where the companies as well as the individual taxpayers are taxed based on the 
similar income rates for the period up to 1965. Thereafter, Finance Act 1965 
introduced to stipulate effective modifications on the taxation strategy by 




well as other associations (Finance Act 1965, Snape, 2011). The introduction of 
the corporation tax adopted its fundamental rules and structure from an income 
tax system. The amendments made on the tax system have led to the divergence of 
the rules and regulations governing both the corporate tax and income tax.  
The UK tax legislation has been developed through the Tax Law Rewrite Project 
that was initiated by HMRC throughout 1997 and 2010, and which aims to make 
tax legislation more compatible and straightforward and make it easy to 
understand and apply. This project delivers first the Capital Allowances Act 2001, 
then focuses mainly on income tax as primary legislation and proceeded three 
basic regulations started with the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003, 
then the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 and finally finishing 
the project with the Income Tax Act (ITA) 2007 (Ipsos MORI, 2011).  Thereafter, 
the project moved to focus on corporation tax and introduced the Corporation Tax 
Act (CTA) 2009, which enforced since the accounting period ending on or after 
1st April 2009. This follows with two acts in 2010 namely: the Corporation Tax 
Act (CTA) 2010 and Taxation (International and Other Provisions) (TIOPA) Act 
2010 (HMRC, 2010a, Snape, 2011). 
During the period of Tax Law Rewrite up to 2008 corporate tax rate has been 
maintained at 30% then it has been reduced from 28% in 2009 to 19% in 2017 and 
it is maintained up to 2020, as it shown in the figure 2-1 below. This reduction is 
properly because of government decisions to adopt a competitive tax rate and 






Figure 0-1: Corporate Tax Rate in the UK (1999-2020) 
 
Source: Trading Economics.com/ HMRC 
However, the HMRC corporate tax statistics table 11.3 titled: Corporation Tax: 
number of companies, income, allowances, tax liabilities and deductions4; shows 
that the effective tax rate (ETR) is increasing, despite the decreasing in corporate 
tax rate (HMRC, 2019).  
The figure 2-2 shows the changes in chargeable taxable profit and tax liability. 
The percentage of companies with taxable profit and a tax liability has increased 
from 90% in 2017 to 93% 2018. Despite the reduction of corporation tax rate and 
the changes in taxable income, the tax liability remains stable over time due to the 
increase in corporation tax in other methods such as the limitation in bringing 
losses forward, reducing capital allowances for investment, a set of anti-avoidance 
measures and the introduction of the bank surcharge (Adam, 2019).  
  
 
4  HMRC publish this table on an annum based under the title: Corporation Tax: number of 





Figure 0-2: Companies with Gross Taxable Profit and Corporate Tax Payable, 
2012-2018. 
 
Source: HMRC. Corporation Tax Statistics table 11.3.  
 The reduction in corporate tax rate leads to increase corporate tax revenue as a 
percentage of gross domestic products as it is shown in figure 2-3 below, which 
confirms that tax rate cut did not cause any loss for the government revenue. 
However, there is still a tax gap that can be identified as the difference between 
tax due to tax authority and tax paid by companies.  
 
The total tax gap due to HMRC was 7.9% (£35 billion) in 2005 o 2006, which has 
reduced to 6% (34 billion) in 2015 to 2016. Regard to corporate tax as a part of 
total tax the estimated total corporate tax gap awo to HMRC was 13.7%  in 2005 
to 2006 and reduced to 6.4%  (3.3 billion) in 2015 to 2016 (HMRC, 2017). This 
gap still exists despite the reduction in corporate tax rate, which leads to question 
the companies morality and social responsibility towards society in paying their 







 Taxable profit 
companies with 
gross Taxable 
profit   
 







Figure 0-3: Corporate Tax gap between 2005 and 2016 
 
Source: HMRC 
                                           
2.4.1 Method of administering the charge 
The authorities imposed for the collection of corporate tax should be formulated 
yearly by the UK Legislation as a way of activating this law. The financial acts 
are known to play a critical role related to the imposition of tax charges. 
Concerning the established companies in the United Kingdom, the accounting 
periods are the key factors for determining the mode of charges (HMRC, 2016d). 
Her Majesty Revenue and Customs (HMRC) is known to administer the corporate 
tax charge. 
2.4.2 Assessment  
The gross profits generated by the UK companies are the major parameters, which 
determine the amounts of corporate tax that can be levied on such companies. The 
HMRC is entrusted with the responsibility of raising the assessment on the 
company that would enhance the induction of corporate tax. The UK companies 




conducted. In the year 1996, the self-assessments were introduced, which 
critically altered the companies’ accounting periods (Financial Act 1998; 
Financial Act 2007).  
 
At a date soon after, the self-assessments were embraced where the companies 
could actively engage themselves and take complete responsibility based on the 
assessment. However, the companies took full liabilities in case of any wrong 
assessment due to their recklessness or negligence (HMRC, 2016b).  
2.4.3 The Payments and Rates 
The corporate tax rate is usually determined annually at the beginning of the 
financial year, which starts for the UK companies from the 1st of April and end in 
the 31st of March the year after.  For which the financial year could defer from 
accounting period for most companies, the corporate tax is calculated by splitting 
the accounting period to two periods to tackle the changes in corporate tax rate 
and ensure that companies pay a fair amount of their income tax liability. For 
instance, if the accounting period of the company begins in the 1st of June and 
ends in the 31st of May, so the calculation of tax liability will be by splitting the 
taxable income to two periods. The first period will begin from the 1st June and 
end to the 31st of March (to meet the end of the financial year) and will adopt the 
previous tax rate and the second period will begin from the 1st of April to the 31st 
of May (to meet the end of the accounting year) and will adopt the tax rate after 
the change.5  
 
The budget in 2007 announced further decisions are taken in policy decision 
section to ensure stability and investments in the future in the UK. These 
decisions include of a large bundle of reforms to the corporate tax system, 
including the corporate tax rate reduction that activated from April 2008 (HM 
Treasury, 2007). The rate of corporate tax on the UK companies is mainly 
determined by the amounts of taxable income generated by companies.  The UK 
government has embraced a fixed percentage rate of 19% since 2017.  However, 
the current government aims at keeping the rates associated with corporate tax to 
 





be as low as possible. In addition, in line with the corporate tax rate reduction, the 
tax rate for small companies was increased to 21% from April 2008 to 2010 to 
prevent companies from integrating as small companies to pay lower than their 
actual tax liability. Furthermore, HMRC adopted a new terminology concerning 
small companies’ rate namely small profits rate since April 2010, however, in 
April 2015 the corporate tax main rate becomes at 20% for both small profit and 
upper profit companies and then reduced to 19%, which becomes active from 
April 2017.  
The rates of corporate tax for 2011 to 2020 financial years are depicted in the 
table given below; 
 
Table 0-1: Rates of Corporate Tax for 2011 to 2020 financial years. 
Rates of Corporate Tax for 2011 to 2020 Financial Years 


























Main Rate 26 % 24 % 23% 21 % 20% 19% 
Source: HMRC & Company Bug website 
2.4.4 Allowances Made on Corporate Tax Accounting and Tax  
United Kingdom listed companies are required to obey the company law and are 
obliged to prepare financial statements with considering the generally accepted 
accounting principles for the period up to 2004, which is the period before 




requirements6.  Regardless of the presence of the general accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) in United Kingdom, which critically form the basic foundation 
for the tax assessment, there exist different reasons behind the variations of 
figures being utilised for tax assessment and commercial accounting. These 
include difficulties associated with the economic concepts definitions, commercial 
accounting purposes as well as appropriate administration strategies applied for 
tax system (Prest, 1978).  
 
The principles associated with the commercial accounting as well as taxation may 
not be similar. Accounting usually involves the information preparation purposely 
for effective control as well as decision-making. The goal of taxation in UK is to 
promote revenue for the country, which can also be employed as a tool to measure 
the government social and economic policy (James, 2009). The accounting 
usually incorporates all the business transactions involving the large wide range of 
finances. On the other hand, the imposition of tax emphasises majorly on those 
transactions that normally affect the tax burden entry as well as depict the way 
such items are related to the calculations associated with the preparation of the tax 
documents.  
2.5 Accounting for Taxation 
The main goal of accounting in UK is to enhance the provision of information, 
which is relevant to decision-making. This information is meant for the interested 
parties such as tax authorities, shareholders and creditors so on. The accounting 
standards, which provide the effective guidelines on the transaction process, are 
developed to meet the accounting and taxation requirements. In addition, the 
concept on the taxation and accounting plays the critical role related to the income 
generation, which determines the rate of taxation in the country.  
Moreover, the UK government can make viable decisions on different activities, 
which are agreed upon to be acceptable for commercial purposes and may not get 
involved in tax concessions (James, 2009). The UK government has embraced the 
 
6  The European Law requires all European listed companies including the UK companies to 
prepare their reports under international Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs), however, unlisted 




special tax treatment, which involves certain expenses. Based on the business 
reasons, it is quite essential to take accounts for every cost being incurred when 
generating revenue. Although certain expenses are not deductible for tax purpose 
such as customers entertaining and gifts, it can be deductible if the amount is 
trivial and for advertising purpose, which due to government's strategy to prevent 
tax minimisation. Nevertheless, the distinction between taxation and accounting is 
considered to be more important than adjustments for an acceptable number for 
income (James, 2009).   
2.5.1 Accounting and Tax Evaluation 
The financial accounting income and taxable income are two different concepts; 
however, they are interconnected (Lamb, 1996). Apart from the existing 
uncertainties, the accounting and tax have been considered to have progressive 
development in the UK over decades. Sir Thomas Bingham 7 had provided 
adequate information on the accepted principles related to the commercial 
accountancy and spotlight on the accepted accounting principle and the actual 
accounting practice regards computing taxable income in cases concerning the 
implementation of GAAP, at page 123B of Threlfall v Jones and Gallagher v 
Jones [1983] 66TC77 (HMRC., 2013). Hi states that:  
“ I find it hard to understand how any judge-made rule could override the 
application of general accepted rule of commercial accountany, which (a) applied 
to the situation in question, (b) was not one of two or more rules applicable to the 
situation in question and (c) was not shown to be inconsistent with the true facts 
or otherwise inapt to determine the true profits or losses of the business.” 
 
This approach might be suitable in general to set the facts of the case, however, 
the law will dominate if there is a contrary legal provision or there were 
suspansions about those facts (James, 2009). 
 
Moreover, taxation was reformed and modified, according to the study conducted 
by James (2002); it can be observed that the continuous pressure against the set 
reform and its corresponding outcomes are being experienced in the country.  
 
7 Former president of the supreme court of the UK, who is known  as the master of the rolls and 




There are many methods can be used for developing the tax system such as Force-
field analysis approach that developed from Lewin (1951), which is an important 
contribution to various fields. This approach provides a framework that can help 
in studying the factors (forces) that impact any situation and can be adopted for 
social and organisational change included different tax systems (Burnes, 2020). 
Individuals may have differing views based on the tax systems development and 
consider it as a rational reform process in changing situations. This optimistic 
technique usually has the drawback in the sense that the approach cannot be 
reflected easily in the real tax reform process as well as not taking in 
consideration the complex array involving the development of tax systems and the 
characteristics of the political procedures (James and Nobes 2015; Lymer and 
Hasseldine, 2002).  
2.5.2 Administrative Effectiveness 
In the United Kingdom, Taxation tends to depend on transaction-based accounting 
rules, which differs from accruals-based method adopted in measuring accounting 
income in traditional accounting. Moreover, the tax system requires being much 
dependent on the verifiable and precise transactions whereas good financial 
accounting is expected to be subjective to some important aspects of taxation 
(Whittington, 1995, James, 2009). 
Both taxation and traditional accounting demand accuracy; however, in 
considering administrative effectiveness, it is significant for a tax system in which 
tax liability depends on precise variablesfor instance, pension allowance 
contributions for tax made based on contributions. Moreover, depreciation 
treatment in the UK can be used to explain the different purposes for both taxation 
and accounting and the necessity for administrative effectiveness taxation. 
According to accounting principles, depreciation should be charged and disclosed; 
however, in the UK depreciation is considered under the capital allowance system 
and might not be deducted when calculating taxable income. Capital allowances 
adopt the shape of accelerated depreciation system to motivate investment in 
particular fixed assets. In addition, depreciation can be biased and subjective when 
it calculated by accountants and may be affected by the intention of tax reduction 




2.5.3 Tax Accounting and Financial Accounting 
This section represents the background details concerning the UK tax accounting 
framework. In addition, it provides information about the link between income tax 
system and financial accounting and shows how the tax report and accounting 
report are linked.      
 
Tax accounting refers to the process of preparing financial statements and 
calculating corporate taxable income in order to identify corporate tax income due 
to the tax authority. Therefore, companies prepare two types of reports to meet 
different specific objectives namely accounting income and taxable income. The 
relationship between tax accounting and financial accounting can be complicated 
as acounting and tax systems are developed in different directions, which present 
the specific structure of the traditional tax regulation setting in the UK (Lamb et 
al., 1998). This complexity increases as a result of both the advanced tax system 
being placed over the old and very complicated framework (Muray and Small, 
1995; Lamb et al., 1998; James, 2009, Brown and Oats, 2020).   
 
All listed companies in the UK have been required by the European Union (EU) 
to prepare their consolidated financial reports using international financial 
reporting standards (IFRS) since 2005 through IAS regulation (Pacter, 2017). It is 
only mandatory for group companies listed in the financial market, for the 
accounting comparability and providing a higher information quality purpose 
across different jurisdictions (Horton et al., 2013). However, based on Companies 
Act 2006, parent companies and subsidiaries have the option to adopt either IFRS 
or the UK GAAP for the legitimate financial report.  
2.5.3.1 Tax Accounting  
The current firms as well as tax environment have been recognised to 
progressively become complex, which is created by increased globalisation and 
due to the introduction of the new form of tax system flowing from the 
introduction of Corporation Tax Act 2009 . Besides, tax accounting could be 
considered as the most complicated part of the financial reports (Brown and Oats, 




current and previous transactions) as deferred tax assets and liabilities to design 
the current financial performance in an accurate manner (Graham et al., 2012). In 
addition, this complexity could be due to the income calculation, as it is prepared 
on an annual based for two different objectives; tax return and financial reports. 
Companies are obliged to prepare their taxable income according to the tax law 
and the amount of tax payment is determined by the taxable income calculated.   
 
In contrast, companies are also responsible for providing the users of financial 
statements with the financial information that help them in their rational decision 
regards to firm’s valuation. The conceptual framework of financial reporting 
originally evolved in the USA and then redeveloped by the UK financial reporting 
council (FRC) and the international accounting standard board (IASB). The 
general aim of financial reporting states by IASB (2018, para 1.2) as: 
   “To provide financial information about the reporting entity that is useful 
to existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors in making 
decisions about providing resources to the entity. Those decisions involve 
buying, selling or holding equity and debt instruments, and providing or 
settling loans and other forms of credit"   
Thus, the main purpose of IFRS is to improve the transparency and comparability 
of the information included in the financial reports at an international scale. Many 
studies provide evidence that the adoption of IFRS enhances the comparability 
and equality of the information reported in the financial reports (Ball, 2006; Byard 
et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2013). However, the adoption and implementation of 
IFRS could not always lead to standardise accounting practices, as there might be 
significant differences between countries, which could be covered by a veneer of 
uniformity and lead to inconsistent financial reporting (James, 2009; Ball, 2006) 
In addition, the IFRS support both principle-based and accruals-based accounting 
standard approaches, which allow for more flexibility for managers in preparing 
financial reports. The principle-based policy obliges mangers to make decisions 
rather than provide elaborated rules and standard implementation instruction in 
accounting transactions process, which could lead to managers’ opportunism in 
reporting earnings (Benston et al., 2006). Besides, the accrual-based method 




cash flow in the financial analysis and reporting processes, which can provide 
managers with freedom to manager and manipulate earnings of (Lang, et al. 2010; 
Cohen  and Zarowin, 2010; Capkun et al., 2012).   
 
This complexity also, could lead to increasing the voluntary disclosure by 
manager to reduce the negative effects of complexity on the information reported 
in financial statement (Guay et al., 2016).  In this regard, the UK departments 
associated with the taxation are being pressurised in attempting to become more 
efficient in administering the tax services.   
 
The Government of the United Kingdom has proposed that the nature of tax 
returns is submitted based on firms characteristic and the VAT registration. The 
UK companies usually seek experienced tax advisers from accounting firms, who 
can play a major role in providing the guidelines related to the tax calculations. 
The tax advisers also determine the future tax to be paid as well as providing 
viable techniques, which are to be employed when paying the tax to the tax 
authority. From accounting companies perspective, the fee of tax advisory 
services provided by the UK accounting companies are considered as the most 
important financial source of fee income for those companies after the fee of audit 
services (Accountancy, 2007; Abdul Wahab and Holland, 2012). Thus, it might be 
sensible to consider that tax minimisation service includes an important part of the 
fee income (Abdul Wahab and Holland, 2012).  
The income taxes implement IAS 12 applied to the annual periods at or after the 
beginning of January 1998, called the comprehensive balance sheet method for 
income taxes accounting (Deloitte, 2020). This method is divided into two 
elements, the current tax method and deferred tax method. The current tax can be 
defined as the amount of tax expected to be payable (receivable) to the tax 
authority in regard to taxable income (tax loss) for both current and past periods, 
with including the settlements of previous periods. Whilst, deferred tax is the 
income tax should be paid or received in regard to taxable income or tax loss for 
the next periods reporting, occurring from previous periods transactions (IAS 12, 




both current and future consequences that result from events and transactions of 
current period (Hanlon, 2003; Brouwer and Naarding, 2018). 
The accounting for current tax is reasonably simple, which can be identified by 
the current taxable income estimated by modifying the accounting income 
reported in financial statements to meet the requirements of tax law. The unpaid 
current tax for both current and previous periods is recognised as tax liability, 
whereas, the overpayment of current tax for both current and previous periods is 
identified as tax assets (IAS 12, para 12; FRS 16, para 5; Telford and Oats, 2014). 
Deferred tax accounting is a complex part of the tax accounting method 
(Harumova, 2016). It has been the issue of debate and challenges amongst various 
parties of interest, such as policymakers, managers, professionals and academics 
over the calculation methods, for example, liability method and deferred method. 
The liability method calculates the deferred tax amount based on the tax rates 
anticipated to be in effect when reversing temporary differences. Whereas, 
deferred method is known as an income statement method, which focuses on 
properly coincide revenues with expenses in the periods of the temporary 
differences generated (Bhattacharyya, 2016).   
The IFRIC 23 has been added to the IFRS interpretations committee scheme, 
since 2014, then issued in 2017 8 .  This is to clarify the treatments and 
measurements for uncertainties in IAS 12. It explains the recognitions and 
measurements of current and deferred income tax assets and liabilities if there are 
uncertainties exist over a tax treatment, which refers to any applied tax treatment 
by company that involves uncertainty about whether the tax authority will accept 
this approach or not. IFRIC 23 applies to all parts of income tax accounting that 
involve any uncertainty related to an item treatment, including taxable profit (tax 
loss), tax bases (of assets and liabilities), unused tax credits, unused tax losses and 
tax rates (Deloitte, 2019).  
 
8 IFRIC is effective for the accounting periods beginning on or after the 1st of January 2019. 
Earlier voluntary application is allowed.  The sample of this study is for the period from 20014 to 




2.5.3.2 Corporation Tax and Tax Accounting  
In the case of the business firms having corporate tax liabilities, an individual 
company is expected to deliver a company tax return to the HMRC, especially at 
the end of the individual accounting period. Upon the submission of the company 
tax return, it is essentially required to engage in certain calculations related to the 
following; 
• Determining the profits or loss, which are made in relation to the corporate 
tax. 
• Determining the amount needed to be paid for the concerned individual 
corporate tax. 
Under the IAS 12, large companies are required to include the result of current 
income tax in financial statements and identify the payable and refundable 
amounts to HMRC regards the current period taxable profit. Thus, next period tax 
is identified regards to the difference between the assets and liabilities carrying 
amount for the aim of tax and the assets and liabilities carrying amount for the aim 
of accounting. This difference between the assets and liabilities carrying amount 
for the different aims makes the assets reclamation and liabilities adjustment, 
which could lead to future tax refunds or tax payments (Brouwer and Naarding, 
2018).  
According to IFRS, companies are required to provide complete, neutral, and free 
of error picture of their position and include all the substantial information for the 
users to gain an understanding of the phenomenon being pictured. Tax accounting 
approach underlying IAS 12 can be justified as it seeks to comprehensively 
exhibit the company’s current and future positions and endeavours to decrease the 
level of managerial opportunism through deferred tax provision. However, 
empirical evidence suggests that the comprehensive quality of IAS 129 provides 
incomplete value relevant information to users since there is a poor relationship 
between deferred tax and future tax cash flows (Brouwer and Naarding, 2018).  
The process of preparing taxable income makes accounting for taxable income a 
challenging part of the financial reporting (Graham et al., 2012). This complexity 
 
9  The comprehensive quality requires deferred tax liabilities to be identified with considering all 




due to taxable income and accounting income are required for different authorities 
and contributed to different objectives namely taxation and financial annual 
reports (Porcano and Tran, 1998).  
2.5.3.3 Financial Accounting  
Financial accounting involves the accounting field concerning; analysis of 
financial transactions, making reports and provide the financial information for 
various users, which help in decision-making (Nobes and Parker, 2008).  The 
international financial reporting standards (IFRS) usually govern the financial 
accounting in large companies within the EU countries.  They consider as the 
standard frameworks that provide the required guidelines and help in improving 
the communication mechanisms of the financial information for financial 
accounting applied at an international level.  In addition, the financial accounting 
usually facilitates the taxation-levied method within the country. This important 
approach enhances the preparation of financial documents that provide guidelines 
towards imposing the taxes on the taxpayers (Chew and Parkinson, 2013).  
The preparation of accounting information is the main purpose of financial 
accounting. This financial information is prepared purposely for those who might 
not get direct involvements in the running of certain organisations. This greatly 
promotes good decision-making processes by organisational managers and other 
stakeholders, who are actively involved in making different judgments on the 
daily running of an organisation (Malhotra and Poteau, 2016). This financial 
information should be published by preparing the financial statements, which are 
known to be taken up by internal and external users and relevant stakeholders with 
the use of historic accounting information. The preparation of the financial 
statements required complying with qualities as below. 
❖ Relevance- The financial accounting is supposed to provide financial 
information that impacts on decision-making. This underlies both 
predicted and confirmed values that any excluding of them could affect the 
economic decision of the decision-maker. 
❖ Reliability- it should not contain the uncertainties, such as bias.  The 
organisational managers should always rely upon it, as the tool for 




organisation and users can rely on it, which prevent organisation from 
concealing the substance of its position (Freedman, 2004; Nobes and 
Parker, 2008).  
2.5.3.4 Financial Reporting  
The UK government has established effective bodies that carry out comprehensive 
implementations related to the tax systems in the country such as Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) which responsible for establishing the UK accounting 
standards. In addition, FRC comprises two essential bodies, which are Financial 
Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) that ensure the enforcement of accounting 
standards and the Accounting Standard Board (ASB) that has a primary role in 
influencing the adoption and development of international financial reporting 
standard (FRC, 2008). 
 
 The framework associated with the financial reporting has contributed greatly 
towards imposing the viable rules and regulations, which facilitate the collection 
of taxes from different sectors. In the year 2002, the European Union (EU) was 
able to embrace a special type of IAS Rules and Regulations that provide the 
required directions. With regard to this, the licensed companies such as the 
insurance sector as well as banking companies are required to adhere to such 
regulations while accomplishing different activities. In accordance with the 
stipulated rules, they should annually prepare detailed financial statements and 
submit them to the relevant authorities for financial evaluation.  
 
These IAS Regulations are applicable to all the European Member States. Since 
the United Kingdom is, at the time of writing, amongst the European member 
states, it requires following such stipulated guidelines. This means that all 
companies should periodically submit their financial documents under the IAS 
regulations. However, those companies that are not subjected to IAS Rules are 
expected to undertake their duties under the Listing Rules and Laws for the tax 
contributions. The Regulations associated with European IAS grants the member 
states with the viable opportunities to exercise the utilisation of other laws 





The UK companies which operate under specialised sectors or industries are also 
required to employ the specific Statement of Recommended Practice in 
accordance with the Financial Reporting Standards (Deloitte, 2020). Different 
financial reporting standards have been implemented in the UK. For instance, 
FRS 100 spells out the appropriate financial reporting model, which provides the 
essential entities required for the preparation of financial statements on the basis 
of accounting standards, legislation and regulations that are more applicable in 
Ireland Republican and United Kingdom. In addition, a new GAAP has been 
replaced on the old GAAP for small companies including of financial reporting 
standards FRS 100 to FRS 105 since 2015. In which, FRS 101 can lead to the 
accomplishments of the framework associated with reduced disclosure that allows 
most parents with their subsidiaries to employ bases for their respective financial 
statements (James, 2017). 
2.5.3.5 Needs, Requirement and Development  
As mentioned previously, the taxable income and accounting income are intended 
to achieve different purpose for different audience, tax systems and capital 
market. Whilst financial accounting obliges to achieve the requirement of 
relevance and reliability in preparing financial information (Freedman, 2004), the 
tax system is intended to achieve specific goals.  These goals are mainly raising 
government revenue with considers the balance between equity and efficiency, 
whereas, keeping tax compliance and administrative cost under scrutiny and 
consideration (OECD, 2013). Besides, the tax system is intended to lead to control 
of economic activities, through incentivise and disincentivise particular activities 
(Freeman, 2004). Hanlon and Heitzman (2010: 130) state that:  
  “Tax rules are written under a much more political process. Lawmakers can 
enact tax rules to raise revenue, encourage or discourage certain activities, and 
attempt to stimulate the economy” 
 
In addition, the difference between tax accounting and financial accounting can 
also, includes the development of each system independently over time, which 




purposes for each system. There is still a continuous need for a systematic 
approach to evaluating international differences in the relationship between the 
tax system and financial reporting. This issue is due to both financial reporting 
standards and generally accepted accounting principles are preceded by rules and 
methods of taxable income measurement and recognition (Alley and James, 2005; 
Lamb, 1996). The rapid development in both accounting and taxation fields 
require a review of tax regulation continually to verify that the legislations meet 
thier objectives (Alley and James, 2005). 
 
Financial accounting is based on principles that focuses on accommodating the 
users’ needs for valuation and estimation of particular information in the financial 
statements, whereas, taxation is historical and requires explicit methods to 
compute tax liability (Alley and James, 2005; Freedman, 2004). Therefore, tax 
regulations focus on past information mainly expenditure, which allow less scope 
for discretion and accruals information. Both types of information serve different 
needs, while accruals based approach utilises in calculating book income, the 
cash-based approach is adopted for tax regulation (Logan, 2011). Thus, accruls 
based focuses on the non-cash outcomes of the transaction and records the 
transaction when it incures not when the cash is received or paid, however, the 
cash based approach for taxable income focus on the cash incident of the 
transaction (PWC, 2011).  
The financial reporting conceptual framework states that the purpose of financial 
reporting is to provide financial information to investors, lenders and creditors 
that help them in making a rational decision about whether providing resources to 
the corporation (International Accounting Standards Board, 2013). This assumes 
that the main needs for the information users are to know the corporate resources 
to evaluate the future cash flow and assess the effectiveness and efficiency of 
managers in utilising these resources. This leads to concentrate more on fair value 
(market) (Power, 2010), however, the fair value depends on models built on 
assumption, where there is no market prices, which could lead to estimation errors 
and increase the tendency of manipulation in financial reports (Landsman, 2007). 
In addition, firm value cannot be the foundation to measure tax liability as a result 




contemporary financial reporting standards do not allow collecting tax, although 
components of accounting keep affecting how both taxable profit and liabilities 
are calculated (Sikka, 2017).  
As a consequence, accounting standards are evolved to meet the needs of 
investors and creditors and neglect tax needs in measuring taxable income and the 
difference will keep continue for the future. Therefore, the development is needed 
to reduce the cost of aligning both financial reports and taxation, which requiring 
a huge amendment to the conceptual framework for financial report and focus 
more on stakeholders requirements (Sikka, 2017, International Accounting 
Standards Board, 2013). 
2.5.4 Book Tax Differences 
Book tax differences result from the fact that the figures for firms’ accounting 
income reported in financial statement differ from taxable income that reflects the 
actual payment of tax liability established in the tax return. This difference in both 
reports (financial statement and tax return) could be as a result of three factors; 
normal differences between the reports, earnings management or tax minimisation 
strategy. These three factors are considered below as the book tax differences 
sources. This section highlights the book tax differences components and 
discusses the book tax differences sources. 
2.5.4.1 Book Tax Differences Components 
The different purposes of financial accounting and tax accounting can be reflected 
in a considerable difference in dealing with a transaction. For example, the tax 
system treats the deduction as a deferred until it occurred then treats it as certain 
and fixed, however, financial accounting treats a liability as accrued when it can 
be estimated. On the contrary, the tax system perceives the income as recognised 
in the current period under the claim of right, ability to pay and control reasons, 
whereas, financial accounting could defer accrual to the end of the year to match 
the revenue with expenses (Sikka, 2017).  
Since January 2005, the tax system required all listed companies in European 




these reports to all users (ICAEW, 2018). This requirement leads the UK 
companies listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) to adopt IFRS in preparing 
their consolidated financial statements and obey the revenue law and International 
Accounting Standard IAS 1210 in preparing their tax return, which included the 
tax liability owed to HMRC. The difference between the purposes of both reports 
(financial report and tax report) creates book tax differences, which due to treating 
the same transaction in both reports in a different way leads to different impacts 
on income (Plesko, 2004; Scholes et al., 1992). The diagram below shows tax 
expense and its components under IAS 12 income taxes as follows:  
Figure 0-4: IAS 12 income Taxes 
 
Source: The Author 
Tax expense comprises current and deferred tax expenses11. Deferred tax expense 
includes two components; deferred tax assets, which is the amount receivable in 
the future due to deductible temporary differences, whereas, the deferred tax 
liability is the amount payable in the future by the company due to taxable 
temporary differences.  
Book tax differences comprise two components namely temporary differences 
(TDs) and permanent differences (PDs) (Abdul Wahab and Holland, 2015; 
Sonnier et al., 2012). In addition, most of income and deduction accounts are 
addressed identically for both financial report and tax objectives. However, 
accounts that are addressed differently are recognised as book tax differences and 
categorised as temporary and permanent differences. The complexity in 
 
10 Refers to comprehensive balance sheet method, which means considering deferred taxes in 
calculating  income taxes with regard to temporary differences between the assets or liabilities 
carrying amount in both financial statement and tax account (IAS 12, para 5).  
11 All online databases do not distinguish between current and deferred tax expense, so, permanent 













accounting for income tax occurs due to the existence of both temporary and 
permanent differences between both financial statement and taxable income 
(Sonnier et al., 2012, Comprix et al., 2011). 
2.5.4.2 Permanent Differences  
Permanent differences are items that are considered as permanent in nature, do not 
arise from timing issues and do not generate deferred tax assets or liabilities 
(Graham et al., 2012). Scholes et al., (1992) state that permanent differences 
originate from items that are included in accounting income or taxable income. 
Permanent tax differences lead to the creation of a difference between effective 
tax rate and statutory tax rate.  
The information concerning permanent tax differences is provided on the tax 
footnotes in the financial statement via a reconciliation section, which provides 
reconciliation of effective tax rate and actual statutory tax rate (Graham et al., 
2012). The reconciliation is required by IAS 12 income tax principles and 
includes both permanent and temporary difference that results from book tax 
differences. These differences show the difference between items that affect tax 
expense but not taxable income (IASB, 2018). An example of permanent 
difference can be explained through transfer price, in which companies are able to 
shift income from high tax rate countries to low tax rate countries to decrease their 
overall tax liabilities related to their overall pre-tax income and report an increase 
of permanent difference in the financial reports (Frank et al., 2009). 
2.5.4.3 Temporary Differences  
Temporary differences refer to the differences in assets and liabilities in taxable 
income and accounting income, which are due to items recognised at a different 
time for book and tax target (Sonnier et al., 2012). Temporary differences refer to 
timing differences and most of them relate to rule difference between financial 
and tax reports (Balakrishnan, et al., 2019). Sonnier et al., (2012) state that 
temporary differences might occur from adopting a different method for 
depreciation, in which companies follow the straight-line method and tax system, 




expense will be higher in the financial statement for the accounting purpose than 
in the tax report for the tax purpose that results in creating a deferred tax liability.  
However, a warranty expense occurs for accounting purpose as a proportion of 
sales on historical expense and expected claim basis, nevertheless, for tax 
purpose, it is not allowed to be deducted until actually paid. Moreover, the 
different dealing of bad debts by adopting allowance approach for accounting 
purpose and write-off approach for tax purpose generate temporary differences. 
The figure below explains the different components of book tax differences.  
Figure 0-5: Book tax differences components explanation 
 
 
2.6 Book Tax Differences Sources 
2.6.1 Earnings Management  
Earnings management is the managers’ incentives to provide the best possible 
picture of performance to achieve a particular target. This can be done through 
preventing the report of declined or negative earnings to beating analysts’ 
forecasts. On the contrast, this target could be for a tax minimisation purpose, by 
reducing the amount of income reported in the financial statement to prevent 
paying a high level of tax. Therefore, the manager might take advantage of the 
discretion choice, which is acceptable in financial accounting principle to make up 
the financial report and provide the users with misleading information (Sohn, 
2016). As investors’ value more firms that record a higher earning and achieve the 
analysts’ expectation than firms that miss the analysts’ expectation (Brown and 





In addition, managers have an incentive to engage in earnings management, as 
their compensation is often related to their performance that in turn is reflected in 
corporate earnings (Degeorge et al, 1999). Moreover, the incentives in engaging 
in earnings management amongst public companies are high, as companies tend to 
improve after-tax earnings and achieve a particular earning.  Previous research 
conducted on earnings management and conformity across countries, suggests 
mixed results (Atwood et al., 2010; Lang et al., 2009; Leuz et al., 2003), 
concerning the influence of book-tax conformity.  
 
In the existing literature, earnings management is interchangeably linked to 
earnings quality; for instance, Atwood et al. (2010), suggest that high levels of 
conformity lead to lower earnings constancy, lower association with future cash 
flows and hence such actions could reduce earnings quality. Besides, Lang et al. 
(2009) provide evidence that companies have a lower level of income smoothing 
engagement in a country with a lower level of book-tax conformity, also, 
Blaylock et al. (2012) confirm that higher level of book-tax conformity is 
significantly associated with higher earnings management. However, Leuz et al, 
(2003) did not find any relationship between book tax conformity and earnings 
management.  
Increasing compliance with the rule is likely to lead to decreased managerial 
manipulation of financial reports and reduced earnings management (Blaylock et 
al., 2012; Desai, 2005, Whitaker, 2005). 
 
In summary, book tax differences include a source of earnings management as the 
changes in income tax expenses that could lead to changes in after tax income. 
Therefore, the manager exploits this opportunity to engage in earnings 
management to achieve earnings figures and beating the market target, which 
could result in ambiguity in the financial information reported in the annual report 
resulting in information asymmetry between managers and shareholders.  
2.6.2 Tax Minimisation  
This section examines the literature linked to tax minimisation activities. It 




the corporate structure that is usually adopted in analysing various concepts 
concerning tax minimisation. In addition, this section highlights the underling 
theory of tax minimisation research and reviews the benefit and cost of engaging 
in such activities.  
2.6.2.1 Tax Minimisation Definition 
Tax minimisation is defined by HMRC as the act of bending the rules of the tax 
system to gain a tax benefit that Parliament never intended (HMRC, 2016b). This 
definition includes all activities that taxpayers engage in to reduce their tax 
liabilities by the entitlement of legitimately managing their financial activities and 
business events to benefit from the available tax resources.  
This activity of minimising tax involves utilising allowances, reliefs, both 
expenditure deductions and exemptions and all other methods of tax exceptions. 
In general, the tax minimisation perceives as the management axis that confirms 
the designing of tax strategies and targets, whereas, tax minimisation management 
can be the circular that interprets tax strategies and targets to anticipated results 
(Agrawal, 2007).  
 
Tax minimisation behaviour by taxpayers depends on issues such as tax rates, the 
expectation of deduction in case of engaging in tax reduction, the likelihood of 
detection, penalties, and the level of risk- aversion involved (Holland, Lindop, 
Zainudin, 2016, Hanlon, and Heitzman, 2010; Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). 
Recent research focuses on the psychological impact on taxpayer behaviour 
towards tax compliance and explains the response in term of framing (McCaffery 
and Baron, 2004) and accountability (Sanders, et al, 2008). On the other hand, 
alternative research suggests that taxpayer compliance behaviour is driven mainly 
by social factors (Jimenez and Iyer, 2016; Torgler, 2007).  
In addition, business tax minimisation strategy can be seen as a bundle of 
complicated activities, due to the separation between the two parties, the principal 




2.6.2.2 The Legitimacy of Tax Minimisation  
Tax minimisation effectiveness is considered as the approach that leads towards 
the achievement of shareholders wealth; therefore, businesses are obliged to not 
engage in this mechanism mainly for reducing tax liability (Scholes et al, 2016). 
Thus, tax minimisation could be deemed as the legitimate actions that taxpayers 
can take to achieve tax reduction whist making the required disclosures of income, 
profit and gains rising, but without engaging in criminal activity (Miller and Oats, 
2016). Nevertheless, these actions might not lead to achieving the purpose of 
effectively minimising tax liability. 
 
The legitimacy of tax minimising is driven from the legal facts of Duke of 
Westminster v IRC (1936). The statement of the judge, Lord Tomlin, below 
leaves space in the law for the principle that he stated:  
  “Every man is entitled, if he can, to order his affairs so that the tax 
attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he 
succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then, however 
unappreciative the Commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow tax-payers 
may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax” 
(Tiley and Loutzenhiser, 2012). 
Whilst tax minimisation could be considered a legitimate activity when it relates 
for example to municipal bond investment on one side, it might also come in a 
continuance illegal tax aggressiveness and evasion on another side, What may be 
seen as being in the middle can be perceived as a tax minimisation strategy 
depends on the aggressiveness level in reducing tax liability (Holland and 
Heitzman, 2010). However, tax minimisation is an ambiguous term as there is no 
clear definition to distinguish between tax minimisation and evasion.  Individuals 
can and do have different opinions when it comes to perceiving the degree of 
aggressiveness in a particular transaction (Oats and Tuck, 2019). Therefore, there 
is ambiguity involved in this activity, which makes distinguishing between them 
difficult. 
The literature refers to tax minimisation utilising some glossaries such as planning, 




use words such as aggressiveness, sheltering, evasion and noncompliance 
(Holland and Heitzman, 2010). 
Tax minimisation involves making adequate a legitimate concerning the financial 
status with the aim of reducing the liabilities involved in the course of taxation 
conducted in a given country (Tiley, 2004). In other words, it is an important 
entitlement offered to the taxpayers, purposely to reduce the liability, which can 
be encountered during taxation. It is usually considered as the formal and legal 
guidelines that need to be adhered by every taxpayer in order to ensure that the 
benefits associated with tax savings are achieved at the minimum tax liability. 
However, the tax minimisation activities become ineffective; especially the 
concerned authority issues taxpayers with strict rules related to the approaches to 
be used for tax minimisation. For instance, the legal facts that are drawn by 
Furniss v. Dawson (1984), which clearly describes how a tax authority presented 
some challenges concerning tax minimisation activities. 
 
For full appreciation of the idea related to tax minimisation in the society, tax 
researchers previously considered the issue of tax evasion as well as tax 
minimisation as key parameters in the continuum for tax minimisation. The 
research conducted by Rego (2003) clearly provides adequate information on 
various activities associated with tax minimisation in the multinational 
corporations of United States. Bruce et al. (2007) “define a tax minimisation as a 
wide stipulated set of evasion schemes and tax avoidance which greatly influence 
only firms’ financial organizations” (Bruce et al., 2007). Different authors 
combine the evasion as well as minimisation since the strategies associated with 
the tax minimisation are usually considered to legal activities. However, specific 
strategies can only be treated to be legal while existing in the ‘ambiguity’ or 
‘uncertainty’ categories. Normally, other strategies are absolutely illegal, for 
instance, underrated taxable income, over-stated tax deduction, etc. 
 
In other words, tax minimisation can be considered as financial advice, which can 
be usually applied in different countries for paying the required amount of taxes. 
In the United Kingdom, the tax system is considered more complicated in 




minimisation, it is necessary to distinguish the concepts and ideas used in 
describing the tax evasion as well as tax minimisation so that unintended 
consequences associated with tax minimisation are avoided such as the penalty, 
which can be imposed on the taxpayers on the basis of their level of ignorance 
concerning the legal approach for tax minimisation. Moreover, the failure in 
understanding the distinction between the evasion and minimisation could result 
in interference associated with the tax minimisation techniques and more so, 
causing critical legal consequences (Hoffman, 1961).  In comparison to tax 
minimisation, tax evasion can be treated as illegitimate practice used for the 
reduction of tax liability. For instance, underreported income analysis or 
neglecting the generated income when evaluating the taxable income. Therefore, 
it is concluded that the terms ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ can be used to determine the 
viability of tax minimisation. This can be evaluated in accordance to Hoffman 
(1961) who clearly verifies the distinction between the tax evasion and tax 
minimisation. This could be possible by using the concepts of legal prerogative 
approach in which different outlines have been provided by the author that tax 
minimisation involves a final goal, which needs to be fulfilled by tax 
management. Based on this evidence, the exercise of legal prerogatives can 
provide useful guidelines concerning tax minimisation. In contrast, tax evasion is 
understood to be the omission or misinterpretation of significant financial 
information with the purpose of evading the huge enforceable taxes. The issue of 
differentiating the above controversial concepts has been the prominent point of 
discussions amongst tax authorities, taxpayers and practitioners (Bond, et al., 
2006). According to Self (2007), the ‘acceptable avoidance’ has been explained as 
an activity of tax minimisation, which consists mainly of two components; firstly, 
a relationship made between the business transactions and tax minimisation. 
Secondly, a relationship made between the commercial purpose and tax 
minimisation. However, if these components are not met then the minimisation is 
regarded as ‘unacceptable’. Regardless of these conditions remained fulfilled by 
the minimisation activity, HMRC can still consider it as unacceptable, since tax 
minimisation is regarded as every activity that aims at minimising the tax liability 
by embracing the benefits associated with the tax reliefs (Bond et al., 2006). The 
challenges associated with the understanding of the distinction between the 




executive, Dave Hartnett. He suggests that the unacceptable minimisation can be 
as secrecy, aggression and misleading issues, which are not fully embraced within 
the tax system in United Kingdom (HMRC, 2008). These references could lead to 
the introduction of ambiguity when distinguishing between the acceptable as well 
as unacceptable minimisation.  
 
The ambiguity encountered while trying to provide a full understanding of the two 
major conflicting terms associated with the minimisation had also been detailed 
by Slemrod, (2004). He suggests that evasion and minimisation cannot have a 
clear line between them when they connect with the tax system. In this regard, tax 
minimisation is considered as creative compliance concerning the tax system. It is 
clear therefore that, based on different arguments made by various researchers, the 
understanding of the acceptable tax minimisation has been recognised differently 
amongst a range of parties.  
 
Kirchler et al. (2003) investigate the social representations related to the tax flight, 
tax minimisation and tax evasion. In addition, they attempt to provide distinction 
between tax evasion as well as tax minimisation based on the legal appearance. In 
this case, the tax minimisation is considered in terms of tax payment reductions 
through legal means, while tax evasion is understood as illegal tax payment 
reduction (Kirchler et al., 2003). From the findings made, they provide evidence 
that tax minimisation is the legitimate practices adopted to minimise tax liability. 
In contrast, tax evasion is generally associated with the immoral, fraud, risks, 
penalty as well as being illegal. Therefore, it can be outlined that the interpretation 
of tax minimisation is that issues associated with activities that connected to the 
effective use of the opacity of tax law to efficiently save tax.  
 
In addition, various activities associated with tax minimisation can be analysed in 
terms of passive or active tax minimisation. Tax minimisation is said to be active 
when the transactions are made with the main intention of minimising the tax 
liability, whereas passive tax minimisation can be conducted without even 
considering the reduction of the tax liability. With regard to these kinds of tax 
minimisation activities, most companies, which are making losses are still 





On the basis of the discussions justified above, tax minimisation is now 
interpreted as any activities, which comprise evasion and minimisation. Even 
though the minimisation is considered to be a legal activity, there is an existence 
of a more distinction, since different arguments have already been made by tax 
authority on the acceptable as well as unacceptable minimisation of tax. 
Therefore, the interpretations of tax minimisation are viewed in terms of the 
progressive issue. 
 
This research focuses on tax minimisation and treats both concepts equally as tax 
savings that result from the difference between the tax liability included in 
financial reports and the actual tax paid to the tax authority. Furthermore, this 
study embraces the definition of tax minimisation as the activities that lead to 
reduce explicit taxes, thus, the legitimacy of both concepts is not examined. 
2.6.2.3 Tax Minimisation Theory 
The motivation of strategies adopted by businesses and organisations is to achieve 
the highest business value, which can be done through adopting a business model 
of interrelated set of decisions (Morris et al., 2005). This is in line with Scholes-
Wolfson (1992) framework that connects between tax minimisation and business 
strategy, and explains the function of tax minimisation in achieving the business 
highest value. This framework focuses on the optimal level of tax minimisation 
that can be achieved through a model of decisions that deem three important 
concepts; including all contract parties, the significance of implicit taxes; and the 
influence of non-tax costs. Scholes et al. (2016, pp: 19) state that tax minimisation: 
“requires the tax planner to consider the tax implications of a proposed 
transaction for all of the parties to the transaction”; “requires all planners, 
in making investment and financing decisions, to consider not only explicit 
taxes but also implicit taxes” and “requires the planner to recognise that 
taxes represent only one among many business costs, and all costs must be 





Shackelford and Shevlin, (2001) state that the Scholes-Wolfson model follows a 
versatile approach to trying to determine the role of taxes in companies, which is 
developed concerning three main concepts known as all parties, all taxes, and all 
costs. These three concepts provide excellent analytical constructing for tax 
minimisation; however, they are less efficient for structure rigorous examinations 
as non-tax costs such as the considerations of financial reporting are difficult to 
measure. Thus, the results derived from the framework could be difficult to 
interpret.  
The first concept refers to all contracting parties such as lenders, creditors, 
suppliers, customers, managers, tax authorities and other stakeholders who are 
linked to tax minimisation transaction required to be consider.  
The second concept refers to the consideration of the explicit taxes in tax 
minimisation activities, which are the taxes due to tax authority and implicit taxes 
such as tax induced cuts in companies’ before-tax rate of return. This 
consideration should be applied when making and financial and investment 
decisions.  
The third concept refers to the consideration of the effects of all costs when 
engaging in tax minimisations activities, these costs could be tax and non-tax 
costs, which involve transactions and managerial incentives costs and the trade-off 
between tax purposes and financial accounting purposes.  
Therefore, the three concepts suggest that the objective of effective tax 
minimisation is different from tax minimisation. Instead, effective tax 
minimisation decisions must be evaluated through the choice of a contractual 
agreement viewpoint and in the effectiveness of organisations design. The 
framework implicit assumption is that if all taxes, all contractual parties and all 
costs are determined and controlled in tax minimisation structure, thus, it can be 
predicted that tax minimisation behaviour is rational and predictable in boosting 




2.6.2.4 Tax Minimisation in MNCs 
Around the world, the practice of tax minimisation is increasingly common 
amongst international companies or companies that have overseas affiliates 
(Rego, 2003). Domestic businesses may also engage in tax minimisation activity 
(Rick and Staff, 2004, Wainwright, 2011), but international companies are likely 
to be more aggressive in tax reduction than local companies (Campbell and 
Helleloid, 2016, Habu, 2016). Tax minimisation phenomena add up to many 
billions of pounds every year, influencing worldwide operations, supply chains, 
and geographic decisions. As a result, tax minimisation sits at the core of the 
international economic system. It is a key to worldwide basic leadership in light of 
the fact that most foreign direct investment (FDI) and worldwide operations 
nowadays are one-sided by tax status (Contractor, 2016b). 
 
A PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) study shows that approximately 21 trillion to 
32 trillion dollars were shifted to tax haven subsidiaries in 2012. In 2014, 400 
large multinational companies had tax agreements with the Luxembourg tax 
authority allowing those companies to pay less than 1% tax rather than the 
statutory rate, which is 29%. Although this is probably an essential policy 
phenomenon in the European Union, the US has tackled this issue over the last 
two decades by developing tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) with 
tax havens (Bennedsen and Zeume, 2015).       
 
Contractor (2016a) explains that if an American drug company has affiliated in a 
lower tax rate country such as Ireland, the company may produce the drug in 
Ireland and export it to the US at an exaggerated price, even though the R&D 
costs have been incurred in the US. The impact of these processes will raise the 
income from Ireland because it is a lower tax rate country and decrease the US 
taxable income and tax liability. Intellectual and brand rights may be shifted to 
Bermuda, a country free of tax, which then asks for a sovereignty payment for a 
registered trademark. This will create a deduction from taxable income due to the 





Companies often seek ordinary business activities in countries considered to be 
tax havens. The main reason and motive for establishing these subsidiaries, is tax 
saving, and to facilitate movement of the company’s earnings from high tax 
territories to tax havens (Graham and Tucker, 2006, Hanlon, 2015). For example, 
registering patents and trademarks in low-tax affiliates allows a company to take 
advantage of opportunities of economic efficiencies, while high tax affiliates pay 
for utilising these assets. This plan decreases the company’s tax liabilities, 
although if repatriation of the profit leads to repatriation taxes, this process might 
reserve cash in low tax subsidiaries. On the other hand, Bennedsen and Zeume 
(2015) provide evidence that the motivation for moving abroad goes beyond tax 
saving, by using subsidiaries for entrenchment activity, which may cause a decline 
in shareholders’ value. In this case, firms frame a complicated system to prevent 
shareholders and tax authorities from tracking the firm’s resources. 
 
For example, the international coffee chain Starbucks has paid tax only once to 
the tax authority during its 14-year period of operation in the UK. Starbucks 
subsidiaries’ transactions assist in creating taxable losses through three categories: 
property payments, price shifting, and inter-company loan (Campbell and 
Helleloid, 2016).  
 
Rego (2003) investigates whether economies of scale exist for tax minimisation: 
whether factors such as a company’s size, profit, or multinational operation, 
engage in more tax minimisation compared with other companies. She shows 
there is a negative relationship between pre-tax income and effective tax rate 
(ETR), and interprets that as evidence that companies with large pre-tax income 
have the motivation and resources to adopt tax minimisation activity. 
Additionally, she finds that multinational companies with various foreign 
operations have lower worldwide ETRs. Consequently, multinational companies 
have greater ability to minimise tax than local companies. 
 
In the UK, one of the methods of tackling the movement of a firm’s resources 
offshore has been by Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs). The UK 
has signed a number of TIEA agreements to exchange information between 




the UK is an active member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) partly due to a desire to improve the effectiveness of tax 
information exchanges and ensure all territories implement the international 
standard of financial transparency and exchange of information (HMRC). The UK 
statutory tax rate was reduced between 2008 and 2014 from 30% to 21%, which is 
similar to those of Switzerland at the time (Talley, 2015). Since April 2015, 
HMRC planned a reduction to 20%, and a further reduction in April 2017 to 19%, 
aiming to reach 18% after 2020 (HMRC, 2015, trading economics, 2017). 
2.6.2.4 Transfer Pricing 
The international community has experienced transfer pricing as the tax 
minimisation as a tax reduction strategy that has extensively been employed. This 
involves the application of terms as well as conditions concerning the transactions 
amongst relevant parties, particularly the market deficiency situation. With regard 
to this fact, the strategies associated with the possibilities of tax reduction 
amongst various international organisations. It normally occurs when more than 
two firms engage in trading activities (Hebous and Weichenrieder, 2010). 
 
Generally, the introduction of transfer pricing was embraced purposely to 
facilitate the allocations of costs between various departments and affiliates. The 
exponential increase in global markets as well as businesses has enabled transfer 
pricing to be vital tool for the management control, such as performance 
management. The performance of different organisational sections cannot easily 
be determined, especially when there is an inaccuracy in the transfer pricing. 
(Swenson, Deborah L., 2000).  
 
The study conducted by Graham et al., (1996), clearly supports that the 
registration of the compensated may not be a guarantee. The prices associated 
with royalties can be made possible by adhering to the special principles. The 
problems experienced with royalties are related with the fair price determination. 
In most cases, the tax authorities are faced with difficult decisions, especially 
when addressing the issues of arms-length associated-price. Frank et al., (2009) 




income from high statutory tax rate countries to lower tax rate countries.  This 
leads to reducing their overall tax liabilities relative to their profit before tax, and 
increase tax minimisation generated from permanent tax differences.  
2.6.2.5 Thin Capitalisation 
This concept can be understood on the basis of the relationship between the debt 
and equity, such that debt supersedes the equity in a company, then the company 
is said to be thinly capitalised. High debt levels are known to increase the interest 
made on the payments, leading to the higher value of the entire tax deduction of 
company (HMRC, 2016c). The thin capitalization can be determined by different 
factors such as agency costs, rates of corporate tax, interest rates and bankruptcy.  
 
The rules associated with the thin capitalisation are formulated purposely to 
minimise massive debt-financing as well as the losses associated with the tax-
revenue. There are two major kinds of rules adhered to when utilising the thin 
capitalization, including specific and non-specific rules.  
1- Allocating a great amount of debt where there is deductible interest 
payments exist.  
2- Allocating a great amount of interest that can be deduced by refereeing to 
the interest rate (paid or outstanding) to another variable (OECD, 2012). 
Consequently, the company might choose debt over equity to raise fund to take 
advantage of the tax deduction that results from interest, whereas dividends on 
shares do not offer such an advantage. Therefore, the difference in tax treatment 
between debt and equity could be a good reason for a company to increase its 




2.7 Conclusion  
This chapter discusses the corporate tax income literature and reviews the UK 
accounting and taxation with a focus on the corporate tax gap. It begins with 
providing information on the background and institutional knowledge about the 
UK tax system that help in answering the research questions. It also provides a 
structured perspective of the corporate tax regime in the UK tax system and 
reviews the relationship between tax system and financial accounting with focus 
on their different objectives. The difference between accounting and taxation lies 
on both have different purposes and targets, while financial accounting purpose is 
focused on provide investors and creditors with certain discretionary information 
to help them in making the accurate decision. However, taxation focuses on 
historical data that presents the firms’ performance to calculate taxable income 
and figure out the tax owed to the tax authority. The two systems of measuring 
income are complementary as they provide different information to different users, 
however, accounting adopts IFRS in preparing financial reports and tax system 
adopts Tax law standard lead both to develop in different directions and continue 
serve different users.  
 
This chapter also reviews the literature concerning book tax difference and its 
components namely permanent differences and temporary differences. In addition, 
it provides detailed information about the sources of book tax differences. These 
sources are, first; normal book tax difference, which results from the different in 
adopting different systems and standards in calculating income tax, second, 
earnings managements that result from full provision approach that adopted in the 
UK, which allows managers to anticipate deferred taxes in the future. 
 This anticipation allows room for managerial opportunism. Third, tax 
minimisation, this section divides to three subsections to highlight various aspects 
in this subject, it begins with provide a definition for tax minimisation and review 
the legitimacy of it. Finally, there is a review of empirical studies conducted on 
tax minimisation all around the world. The final section evaluates tax 





CHAPTER THREE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
3.1 Introduction  
Corporate governance mechanisms are an important element in explaining 
managerial behaviour and the adopted monitoring approach that assist in reducing 
the principal-agent conflict. Corporate governance arguably also plays a vital role 
in regulating the level of a company’s engagement in tax minimisation activities. 
Corporate governance research has been a focus of various academic fields such 
as accounting, finance management and economics (Aguilera et al., 2016, 
Filatotchev et al., 2009) and has acquired an international significance after the 
financial crisis in 2008 (Du Plessis, et al., 2018). This is due to rising corporate 
scandals and public protests on excessive executive remuneration (Aguilera et al., 
2016). This chapter presents reviews previous literature on corporate governance 
concerning definitions and theories, as well as institutional context pertinent to the 
research questions. It illuminates the issue of how the literature to date views the 
effect of corporate governance on the relationship between tax minimisation and 
firm value. The theoretical underpinning of this issue lies within the confines of 
agency theory, managerial hegemony theory, shareholder theory, stewardship 
theory, and stakeholder theory, although the focus of the chapter considers the 
opposing concepts embedded within the agency. 
3.2 Corporate Governance Definition 
Corporate governance definition is essential and flexible, allowing itself to evolve 
to meet the changing in the corporate environment (Du Plessis et al., 2018). 
Corporate governance is defined by Cadbury report in 1992 as: 
 “The system by which companies are directed and controlled” (Cadbury, 
1992: P. 15). 
The focus of corporate governance in this definition is considered as a narrow and 
inward-looking method that concentrates mainly in determining internal director-
related rules within the corporation, however, in 2004, the OECD extends 




“The procedures and processes according to which an organisation is 
directed and controlled.  The corporate governance structure specifies the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different participants in 
the organisation such as the board, managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders and lays down the rules and procedures for decision-making” 
(Johnston, 2004: P. 151). 
 
This definition is an outward-looking, more comprehensive and multifaceted 
method that understands corporate governance on a wider scale and adopts a 
perspective beyond the issue of directors’ management and control (Du Plessis et 
al., 2018).   
 
The concepts of corporate social responsibility and corporate citizenship are 
issues dominated in corporate governance debates for many years. Those concepts 
are linked to the good corporation concept and have been of significance to many 
academic in the field since the beginning of the nineties (Du Plessis et al., 2018). 
Nevertheless, the debate has moved from narrowly focusing on corporate social 
responsibility issue to a wider concentration on general corporate responsibility as 
demonstrated in the consultation paper published by the UK Department for 
Business and Innovation skills in 2013: 
 “Corporate responsibility- the increasingly more acknowledge term for 
corporate social responsibility- is the responsibility of an organisation for 
the Impacts of its decisions and activities on society and the environment 
through transparent and ethical behaviour above and beyond its statutory 
requirements” (UK Department for Business and Innovation & Skills, 2013: 
p.3).  
This definition moves the corporation from the narrow aim of making money or 
profit to being responsible to build a better society (especially for large public 
companies) and to demonstrate corporate citizenship. The financial crisis of 2007-
2009 does not indicate the total failure of corporate governance and the problem 
of risk management was due to the failure of system and models used; rather, it is 
more about risk governance and involves ineffective board oversight and 
increasing risk behaviours. The primary cause of the financial crisis occurred due 




impulsive behaviour and companies’ irresponsible activities (Du Plessis et al., 
2018), which is far beyond corporate governance contemporary definition.  This 
view is clearly indicated in the King report in 2009 that represents South African 
and UK views as follows:  
 “The credit crush, and the resulting crisis among leading financial 
institutions, is increasingly presented as a crisis of corporate governance. 
However, although current problems are to an extent indicative of 
shortcomings in the global financial architecture, they should not be 
interpreted as reflecting dysfunction in the broader south African and UK 
corporate governance models where values-based principles are followed 
and governance is applied, not only in form but also, in substance” (King 
Report :P.8). 
 Corporate governance in the contest of tax minimisation activities is considered a 
moderating factor of those activities since it could affect decisions related to the 
engagement in tax saving (Annuar et al., 2014). For instance, a manager of an 
organisation that practices what may be considered good corporate governance 
will take into account tax minimisation activities that increase firm value and 
promote shareholders wealth. However, a manager of a company in which poor 
corporate governance prevails will consider these activities in terms of his self-
interest as acknowledged through agency theory (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009).   
3.3 Agency Theory 
Agency theory in corporate governance explains the agency relationship between 
shareholders (principals) and managers (agents). This relationship involves 
conflicts, as the latter tend to maximise their benefit instead of the former’s 
benefit, and suggests that managers use information asymmetries as an effective 
tool to improve their benefits at shareholders expense (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). This agency relationship arises when the management and control are 
separated, and the existence of information asymmetry between shareholders and 
managers stimulates managers to maximise their wealth. As only managers can 
have more access to the information, this obstructs shareholders’ ability to 




maximise their wealth objectives are their status, remuneration and job security 
(Weir et al., 2002). 
Thus, agency theory stands on the basis that the so-called agency dilemma could 
exist due to the existence of two events. First, the separation between management 
and control results in a conflict of interest between the agent and principal. 
Second, it is difficult to identify the interest conflict between the agent and the 
principal upon a full contract. In the absence of shareholders’ monitoring role with 
the separate ownership and control, managers could divert the firms’ resources 
and endeavour their objectives at shareholders expense (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Hart, 1995).  
The complete and comprehensive contractual relationship between the principal 
and agent could include huge transaction costs, which make it infeasible (Marnet, 
2005)  because the future contingencies are unable to be predicted and controlled, 
thus,  there is residual control right exists for agents to act and make a rational 
decision in these circumstances that are not specified in the contract.  As agents, 
obtain delegated authority their decisions impact both agents and principals 
interests (Williamson, 1988; Hart. 1995). 
 
 In principle, the shareholders hold all the residual control rights, however, they 
are not qualified to exercise the control rights themselves and make a decision, 
due to information asymmetry, that is why they hire the managers to do the work. 
This eventually allows managers to retain considerable residual control rights 
including the right to address shareholders funds on their own decisions (Shleifer, 
and Vishny, 1997). These residual control rights raise managerial opportunism in 
which shareholders shift the profit into managerial discretion and managers utilise 
this discretion to shift the company’s resource to their own (Williamson, 1988).  
 
Controlling agency problems between managers and shareholders is considered a 
significant element for a corporation’s survival (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The best 
solution to mitigate agency problem can be through the perfect monitoring 
system, although, this option is infeasible as the monitoring cost is so high and in 
addition, detailed monitoring could result in unintended outcomes (Marnet, 2005).  




managers’ behaviour with shareholders’ interests.  Moreover, the separation of 
ownership and management contributes to the conflicts of interest, where the 
separation mechanisms can be by hierarchies, independent directors and share 
incentive structures (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
 
The conflict of interest between managers and shareholders with the incomplete 
contract would increase the need for corporate governance to be implemented as a 
mechanism to mitigate this conflict and prevent managerial expropriation of 
investors’ fund, which is a central aspect of agency problem (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). This can be effective through an adequate monitoring system that controls 
incentive conflicts and managers performance in utilising their residual control 
rights and making rational decisions (Hart, 1995).  
 
The purposes of corporate governance mechanisms is to restrict managerial 
discretion and improve formal and informal accountability, also, consider the 
socio-psychological factor that prevents managers from exploring governance 
issues that are hidden in-between spaces (Marnet, 2012). These purposes can help 
in reducing agency problems and aligning between the objectives of managers and 
shareholders.  
 
Extending agency theory to the field of taxation, the evasion of tax is a strategic 
option that might be the preferred choice of managers, explained by the implied or 
actual contract of employment between managers and shareholders to increase 
shareholders wealth. 
 
Therefore, terms of employment may give managerial incentives to exploit 
opportunities in tax management, which may result in personal gain at the expense 
of shareholders. Desai and Dharmapala (2009) demonstrate that employment 
contracts may not be at the optimal level for shareholders for two reasons related 
to tax minimisation. Firstly, their compensation level is not linked with the actual 
effort levels made by managers. Secondly, attempts by managers to decrease the 
tax liabilities of the organisation would involve the internal control system’s 
reliability because any illegal plans of tax evasion would be performed secretly. 




control functions at the shareholders' expense. Applying those processes in 
companies that have a multinational appearance, various types of economic 
legitimacy, and comprising a mixed approach of governance could be difficult, as 
the affiliates are influenced by the headquarters and have to consider the parent 
and the host country’s regime simultaneously. The worldwide trading of MNCs 
and their affiliates (direct investment and majority foreign-based) have increased 
the incentive to voluntary disclosure within companies, as those subsidiaries tend 
to have information asymmetry (Windsor, 2009, Madhani, 2015). Furthermore, 
those subsidiaries tend to formulate their transparency practices and corporate 
governance according to the host country’s regulations, and the institutional 
environment. This combination between parent and host country creates an 
intricate regime, which is difficult to manage (Windsor, 2009).  
 
Corporate governance systems in some countries, such as the UK, US, and 
Australia, are designed to tighten a restricted triple form to combine a company’s 
board, managers, and shareholders, to maximisie their benefits. Corporate 
performance and accountability within these jurisdictions have been the driving 
force behind the financial benefit on behalf of shareholders.  
 
In short, agency theory in corporate governance represents the agency problem 
that occurs due to the agency relationship between principal and agent. Agency 
theory is based on the assumption that agency problems occur in two scenarios, 
first, a conflict of interest exists between principal and agent, where each party 
peruse his own objectives on the others’ expenses. Second, the contract between 
principal and agent is incomplete and does not allocate all the conflict interests. 
Therefore, the principal has to incur agency cost to align their interests with the 
agents’ interests to maintain the company existence. Thus, corporate governance 
mechanisms exist to play a moderating role in reducing agency problems by virtue 





3.4 Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
Due to the existence of information asymmetry, shareholders tend to depend on 
corporate governance mechanisms to ensure that managers operating decisions are 
in line with shareholder interests. Corporate governance mechanisms and tax 
minimisation are interacted in term of managerial opportunism, for example, 
Desai and Dharmapala (2009) argue that the opportunity of managers’ engaging in 
tax minimisation lead to pursue their own interest and this engagement underlying 
complexity and obfuscation around financial information to prevent the detection 
from the tax authority.  
According to Demirag et al. (2000), corporate governance mechanisms can be 
classified as comprising two categories; one is external to the firm that reflects in 
statutory requirements and the markets operation; the other is internal mechanisms 
to the firm and its organisation. External mechanisms include the market for 
corporate control, which considers as the last option mechanism that helps in 
making the assets in more productive use and creates a large benefit for both 
shareholders and the overall economy (Jensen, 1986; Weir et al., 2002). This 
mechanism is existed in hostile takeovers and found to be an effective mechanism 
that utilises as the market valuation for firms’ performance (Demirag et al., 2000; 
Weir et al., 2002). In addition, apart from the previous mechanism Aguilera et al. 
(2016), consider also the legal environment, stakeholder’s activism, rating 
organisation and the media.  
The internal mechanisms, according to Demirag et al. (2000), include board 
composition, managerial shareholders, non-managerial ownership includes 
institutional shareholders. Also among these mechanisms are; director quality, 
committee structure, board monitoring, debt financing, according to Weir et al., 
(2002). They suggest that it is important to increase the awareness of the 
interrelationship between internal and external mechanisms as companies are 
shifting to specific internal governance structures in line with the Code of Best 
Practice.  
In contrast, the internal-external mechanisms distinction is problematic in that 




contradict between service and control duties (Concannon and Nordberg, 2018), 
especially in distinguishing whether shareholders are internal or external. 
Shareholders are considered one of the internal mechanisms because in a 
theoretical sense they are the company’s owner (control), however, they are 
external mechanism as they do not work in the company and they are legally 
separate from it and are not liable for the company’s debts (service).  In this 
instance, this research considers institutional ownership as external because they 
do not work in the company and they are legally separate from it.  
In addition, this study focuses on one external mechanism for monitoring role 
purpose, which is institutional ownership and one internal mechanism, which is 
executive remuneration to examine its impact on tax minimisation strategy and 
firm performance.  
External mechanisms are the mechanisms that act from outside the core of the 
company. Walsh and Seward, (1990) focus on the market for corporate control as 
a significant external mechanism and suggest that external control mechanisms 
are expected to be operated when the internal control failed in controlling 
managerial opportunism. However, Aguilera et al., (2016) argue that market for 
corporate control is not the most significant external mechanisms as there are 
many other that act to make certain that managers work to achieve stakeholders 
interest, ensure stakeholders engaging in a productive relationship, afford 
financial transparency, and provide overall strategic guidance.  These external 
mechanisms are able to immediately influence firms’ governance and the 
efficiency of the internal mechanisms, which are the legal environment, 
stakeholders’ activism, rating organisation and the media. Market for corporate 
control can discipline managers and minimise agency cost (Aguilera et al., 2016) 
through the breakdown of the internal control processes of the firms that have 
considerable free cash flows combined with policies that cause for resources loss 
(Jensen, 1986). However, this work taken after acquisition can generate later 
problems that have large influence on stakeholders; also, the market for corporate 
control cannot resolve corporate governance problems as it faced huge inspection 
and judgment from labour associations, the media, and some significant 




3.5 External Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
3.5.1 Institutional Ownership Monitoring 
Institutional ownership can offer direct monitoring and disciplining upon the 
management team and constrain possible opportunism in policy decision-making 
(Andrikopoulos et al., 2017). Furthermore, active monitoring can put pressure on 
the management to maximise shareholders' benefits. For instance, Sheifer and 
Vishny (1986) state that building large shareholders foundation with a motivation 
to monitor can lead to boosting monitoring management.  
 
The nature of ownership structure in the UK is widely dispersed (Short and 
Keasey, 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002) which due to the existence of takeover 
code and investors protection regulation that serve the minority shareholders 
interest, however, there is a growing concentration of institutional ownership 
(large shareholder) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Sun et al., 2016).  Short and 
Keasey (1999) state that the high level of institutional ownership in the UK 
compared to the US, leads the manager to become more embedded and 
institutional ownership are more able to harmonise their monitoring duties, which 
due to the bankruptcy law precisely implements creditor rights in the case of 
financial crisis above both managers and shareholders. 
 
Large shareholders who are institutional ownership in the UK can play a vital role 
through management monitoring in reducing agency problem and aligning the two 
parties’ interests. However, institutional shareholders could act to achieve their 
own benefits and utilise their authorised rights to increase their own resources on 
minority shareholders account (Hart, 1995). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that 
the law regulation does not provide adequate protection to monitoring large 
shareholders and emphasise the significance of the legal right in protecting 
minority shareholders and monitoring large shareholders, otherwise, in the 
presence of high private benefits of control, large shareholders will dominate 
minority shareholders. In contrast, Coffee (2001) state that strong markets require 
strong legal rules and the UK with the development of the stock exchange market 




legal regulations to bridge the gaps between regulation loopholes. Besides, the 
UK’s Companies Act (2006) adopted adjustments were a reaction to this 
requirement.  
 
Moreover, some studies suggest that institutional shareholders in the UK are 
passive and ineffective in their monitoring role (Goergen and Renneboog, 2001; 
Dong et al. 2008), However, Dong et al. (2008); McNulty and Nordberg (2016) 
categorise institutional shareholders based on the trading characteristics to active 
and passive. Dong et al. (2008), after they split the institutional shareholders' 
sample to active and passive shareholders, they find that active shareholders with 
long- investment can play an important role in monitoring, restraining the 
directors pay level and boosting the pay-performance relationship.   
 
Nordberg (2010) states that active and passive investors are both used in two 
different senses, which relating to the investment approach and investors' 
engagement with the companies. Whilst Investment approach means whether they 
actively select which shares to hold, or passively follow an index, investors’ 
engagement refers to whether investors actively engage with the companies by 
challenging policy, debating strategy or voting; or passively take whatever comes.  
In regards to investors’ engagement, Nordberg (2010) adds that investors are able 
to take three participatory positions concerning their investments, either as a 
general tendency towards their whole portfolio or towards particular shares.  They 
could be passive in their approach to the company, management and the 
company’s strategy. This might include voting with management at the meeting of 
shareholders or may not vote at all. However, active shareholders endeavour to 
impact the direction of the company by using their voting rights to indicate 
dissatisfaction with the company’s strategy or management, while sometimes 
pressing with managers and senior management to change the policy. 
 
Besides institutional ownership, there are also shareholders who are non-executive 
directors (known as outside directors in the US), who can play a vital role in 
monitoring the management and protecting shareholder interests as they are 
independent and do not have any link with the management. Choi and Rabarison 




showing powerful dispute through either opposite opinion and withdraw or hold 
their votes on management proposals. This dispute can have an impact on 
increasing firm performance. This positive impact is suggested since the 
beginning of 1990s, for example, Byrd and Hickman (1992) argue that non-
executive directors can play an important role in monitoring the management 
decision during the process of the bidding tenders’ acquisition during the eighties 
in last century.  
3.5.2 Ownership Structure and Corporate Tax Minimisation 
Agency problems exist in companies with dispersed ownership because of the rise 
of information asymmetry and the existence of interests’ conflict between 
shareholders and managers. Thus, the main purpose of corporate governance in 
this situation is to reduce the managerial incentives from explicit expropriation 
and to boost the conjunction between the two parties’ interests (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976).  
 
The relationship between tax minimisation and ownership appears in the shape of 
managerial stock ownership; in this case, managers are deemed to work in 
achieving shareholders’ interest, which leads to reduce agency costs (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Therefore, managers’ engagement in tax minimisation strategy 
results in increasing both managers and shareholders wealth. Prior research 
conducted on the relationship between tax minimisation and different ownership 
structure such as managerial dual-class share, institutional ownership, 
concentrated and disparate ownership, family ownership, foreign ownership and 
hedge fund ownership. Each of these characteristics seems to have a vital function 
in deciding the tax minimisation level through impacting manager’s decisions and 
behaviour upon tax-saving strategy. In studying the impact of institutional 
ownership on companies’ tax minimisation behaviour, Bird and Karolyi (2017) 
argue that companies with high institutional ownership tend to engage 
aggressively in tax minimisation in particular international tax minimisation 
strategies, such as transfer price and the use of tax haven. This indicates that 
institutional ownership perceives tax minimisation as a value-added and the 




(2009) find that institutional ownership plays a moderating role in the relationship 
between tax minimisation and firm value measured by Tobin’s Q, in which the 
relationship is positive for the companies with a high level of institutional 
ownership as predicted by agency theory. 
3.6 Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
3.6.1 Executive Remuneration and Control 
Executive remuneration is part of the managerial structure, which is one of the 
most significant corporate governance mechanisms that help in reducing the 
agency cost through mitigating principal–agent conflicts. Executive compensation 
functions as incentives for managers to enhance firm value and align their interest 
with shareholders. There is increasing interest in this mechanism especially after 
the financial crisis in 2007-2008 and the results of the empirical studies are mixed 
and inconclusive (Aguilera et al., 2016). This motivates the researcher to adopt 
this mechanism in this study to examine its impact along with institutional 
ownership on the relationship between different tax minimisation components and 
firm value. Aguilera et al. (2016), argue that the lack of empirical findings could 
be due to describing an incomplete picture of governance mechanisms, which pay 
attention only to internal mechanisms and ignore external ones, thus, experiences 
unobserved heterogeneity and faulty specification. Contrarily, other studies find a 
positive relationship between remuneration structure and firm performance, for 
example, Mehran (1995) studies the relationship between compensation and 
ownership structures, control and firm value measures by both Tobin’s Q and 
ROA in a random sample of selected companies and find a positive relationship 
between equity-based compensation, percentage of equity held by executive and 
firm value.  
In addition, the presence of the active shareholders, executive compensation can 
lead to reducing agency cost, for example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), 
argue that executives are remunerated for luck and this luck payment exists more 
on the most discretionary components of compensation, salary and bonus. This 
luck payment is stronger within companies with poor governance, however, the 




they charge CEO more for the options that are granted. These options include gift 
components, due to CEO have a value from the inherent volatility despite their 
effort. In addition, companies with active shareholders and smaller boards are 
better in charging their CEO and better in removing the gift components by 
reducing the other payment components. Moreover, Yermack (1996) also finds 
that small boards are more effective and lead to increase firm value measured by 
Tobin’s Q and as consequences shareholders wealth, also, there is a negative 
relationship between board size and compensation responsiveness to shareholders 
resources. These results are robust to some controls for firms’ size, industry 
membership, managerial ownership, growth opportunity and alternative corporate 
governance structures.  
Theoretically, effective remuneration and executive performance monitoring are 
tools to incentivise manager and align their interest with shareholders (Marnet, 
2005), however, there has been growing concern on the effectiveness of board’s 
monitoring role as the effect of selecting the board members by managers can lead 
to producing ineffective board function (Hermalin and Weisbach 2001; Marnet, 
2005). The effectiveness of the board is limited when it comes to set executive 
remuneration and prevent rent extraction, compare their performance with the 
ideal contracting view, where the director takes a hostile attitude against 
management. Remuneration is subject to market forces and managerial power, in 
which the former is suggested by the ideal contracting view that drives to 
minimising the agency costs and the later drives to achieve managerial rent extract. 
The purpose of setting director remuneration is to mitigate agency problem and 
align between managers and shareholders’ interests, however, remuneration may 
become part of the agency problem and leads to managerial opportunism 
(Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Marnet, 2005).  
 
In term of the influence of non-executive directors on executive remuneration, 
Ryan and Wiggins (2004) argue that the non-executive directors hold a bargaining 
advantage over the CEO, which leads to align executive remuneration with 
shareholder interests. In addition, companies with more independent directors on 
the board, award directors with compensations based on more equity-based, 




executive power increase over the board. For the type of remuneration awarded to 
the executive, Ryan and Wiggins (2004) find that companies with more executive 
and entrenched CEOs adopt less equity-based compensations, moreover, 
companies with entrenched CEOs who are also, board chair are perhaps 
incentivised to replace cash payments with equity.  
There is an argument that companies ignore utilising conceptualised operating 
figures in their financial reports, thus, boards of directors are able to make a 
decision on earnings numbers in determining the executive annual compensation 
(Bushman et al., 2000).  
3.6.2 Executive Remuneration and Agency Cost 
To reduce agency problems some initiatives should be taken to align shareholders’ 
and managers’ interests. These initiatives underlie some costs defined by Jensen et 
al. (1976) as agency costs, which including three costs; first monitoring costs 
endured by shareholders such as the cost of assessing and controlling managers’ 
behaviours through budget restrictions, compensation policies and operating rules. 
Second, bonding costs incurred by the managers such as financial and non-
financial costs and the residual loss that occur due to the difference between the 
manager’s decisions and the decisions that would maximise principal resources.  
In general, tax minimisation strategy could lead to increase in after-tax income 
and maintain long-term tax benefits for shareholders, thus, this could incentivise 
shareholders to induce executives on the involvement in tax minimisation strategy 
and increase their after-tax resources. Some research has examined the 
relationship between tax minimisation opportunities and both before and after-tax 
decisions of performance measures executive compensation plan in the short term. 
For example, Atwood et al (1998) find that companies that have higher 
opportunities of tax minimisation activities choose after tax performance measures 
to make sure executives deem the results of tax strategy and operational decisions. 
Atwood et al (1998) state four factors that influence tax minimisation investments 
according to prior research, these factors are firm size, foreign operating, capital 
intensity and the number of operating sections, which have a positive relationship 




3.6.3 Executive Remuneration and Tax Minimisation 
A better understanding of how tax impact executive remuneration could provide 
beneficial perception in answering essential questions in both corporate and public 
finance (Bird, 2018). For instance, the nature of the procedure deciding executive 
remuneration has been a debate in corporate governance subject. Nonetheless, 
because of increasing income inequality and attention upon governance budget 
deficiency, policymaker and the public have become progressively attentive in 
increasing the progressive method in the tax system. This can reflect the reaction 
of high-income earners such as executive to such progressivity at both individual 
and company level (Bird, 2018). Changing the tax rate leads the company to 
choose the structure of remuneration package, in which each of the package 
components might be taxed in a various method with different non-tax costs and 
benefits to the company and managers (Bird, 2018).   
As far as tax expenses is a concern, the company’s target is that of reducing tax 
expenses and lower the effective tax rate (ETR) through tax minimisation strategy, 
thus, executives will be compensated for their effort to achieve this target. Hence, 
executives are expected to effectively manage this strategy to achieve tax 
minimisation target and their role conditions with shareholders. Some studies find 
that engaging in tax minimisation activities leads to reduce ETR and increase 
executive remuneration, which indicates that executives are provided with 
incentives to generate tax saving from reducing tax expenses reported in the 
financial statement (Armstrong et al., 2012).  
 
In explaining the relationship between executive remuneration method and tax 
minimisation, Gaertner (2014) examines the after-tax CEO incentives and 
corporate tax minimisation and finds a negative relationship between after-tax 
CEO remuneration and effective tax rate. However, there is a positive relationship 
between cash-based remuneration and the adoption of after-tax based 
remuneration, which explains the executive are rewarded for taking on additional 
remuneration risk. In addition, the annual bonus considers as one of the 
mechanisms utilises by companies to reduce tax risk, however, it's not the most 




managers to minimise tax exposure up to market price, reflects tax minimisation 
activities. In addition, as executives are required to prepare two different income 
reports, accounting and taxable income, thus, executives could tend to report a 
high accounting income as an incentive for potential investors, attract better debt 
contracts and increase their remuneration, however, they tend to report a low 
taxable income to conserve shareholders resource from transferring to the tax 
authority. 
 
In understanding the difference engagements in tax minimisation strategy between 
private and public companies, there is some thought that the likelihood of 
engaging in tax minimisation strategy by managers in public companies is less 
than in private companies. This is due to public companies relying excessively on 
equity finance from the external capital market, which demands managers’ 
performance-based remuneration to reduce agency conflict between managers and 
shareholders. Thus, those managers are required to increase the financial 
accounting income reported to the capital market. Nevertheless, as the UK 
markets for public and private companies are fundamentally different, managers 
in private companies with concentrate ownership can discuss firm performance 
information and tax minimisation activities effectively, in a method not through 
the financial statement (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).  
Thus, the pressure of reporting higher income to the capital market is lower, also, 
the contracting with managers and creditors is based on information not in the 
financial statements (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Therefore, private companies 
are more able to report lower earnings to engage in tax minimisation through 
transactions leads to a decline of both figures of accounting and taxable income 





This chapter represents corporate governance knowledge and discusses some 
concepts related to the research subject. It begins with the expansion of corporate 
governance definition overtime and highlights agency theory, which is the main 
theory that adopted for this research. In addition, it explains the internal and 
external corporate governance mechanisms and shed light on the controversial 
distinction between internal and external mechanisms.  This chapter focus on the 
two main mechanisms that adopted in this research namely institutional ownership 
as an external mechanism and executive remuneration as an internal mechanism, 
and review their relationship with tax minimisation in agency theory context. The 
role that corporate governance plays on the relationship between tax minimisation 




CHAPTER FOUR: CORPORATE TAX MINIMISATION, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM VALUE 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter reviews tax minimisation and corporate governance mechanisms and 
investigates their impact on firm value. The impact of both tax minimisation and 
corporate governance on firm value is associated with both cost and benefits as 
explained by agency theory in which the cost is due to the conflict of interests 
between managers and shareholders because of the existence of information 
asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Desai and Dharmapala, 2009). Corporate 
governance uses a series of mechanisms to mitigate agency problem, which lead 
to align the principal- agent interest and consequently increase shareholders 
wealth that in turn can be reflected in firm value. Thus, this chapter shed lights on 
literature concerning the influence of both tax minimisation and corporate 
governance mechanisms on firm value.   
4.2 The Perception of Shareholders and Firm Value 
Conventionally, shareholder’s value increases when companies engage in tax 
minimisation activities, although a more accurate prediction is provided by an 
agency approach on tax minimisation in which corporate governance is viewed as 
a significant determinant of tax savings valuation. Tax minimisation increases 
firms’ after-tax value and is linked to the standards of governance where, for 
instance, poorly governed companies may compromise this value due to 
increasing managerial opportunism. Therefore, the impact of tax minimisation in 
firm value is greater for well governed companies (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009). 
The Companies Act 2006 forces a duty on directors to promote the success of the 
company and in so doing increase shareholders wealth. From the shareholders 
perspective, success can be measured by profitability (Cho et al., 2019), and that 
profitability can be measured in a variety of ways, two of which are employed in 




4.2.1 Market Value Measured by Tobin’s Q and Firm Valuation 
Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the company market value to the replacement 
cost of the net tangible assets (Brainard and Tobin, 1968). It is an indicator of a 
profit rate that can be determined by the difference between the predicted rate of 
return on assets and the measured supply cost of assets based on market 
expectations (Chan-Lee, 1986). The valuation ratio embodies the current financial 
market prediction, which is deemed to be one of the main benefits of this ratio.  
Tobin’s Q measures the company’s valuation from the shareholders perspective 
(La Porta et al., 2002), in studying Tobin’s Q as an indicator for firm 
performance, Wolfe and Sauaia (2003) suggest that Tobin’s Q can be a more 
meaningful method in evaluating the company’s comparative performance. It also 
offers the ability to determine whether as an ancillary or final indicator can 
provide useful information concerning management successfulness in operating 
the assets under its control, the potential growth and identifying the company’s 
ability in capturing investment opportunities.     
Tobin’s Q is widely utilised in the financial literature as a proxy for future 
investment opportunities and future performance. Fu et al. (2016), state that the 
numerator of the rate (market value) relies on discounted predicted future cash 
flows created by the company’s assets. As the denominator is, the replacement 
cost of the assets is articulated in present value, there is a positive relationship 
between company’s Tobin’s Q and future cash flows; in addition, they find that 
higher Tobin’s Q ratio is associated to higher future operating performance.     
This ratio is also widely utilised in corporate governance research in order to 
examine the relationship between managerial ownership and firm value (Morck et 
al., 1988). Moreover, Yin et al. (2018), examine the importance of monitoring for 
the institutional ownership and firm value measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q, find 
that institutional ownership’s monitoring approach improves firm value. 
Furthermore, they find that the increase in long term shareholders lead to enhance 
firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q, and ROA.  
 In investigating the impact of information technology on financial market as 
measure of firm performance, Bharadwaj et al., (1999) find a significant positive 




addition, Kim  and Bettis, (2014) study the relationship between firm performance 
and cash holding for over 63,000 firm year observations for US companies from 
1987 to 2009 and find that their shareholders value cash holding and also, the 
potential benefit of cash holding could lead to more investment and job growth. In 
addition, La Porta et al. (2002), argue that firm valuation measured by Tobin’s Q 
is higher in two factors - countries that have a stronger protection of minority 
shareholders and companies with higher cash flow ownership through controlling 
shareholders.  
4.2.2 Market Efficiency Theory 
Market efficiency theory explains the influence of stock information on the 
securities markets. The widely held view is that in an informationally efficient 
market the increase of information leads to the spread of the news quickly which, 
in consequence is fully reflected in the stock prices. Fama (1970) explains this 
assumption in which an efficient capital market comprises the information fully 
and immediately reflects on the stock prices. This theory is still relevant and 
advocated in research concerning explaining stock price movements. For example, 
Malkiel (2005) examines the efficiency of the market in adapting accurately to 
new information over a period of 30 years.  He finds that professional investment 
managers do not beat their index benchmarks and generally market price reflects 
full available information. Even though there are, several studies that support the 
market efficiency assumption in describing stock market behaviour (Fama, 1970; 
Malkiel, 2003; Malkiel, 2005) there are other studies providing evidence about the 
inefficiency of the stock market in reflecting the available information due in 
large part to a delay in stock price responses to event announcements. This delay 
in price responses is due to the information delivered in low investors’ attention 
time or this information is less prominent (Klibanoff et al., 1998; Hirshleifer et al., 
2013). For example, Campbell and Shiller, (2001) examine the application of two 
forecasting variables for stock market namely, price earnings and dividend price 
ratios utilising annual US data from 1971 to 2000 and quarterly data for 12 
countries from 1970. They provide evidence that the ratios are beneficial in 
forecasting the movements of future stock prices comparing to the simple efficient 




and immediately companies’ information that related to performance and future 
potentials, thus, the companies’ valuation underlying in stock prices by market 
participants will be irrational, which leads to the unreliability on stock price as a 
measure to reflect the reliable information that explains firm value (Holthausen 
and Watts, 2001).  
To conclude that stock market prices manifest shareholders valuation as these 
prices reflect full and available information about companies’ performance, it is 
essential to presume that stock markets are technically efficient in transforming 
the available information to indicate the value of the companies.  
4.2.3 Return on Assets as a Measure of Firm Performance 
The Return on Assets ratio has also been utilised widely in previous research as a 
measure of firm profitability or firm performance (Deloof, 2003; Maury and 
Pajuste, 2005; Li et al., 2016; Dary and James, 2019). ROA prevents the potential 
distortion generated by financial strategies such as artificially maintaining a good 
level of return to shareholders and concealing a decline in companies’ 
performance. Thus, ROA captures whether a company can generate sufficient 
return on assets instead of only presenting robust return on sales (Hagel, Brown 
and Davison, 2010). In addition, ROA indicates a company’s ability in finding 
attractive opportunities related to their assets and is an important determinant of 
growth opportunities and economic growth (Dary and James, 2019). Hence, ROA 
is not a perfect measurement; however, it is the most efficient, widely available 
method to evaluate corporate performance compared to the Return on Equity 
(ROE) ratio that ignores the impacts of leverage and provides an incomplete view 
of companies’ performance. Moreover, ROA is a backward indicator, as its route, 
provides perception in the quality of previous managers’ decisions and encourages 
testing the basic decisions and their hypotheses (Hagel et al., 2013).   
Yates and Firer (1997) argue that the variance in ROA reflects the volatility of 
earnings and can be a better financial ratio indication of the future firm 
performance as a guide to investors. Additionally, ROA and the volatility of these 
returns provide a significant explanation of the perceived risk and recognised as 




examine the influence of multiple shareholders on firm valuation measured by 
Tobin’s Q and ROA, find that equal allocation of large block-holders votes has a 
positive influence on firm value. They also argue that Tobin’s Q and ROA are the 
main measures of firm performance and they provide similar results, however, 
some ROA parameter estimates are less significant. Likewise, Maury and Pajuste 
(2005) examine the impact of trade credit investment on firm performance 
measured by both Tobin’s Q as a market-based measure and ROA as a non-
market measure for listed agro-food companies in the US from 2001 to 2014. 
They find that trade credit investments positively influence firm value utilising 
both measures. 
4.2.4 Value Relevance and Firm Valuation 
The market efficiency hypothesis assumes that firm value reflects the current 
value of the anticipated value of future cash flows that decrease at a suitable risk-
adjusted return (Kothari, 2001). Hence, the accounting amount could be 
significant for the users of financial information, whether this amount is related to 
the current company’s stock market value or reflects future cash flows. This is due 
to a significant relationship between the accounting amount and current stock 
market value of a company with estimated future cash flows provides an 
explanation to measure firm value based on a company’s profitability and 
performance. Thus, this amount could be beneficial to enhance investors’ 
decisions in valuing companies’ equity and can be defined as value relevant 
(Barth et al., 2001; Kothari, 2001).  
Therefore, the main central point of value relevant literature is to determine the 
usefulness of accounting amount in providing reliable information that is relevant 
for companies’ valuation. This can be achieved by implementing various 
valuation approaches to examine the relationship between the accounting amount 
and a specific benchmark variable that reflects stock prices (Barth et al., 2001; 
Holthausen and Watts, 2001).   
The aim of value relevance studies is to examine the relevance of accounting 
amount and the reliability as indicated in share prices. The share prices can be an 




which are the two main criteria and objectives used by FASB as defined in its 
conceptual framework.   The conceptual framework articulates that the accounting 
information is relevant if it can make a difference to the decisions of the financial 
statement users and it is reliable if it represents what it aims to represent (Barth, 
2000; IASB, 2018, para 2.4).  
 
To conclude that the main aim of value relevance studies is to empirically 
examine the relevance and reliability of accounting amount in presenting 
beneficial information that can help users in their companies’ valuation. The 
accounting amount is deemed as value relevant if it relates to some value 
measures such as stock price or future cash flows (Barth, 2000). Whilst, 
considering the stock prices as a standard to examine the value relevance of 
accounting amount, the capital market should be assumed as an efficient in 
providing information that reflects firm value.   
4.3 Tax Minimisation, Corporate Governance and Firm Value 
Tax minimisation is linked to the principles of social responsibility that aim to 
offer the benefits to all stakeholders, rather than simply fulfilling the demands of 
the regulations and manipulating the rules to increase shareholder wealth or 
managerial interests (Hoi et al., 2013). However, tax minimisation is a creative 
activity that may lead to the prevention of exaggerated company tax payments, 
whilst considering the alignment with regulation and legislation. The future 
horizon of tax minimisation is to achieve the optimum level of tax benefit at 
acceptable tax risk, taking into account social responsibility and related ethical 
issues. In his famous quote, Hand, the judge (1947) explains an approach for 
identifying tax liability in cases of carelessness in court case decision the United 
States vs., Carrol Towing co. His interpretations of the complicated internal 
revenue codes have been influenced as examples to distinguish between personal 
and corporate tax.  
 “Over and over again, courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so 
arranging one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does 
so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay 




contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is mere cant.” (Judge 
Learned Hand, 1947). 
Tax minimisation is a controversial subject and is one in which companies must 
pay their contribution to society and play their role as a matter of morality and 
social responsibility. On the other hand, managers should be knowledgeable in tax 
minimisation to play an important role in drawing up a suitable method of tax 
minimisation that coincides with the business plan to utilise the financial 
resources in reinvestment strategy decisions. In contrast, tax authorities should 
consider the priority of the nation and the wellbeing of its citizens now and for 
future generations (Manabat, 2016). 
Desai and Dharmapala (2009) examine the impact of book-tax gaps on the 
valuation of U.S companies and argue that tax minimisation advantages do not 
appear to be recognised by investors in the case of companies with a high level of 
governance. However, companies with a low level of governance seem to engage 
in managerial diversion (the act of diverting a company’s resources to private 
benefit) through the aggressiveness of their tax strategy. Nevertheless, in studying 
the relationship between institutional differences and the use of tax havens, 
Bennedsen and Zeume (2015) find that companies with a higher corporate tax rate 
and powerful corporate governance are more likely to use tax havens, even where 
controls exist for economic advancement. It is obvious that when the average 
income tax rate is high, tax savings are valuable; what is more, seizure requires 
more complex systems at the point when corporate governance is high. Therefore, 
the purpose of engaging in tax minimisation activity goes beyond tax saving to the 
entrenchment purpose, which relates to firm complexity, and may reduce 
shareholder value.  
Chen et al. (2010), in explaining how ownership structure and corporate 
governance affect a firm’s tax minimisation behaviour, state that companies with 
institutional shareholders rely less on tax minimisation activities if they perceive 
that these activities advocate managerial entrenchment and increase opacity. Thus, 
the long-term institutional shareholders affect the level of tax minimisation 




managerial entrenchment and prohibit the use of tax minimisation for rent 
diversions (Moser, 2013).  
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) examine the relationship between tax minimisation 
and ownership structures that generate agency costs and find no obvious 
explanation for the changes in tax minimisation in the literature. They call for 
further investigation of the agency costs and ownership structure and their impact 
on tax minimisation by accounting researchers. Theoretically, tax minimisation 
increases firm value and promotes shareholder wealth. However, companies with 
institutional ownership tend to discourage tax minimisation decisions in order to 
prevent managerial opportunism and information opacity.    
Kim et al. (2011) investigated a large sample of US companies from 1995 to 2008 
while studying the relationship between tax minimisation and the risk of the future 
share price crash. They find that tax minimisation makes it easier to withhold bad 
news for long periods; however, on the release of the accumulated bad news the 
resulting outcome leads to stock price crashes. It could therefore be argued that 
concealment policies are detrimental to firm value and that the requirement of the 
UK corporate governance code for transparency should be observed, thereby 
better serving all interests.  
This result aligns with the view that tax minimisation encourages managerial 
entrenchment, and discourages new accumulation for a period of time, by 
furnishing instruments and rationalisation for these behaviours (Chen et al., 2010; 
Desai and Dharmapala, 2009). In addition, they explain that there is alleviation, in 
that positive relationships exist between tax minimisation and the risk of stock 
price crash in the case of companies with robust outside control systems like high 
analyst coverage, high institutional ownership and powerful takeover threat. This 
resonates with the findings of Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) who state that stock 
markets react negatively towards news related to companies’ engagement in tax 
minimisation; however, this negativity attenuates with strong corporate 
governance. Blaufus et al. (2016), examine tax minimisation and stock price 
reactions for 139 tax news items concerning large multinational companies in 
Germany for 2013-2014. In distinguishing between tax minimisation and tax 




cumulative abnormal returns to 0.54%. They explained that focusing on tax 
minimisation news with efficient tax saving raised the cumulative abnormal 
returns to 0.75%. This indicates that shareholders value tax minimisation activities 
and confirms that managers are acting positively in shareholders’ interest. 
Furthermore, shareholders perceive a positive reputation resulting from tax 
minimisation engagement. This highlights the remarkable positive reaction 
towards tax minimisation news when the reputation of companies is high.    
In alignment with the evidence that corporate governance moderates the 
relationship between tax minimisation and firm value, Li et al. (2016), investigate 
whether the variety of firm board independence levels that results from board 
reforms demonstrates the extent of tax minimisation activities adopted by 
companies. They find that board reforms comprising board and audit committee 
independence, and reforms, which isolate the roles of board chairman and chief 
executive, reduce the level of tax minimisation. When insufficient discipline is 
imposed on managers, it encourages them to play safely, avoiding projects which 
cost them more effort to prevent underlying risks. On the other hand, when 
sufficient discipline is imposed, this encourages managers to engage in more 
effort and more risky projects, with consequently more value to tax minimisation 
activities (Armstrong et al, 2015). Examining the relationship between tax 
minimisation and firm value with respect to board reforms, they find corporate 
governance has a strong impact through board reforms, which leads to a 
significant positive relationship between tax minimisation and firm value. They 
explain that board reforms reduce agency problems relating to opportunistic tax 
minimisation engagement, which enhances positive association between tax 
minimisation and firm value, as consistent with (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009; 
Desai and Dharmapala, 2005; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006).  
These studies advocate the positive effect of tax minimisation on firm value and 
perceive it as an enhancement of shareholders’ wealth in the context of corporate 
governance. This activity is compliant with relevant codes and legislation, despite 
the defeat of the ethical perspective in determining such a strategy (Davies, 2015). 
This positive effect of the minimising of tax involves various risks, which 
reverses the positive factor of its activity. Blaufus et al. (2016), find that market 




reaction to tax minimisation news when the level of company’s tax risk is high. 
However, the reaction to tax minimisation news is remarkably positive for 
companies with high reputations (measured by advertising expenses and media 
coverage). In addition, the moderation effect of corporate governance in this study 
does not appear to be based on stock price reactions to tax minimisation news. 
Moreover, they find that tax minimisation does not incur significant agency costs. 
Similarly, when Huesecken et al. (2016), study the capital market reaction 
towards tax minimisation in Luxleaks events12 for a specific period of time, they 
do not find any relationship between news disclosure and potential penalties’ risk, 
with separation of reputation risk as the main reason for the negative market 
response. In line with that, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) emphasise that the 
positive market response can be derived from strong corporate governance. Wang 
(2011) documents this positive reaction of the market is weakened when 
transparency is reduced.  
This study focuses on the UK listed companies in particular the constituents of the 
FTSE 350 index, as those companies have to obey the same regulations in 
disclosing the information related to tax and corporate governance in their annual 
report. Additionally, those companies have considerable capacity to engage in 
long run tax minimisation. This study, limited to the period of 2014 - 2016, when 
the UK corporate tax rate reduced to 21% in 2014 and 20% 2016, seeks to 
investigate whether this reduction in tax rate has any impact on BTDs and whether 
BTDs in this period has any effect on firm value.  
The above-stated predictions and assumptions of this research are based on two 
different theories, one each from taxation and corporate governance: The Scholes-
Wolfson framework (1992) and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The 
Scholes and Wolfson model calls decision makers to take into consideration three 
vital concepts of effective tax minimisation all of which are contract parties 
namely managers, shareholders and other stakeholders; furthermore all implicit 
and explicit taxes and all costs (financial reporting, agency) are relevant (Scholes 
and Wolfson, 1992). They go on to state that companies may defer profit to 
 
12  In November 2014, hundreds of advance tax rulings information related to multinational 
companies was published by the International Consortium, Investigative Journalists. This 
unexpected announcement of confidential tax information was publicly called the Luxembourg 




anticipate in the period of tax rate declines using different methods, however, this 
profit shifting strategy can be applied based on the consideration of the specific 
time of the year. In term of all parties, companies in their tax minimisation 
strategy cannot reduce tax without impacting other organisational objectives 
(Scholes et al., 2016).  However, some stakeholders’ reaction may be positive 
towards engagement in tax minimisation if this activity increases after-tax return, 
or in a worst scenario, the reaction will not be negative (Hanlon and Slemrod, 
2009). Another view to consider is that some stakeholders appreciate and have 
high regard for tax minimisation, others do not, the result of which may make the 
effect on companies’ reputation equal zero (Rego and Wilson, 2012). In the 
context of total taxes payable and total related costs, managers should consider 
those competing views of key stakeholders when they engage in tax activity to 
achieve the optimal goal of tax minimisation that results in the maximising of 
after-tax cash flow. In this instance managers should balance between the benefits 
and the costs that include in tax minimisation to prevent the reputation risk that 
underlying in engaging in tax reduction (Gallemore et al., 2014).  
In addition, managers need also to consider the principal-agent dilemma as tax 
costs. This dilemma arises from the split between ownership and control (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976), and conflicts of objectives and information asymmetry 
between the ownership party and the control party that causes the absence of tax 
minimisation information for shareholders. This absence may affect shareholders’ 
valuation to the tax risk and prevent tax authorities from detecting this activity. 
Therefore, this scenario could result in managerial opportunism and transfer the 
benefits to managers instead of shareholders (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009). 
Jensen and Meckling, (1976) in their paper concerning agency theory explain that 
risk as a conflict of interest between principle and agent that occurs as a result of 
the interest conflict between the objectives of both parties.  
Agency theory posits that shareholders incur agency cost to align the conflict of 
interests between managers and shareholders that appear as a result of the 
complexity of the contract setting between the two parties (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) and the contradictory objectives of the parties. Thus, the negative valuation 
of tax minimisation by shareholders could vary if there is an effective corporate 




to an appropriate code.  The presence of these mechanisms could affect tax 
minimisation decisions and provide some information to support shareholders in 
assessing tax minimisation strategy (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009). 
 
The Scholes-Wolfson and agency theories are considered to provide insight into 
basic justifications and predictions in respect of the purpose of this research. This 
examines the relationship between different methods of tax minimisation and firm 
value whilst considering corporate governance mechanisms as a moderating role 
of this relationship. The intricacies of this relationship are considered from two 
perspectives.  First, the relationship between tax minimisation and firm value is 
tested to obtain a deeper perception inside shareholder’s valuation of the different 
methods of tax minimisation. Second, the relationship between tax minimisation, 
firm value and corporate governance are examined to better understand the impact 
of corporate governance in the first relationship.  
The table below summarises some of the key theories, models and frameworks 
contained within the literature pertaining to tax minimisation, corporate 








Table 0-1: Summarises Some Key Theories, Models and Frameworks. 
Authors and 
Scholars 










Setting dummy variable 
for Tax avoidance news, 
Reputation risk 
(advertising), and family 
firm dummy 
Cumulative abnormal 
Return (total shareholder 
returns obtained from 
DataStream, using market 
model 
_______ Positive abnormal return for tax avoidance news. 
There is no reputation effect of T.M, but positive 
Market reaction to T.M news is related to high 
reputation risk 










returns: Market model 
and adjusted model 
Tm. Measured by Cash 
effective tax rate (tax 
paid/pre-tax income), and 
TM measured by total 
income taxes/special items 
adjusted pre-tax income  
_____ Significant positive accumulated returns for firms 
referred to more information about T.M and boosted 
tax certainty, exceeds the negative effect of potential 
reputation costs. 





from the OECD 
Tax on pre-tax earnings 
measured at the statutory 
rate minus taxes actually 
paid expresses as a pre-
tax earnings percentage.  
Firm value measured by 
Tobin’s q (market equity 
value+ book liabilities 
value (-deferred tax 






separation of the 
chairman and CEO 
position 
A significant decrease in TM. After major board 
reforms. Negative (positive) relationship between TM. 

















and board characteristics 
TM measures by two 
proxies; EndFin48Bal (the 
ending balance of the 
firm's uncertain tax 
benefit) and TAETR (the 
difference between the 
firm's three-year average 
GAAP effective tax rate)  
Changing in the 





A positive relationship between financial development 
and board independent for low tax minimisation and 





listed in LSE 
2005-2007 
TM=firm’s STR- ETR, 
TM components: tax 
loses, permanent diff., 
temporary diff, FOR tax 
differentials, unclassified 
items 




Shareholders do not value TM, and negative 
relationship between TM and FV 




Firm value: natural log of 
equity and market to 
book ratio. 
ETR, CETR, book tax gap Dummy of founding 
family member 
holding a position in 
top, dummy of 
family blockholder 
Firm value has been measured to control the 
substantial effect on the relationship between tax 






Tax minimisation: Scaled 
book tax difference, 
interaction variables 
(Institutional ownership 
and book tax difference) 
Tobin’s Q Institutional 
ownership  
No relationship between firm value and tax 
minimisation without institutional ownership variable. 
Significant relationship between TM   and firm value 
in firms with high institutional ownership. Positive 





















Share price decreases when there is news about 
engaging in tax minimisation. This decline is 





From the table above, the apparent conclusion is that theoretically, tax 
minimisation increases firm value, but this result is more significant in the 
presence of strong corporate governance. Considering corporate governance, the 
obvious question is what influences it? The answer is that many factors may affect 
corporate governance and in consequence affect the relationship between tax 
minimisation and firm value. Board composition as an internal mechanism could 
affect the level of tax minimisation engagement by a company; the quality and 
quantity of information disclosure as well as institutional ownership monitoring 
role, as external mechanisms, can have a vital impact on tax minimisation 
activities, along with capital market reaction towards this disclosure. Institutional 
context, and managers’ characteristics and behaviour, determine their engagement 
in aggressive tax minimisation.  
 
To summarise, the hypotheses of this research built on two assumptions based on 
the reviewed literature, first there is a relationship between different tax 
minimisation components and firm value, and second, this relationship is 
moderated by internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. This is 






4.4 Conclusion  
This chapter summarises the current knowledge within the literature related to the 
topic of tax minimisation and corporate governance mechanisms on firm value. 
This chapter begins with identifying different firm value measurements and 
supports this explanation with evidence from the literature. Firm value can be 
measured either though market measurement which is Tobin’s Q and non-market 
measurement (firm performance) utilising ROA, which is identified by some 
scholar as firm performance. The following section then provides a deeper 
understanding of the impact of both tax minimisation and corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm value. The next chapter underpins this institutional 





CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter addresses the research methodology proposed for this study.  It 
begins with a discussion related to philosophical considerations, the research 
approach and strategy. The chapter further outlines the author’s personal 
philosophical perspectives related to ontology, epistemology, axiology and the 
research paradigm in order to justify and underpin the methodology adopted and 
the reasons why this research is appropriate for the particular paradigm in 
question. The last section considers hypothesis development and the means by 
which that will be tested and how the hypotheses connect to the research model.   
5.2 Research Philosophy 
5.2.1 Defining the Research Philosophy 
To grasp a fundamental understanding behind a given research philosophy it is 
necessary to consider the research paradigm. Regards to Cohen et al. (2000), a 
research paradigm defines the wider view through which beliefs, perception and 
understanding of different theories and applications are utilised to undertake the 
research can be fully understood. While it cannot be said to be a methodology, it is 
however a philosophy that guides and steers the means by which the research will 
be conducted (Gliner and Morgan, 2000).  Expanding on this, Sayer (2011: P.16) 
writes: 
“One of the challenges of social science is to explain social phenomena in a 
way which acknowledges the importance of social structures and contexts 
without ignoring their ethical implications”. 
Research philosophy describes the researcher’s unique world view and the vital 
assumptions the researcher makes about the nature of reality. Those assumptions 
inform and direct the research methodology used to conduct a research (Saunders 




of research assumptions within two broad categories, firstly, theory philosophy 
(epistemology and ontology) and secondly, research paradigms (methodology and 
methods).  
5.2.2 Ontology  
Philosophy in its widest sense is concerned with the nature of reality and the 
individual’s perceptions of that reality, whether this reality is an objective external 
truth or alternatively, a subjective fabrication of our imagination (Burrell and 
Morgan 1979). It is the beliefs held by a researcher about the nature of reality and 
its association with individual situations that is the backbone and the cornerstone 
that supports our assumptions.  Ontology in social science can be considered as 
binary groups of opposing beliefs, namely those of Objectivism and Subjectivism. 
Objectivism occupies a reality where the world has substantial structure or 
templates (Seibt 2018, Oats 2012). This reality is free of the beliefs and 
perceptions relating to the behaviours of social actors (Howell 2013, Saunders et 
al. 2012). In contrast, Subjectivism considers reality existing as a consequence of 
social actors’ perceptions and beliefs.  Thus, for the subjectivist researcher to 
understand the nature of reality there is a prerequisite to study the details of the 
subject that caused the phenomena and incidents (Saunders et al. 2012).  
5.2.3 Epistemology  
Epistemology considers the validity of evidence and knowledge that endorses 
reality and explores the causality between observable phenomena and the 
interpretations of meaning. Epistemology is concerned with the study and 
development of knowledge to distinguish between opinions and the justified belief. 
In social sciences, for example, epistemology considers that researcher undertakes 
a research project within the limits of a specific ontology that includes some of 
philosophical assumptions about the basic knowledge and its communication 
between individuals (Creswell, 2013; Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Epistemology is 
all about accessing specific knowledge required by executives in order to take a 
decision and the efficiency of the information system in providing this knowledge 




Epistemological assumptions can be categorised in two opposing elements: 
Positivism and non-positivism in the context of the competing ontologies 
described earlier (Oats, 2012, Easterby-Smith et al. 2012). Positivist researchers 
believe that an external reality exists and considers reality as an objective entity; 
the corollary is that hypotheses are developed from existing theories, examining 
the causality, effects and relationships through observation and measurement 
using “scientific” experiment (Howell, 2013). Non-positivism, understands reality 
through the study of conscious experience that is the result of the unique manner 
in which the individual will perceive activity through actions and reactions 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012).  
5.2.4 Axiology 
Axiology considers the value and beliefs pertaining to individuals and, with 
regard to the nature of any research, will determine specifically whether the 
individual allows his or her values to impinge upon the process and outcome 
(Saunders et al. 2012).  Sayer (2011) takes up this point and discusses ethical 
theories that consider real-life situations and explains social phenomena through 
merging ethics with social science, which relate to social structures applicable to 
everyday life. The positivist perceives the world as external reality and as such 
endeavours to conduct value-free research therefore asserting the independence of 
the researcher such as would be the case of the “white gloved” scientist. The 
alternative phenomenological position considers the researcher’s axiology as 
being value laden, when, for example, he or she interviews a subject there is an 
engagement and an involvement that is not and cannot be totally detached.  
5.3 Methodology and Methods 
Choosing the research framework is the precursor to determining a methodology 
and then adopting appropriate methods. The framework explains the approaches 
used to emphasise the credibility of the research findings, through contextualising 
theory within practice. Hence, the philosophical assumptions and the researcher’s 





The philosophical assumptions and the stance of the researcher are considered in 
the foregoing section of this study. The researcher’s understanding of the nature 
of reality, acceptable knowledge, and his or her values have a significant effect on 
the research design and methodology.  
5.4 Author’s Assumptions 
The author’s ontological and epistemological stance is that of positivism, and the 
nature of this study is consistent with those positions as it concentrates upon the 
relationship between tax minimisation and firm value and therefore the data 
collection is concerned with an observable reality. The nature of reality in this 
research is that the resources are external to the procedure of data collection and 
empirical research. Tax minimisation issues and firm value already exist in firms. 
Thus, this research considers this reality in order to enhance a comprehensive 
perception of the relationship and improve the prediction of firm’s future value. 
This research generates law-like generalisations in searching for associations and 
possibly causal relationships in the data. This research is conducted in a value-free 
context, where the data were collected from companies’ websites and other 
different authoritative sources with the researcher remaining independent from the 
companies under observation.  
 
In addition, the ontology relating to this research tends to be allied with realism, a 
view that argues that companies have a neutral existence and assumes that 
observing phenomena exclusively could inform the research with credible data. 
Hence, the phenomena of tax minimisation and firm value are observed externally 
free of executives and shareholders’ perceptions and their individual actions are 
not examined. Also, as this study is value-free, so the relationship between tax 
minimisation and firm value is free of the influence of the research.  
5.5 Research Approach 
The appropriate selection of method and approach used to conduct a research 
study is germane in reaching both a definition of the research questions and 
reaching a defensible conclusion related to the findings of the research. The 




secondly, the deductive approach. In the case of an inductive approach, the 
researcher begins by making an observation, and then he will be able to collect 
data from different sources. Based on the findings of his research, the researcher 
can develop a theory. The deductive approach is based on research conducted 
after developing hypotheses from different sources of literature, journals and 
academic papers. Based on the findings of these sources, the researcher then tests 
and support the underpinning theory (Alqunayeer and Zamir, 2015).  
The research approach forms the action plan to address the questions posed in a 
research study. It starts from the problem definitions, and proceeds to the final 
stage, where a conclusion can be drawn. Several researchers see it as the plan, 
structure and strategy for investigating research problems/questions (Smith, 2011, 
Creswell, 2013, Naoum, 2013). A positivist ontology will invariably use a 
quantitative approach to address a research study (Fellows and Liu, 2015, Bryman, 
2016, Newman and Benz, 1998) employing a systematic, controlled, empirical 
technique of examining data about natural phenomena. This approach best suits 
the underlying philosophical nature of this current study. The deductive approach 
follows the path shown below: 










Figure 0-2: Inductive Approach 
 
Source: Author 
Based on the nature of the research, the author concludes that the deductive 
approach is pertinent to this study and that such an approach is consistent with the 
philosophical stance adopted by the author and described earlier. 
5.6 Research Paradigms 
Paradigms are evident in almost every element of research as they reflect the 
researcher’s choices of study. Paradigms can impact on the research study by 
identifying the subject and developing the questioning pattern to be linked to the 
research subject. Likewise, they affect the methods used in answering particular 
research questions and the way of interpreting the findings (Lukka, 2010). Collis 
and Hussey (2014) identify the paradigms as simulating the research process that 
progresses based on the researcher assumptions about the nature of knowledge 
and the way of conducting the research.  The term paradigm has its origins in the 
Greek word Paradeigma meaning “pattern”.  The term paradigm was first used by 
Kuhn in 1962 to indicate a conceptual framework utilised by a group of scholars 
(Antwi and Hamza, 2015). This framework or paradigm equipped scientists with 
an appropriate model for investigating the phenomenon and resolving the problem 
(Kuhn, 2012). Therefore, the paradigm, according to Kuhn, indicates a research 
context that is combined with a bundle of values, beliefs, and assumption adopted 
by a group of researchers concerning the nature of the research and how it will be 
conducted.  In short, it denotes a structure or a pattern framework of scientific 




Burrell and Morgan (1979) explain that researchers are required to make basic 
presumptions about the nature of society and the nature of social science, hence 
situate themselves upon a philosophical field as has been illustrated earlier. 
Furthermore, Burrell and Morgan (1979) distinguish four categories of research 
paradigms concerning the core assumptions, where the assumptions relate to the 
nature of social science can be at two different extremes: objectivism and 
subjectivism forms of ontology. Burrell and Morgan (1979) state that the nature of 
society can also be divided into fundamental two extremes: sociology of radical 
shift and social order (sociology of regulation).   
As stated earlier, the ontological positions of the researcher lead to understandings 
of the world as consisting of social order, thus, the research patterns of events and 
behaviours coincide with a belief that this world can be studied through utilising 
an objective approach (Epistemology).  
As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, this research is independent and value-
free where the author’s beliefs and opinions do not have any influence on the 
research, such, for example, as using standardised data collection methods for 
instant: survey, and secondary data. In this study, a functionalist paradigm is 
adopted. If, however, the researcher believes in the subjectivist interpretation with 
involvement of participants as the prevalent method of conducting a research the 
researcher will of necessity be applying subjective perspectives during 
interviewing or observing various participants and reuniting variations in their 
responses.  This is known as the interpretive paradigm.  
 
In Figure 5.3 below, “radical shift”, proposes that the researcher strives to 
understand and instigate changes to apply an objective approach and employ a 
radical structuralist paradigm. However, understanding radical shift utilising 
subjective views of participants leads to the adoption of a radical humanism 
paradigm (Bhattacherjee, 2012). The figure 5.3 shows the four different 










Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
On the other hand, Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) portray the contradicting 
traditions of conducting social science research in the positivist and social 
constructionist traditions, which are frequently elevated to a polarised stereotype 
by conflicting ideologies. Moreover, the Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) definition of 
constructionism considers as one of the approaches that has been indicated by 
Habermas (1970) as interpretive methods and a paradigm which developed in a 
way to respond to positivism. Easterby-Smith et al. (2012: p.58) define 
interpretive methods as, 
 
 “The ways that people make sense of the world especially through sharing 
their experiences with others”. 
 
According to Burrell and Morgan’s models (1979), this study conducts a 
functional model, which examines the relationship between tax minimisation 
components and firm value measured by Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA) 
(Social Order), whilst investigating the rule of corporate governance on this 
relationship (Accounting rule), to evaluate the efficiency of the existing tax 
compliance regulation (efficient regulations). These criteria take into account a 
proof of evidence from stock market to create neutrality (objective proof). 
Functionalists consider social order is understood by their components, thus, 




elements in more details applying objectivist techniques for example a survey and 
experiment (Bhattacherjee, 2012).  
5.7 Theory 
Theory demonstrates relationships between phenomena by outlining a form of 
generalisation comprising interrelated, definitions, assumptions, propositions and 
constructs (Grover, and Glazier, 1986; Teddlie, and Tashakkori, 2009; Kyungwon, 
2013). Theory development is considered as a fundamental activity for scientific 
disciplines. Theory creates a core body of knowledge connected to significant 
questions in a subject of study and design disciplined boundaries (Pettigrew & 
Mckechnie, 2001; Kyungwon, 2013). Bacharach (1989) defines theory as a 
system of concepts and relationships between these concepts, which exhibit 
together a logical systematic and consistent explanation of a phenomenon of 
concern through a set of assumptions and boundary conditions. This evidences the 
proposition that logical thinking is a vital prerequisite of a given theory, which 
confirms that a theory is considered to be coherent and systematic. Thus, theory 
performs a fundamental role in expecting the outcomes of the relationships 
between different variables in quantitative research and provides basic 
justifications for practice in research methodology. According to Whetten (1989) 
theory can be defined as a complete if it includes four primary elements: What, 
When, How and a set of Who, Where and When elements together frame the 
subject of theory (Whetten, 1989). The table 5-1 and figure 5.4 below explain the 





Figure 0-4: Elements of a Theory 
 
Source: Whetten, (1989) designed by the author.  
Table 0-1 Theory Elements 
What What are the concepts and variables that should be examined by the theory? 
This element explains all relevant concepts and variables that should be 
included in the examination and considers deleting the ones that do not add 
value to understand the phenomena. 
How How are these concepts and variables related? 
This process includes using arrows to link the boxes as shown in the figure 
5-5 above, which adds order to the concepts through drawing patterns, 
which introduces causality  
Why Why these concepts and variables are related? 
This step is the most significant part of the theory, as it is required a 





Who is influenced by this theory? Where is this theory relevant? And when 
is this theory relevant.  
These factors set the limitations on the suggestions created from a 
theoretical paradigm, which create the boundaries of generalisation and form 
the scope of the theory. 
Source: Whetten, (1989) designed by the author. 
Applying these components on this study where the main variables are tax 
minimisation measured by book tax differences (BTDs), firm value measured by 
Tobin’s Q and ROA, with the moderating role of corporate governance measured 
by institutional ownership, managerial ownership, executive remuneration (REM). 
The relationship that this study is examining is the impact of tax minimisation 
components on Tobin’s Q and ROA, and considering corporate governance 




whether investors distinguish between the different components of BTDs in their 
company’s valuation in order to make an investment decision. The following 
framework will help to identify how the tax minimisation measured by the book 
tax differences and firm value differs across the alternative methods in FTSE 350. 
To address this, the study explores different methods and notices the effect of 
these methods on the firm value. Moreover, it shows the role is played by the 
corporate governance mechanisms in moderating the relationship between tax 
minimisation and firm value. 
Figure 0-5: Book Tax Differences, Corporate Governance and Firm Value 
 
 
Source: The Author  
5.8 Research Design 
Research designs can be of two forms, and these forms are exploratory and 
conclusive research designs. In exploratory research design, the researcher 
attempts to examine particular scopes of research and there will not be defined 
answers to the research questions that were asked. Conclusive research; however, 
can be of two different forms; descriptive and causal. In descriptive research 
design, the researcher explains the different influences and reasons in the scope, 
which was selected in the field of the research. In contrast, in causal research 




involved in the dellima that was taken for conducting the research project 
(Alrashidi and Phan, 2015). The limitation of causal research is that researchers 
are unable to study true, randomised natural tests; they rely instead on non- or 
semi- test examination methods. The drawbacks of those methods increase the 
concern over the extent of inferring causality from an accounting study field. 
Positivist research comprises clear attention to and reporting of the subjective 
decisions and judgments a researcher faces in developing causal explications and 
making research-design options. Those judgments and decisions could omit 
alternative possible explications to be considered, and could decline the evidence 
collected those conflicts with those alternatives. This reveals vital limitations on 
the validation of the inferences achieved. Informing those limitations and 
reporting the subjectivist nature of developing and validating causal explications 
as an inevitable factor, may enhance the objectivist nature of a research (Luft and 
Shields, 2014).   
For the purpose of this research, the descriptive research design is selected in 
which the data is collected from different sources so that the research questions 
can be adequately answered.  
5.9 Hypotheses  
The hypotheses of this research set to examine the relationship between tax 
minimisation components and different variables of firm value and also, 
considering both agency theory and The Scholes-Wolfson framework (1992) as 
explained in the previous chapters (2&4). Also, the hypotheses used within this 
research have been developed based on the perception gained from the literature 
review. 
5.9.1 Tax Minimisation and Firm Value 
The literature review includes prior research concerning shareholders’ valuation 
of tax minimisation decisions and the various findings accordingly. There is a 
mixed result that represents this relationship that is either positive or negative 
depending on shareholders’ perception and expectation of tax minimisation. For 
example, some studies (Drake, et al, 2019; Inger, 2014) state that the positive 




shareholder’s expectation of future cash flows generated by tax reduction. Also, 
shareholders value the company’s attempt to reduce tax expense and prefer 
consistent holding pre-tax income, while others find the negative relationship due 
to shareholders’ perception to tax as a risk activity, which could underestimate the 
expected future cash savings generated by tax reduction (Desai and Dharmapala, 
2009; Hill et al, 2013; Drake et al, 2019). Therefore, prior research has concluded 
that tax minimisation is connected with firm valuation in unexpected directions. 
Furthermore, the author’s motivations in carrying out this study will examine the 
relationship within the FTSE350 companies and then separate its components into 
two indices namely the FTSE100 and FTSE250. Thus, the hypotheses as below:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is a significant relationship between book tax 
differences components and firm value. 
The FTSE350 consists of FTSE100 and FTSE250, the result of the relationship 
between tax minimisation components and firm value could be in different 
directions, due to FTSE 100 comprises of the biggest 100 companies in the market, 
which could result in different findings. Therefore, it could show persistent tax 
minimisation activity because of persistent earnings in these companies in a long 
run. Whilst, FTSE 250 comprises of the medium size companies in term of their 
assets and earnings. Those companies are not expected to provide persistent 
earnings for a long period. Thus, it is unlikely to present a long run tax 
minimisation activity; due to tax reduction costs could be higher than the 
company’s ability (Dyreng et al, 2008). Regards to shareholders’ perception on 
risks and benefits that associated with tax minimisation in FTSE350 and both 
FTSE 100 and FTSE 250, the next hypothesis examines the relationship in both 
indices separately to show whether the relationship in both indices have different 
results or not.  
As discussed in chapter 2 that there are different sources of book tax differences 
resulting from the differences between both accounting and taxable incomes. 
These resources are temporary differences, which can be utilised as an evident for 
earnings managements and permanent differences which reflect tax minimisation 
activities by managers. This research examines the impact of these two types of 




their behaviour. Inger (2014) finds that shareholders in their valuation distinguish 
between different methods of tax saving of tax minimisation. This is because 
different method concerning different benefits and risks preference (Frank et al, 
2009; Hill et al, 2013). Companies engage in permanent tax differences due to the 
non-conformance in financial and tax disclosure standard, which lead to two 
different factors. First, the presence of the association between tax minimisation 
components and firm value. Second, this relationship could arise as a result of 
shareholders perceives of companies’ tax activity as the ability of leading tax 
saving strategy. In this, scenario shareholders positively value tax minimisation 
(Frank et al, 2009). According to temporary differences that generated from 
deferred tax expenses, could notify shareholders earnings qualities (Hanlon, 2005). 
Temporary difference is a timing difference, which may mirror an improvement in 
cash flow in the fiscal year when this method is conducted, however, this 
difference will be reverse in the year after, therefore, shareholders do not value 
temporary difference due to the temporary saving generated (Inger, 2014). In this 
instance, it can be conclude that permanent tax differences lead to increasing in 
firm value as a result of the positive valuation of shareholders, whilst, 
shareholders do not value temporary tax differences, therefore, temporary tax 
difference have no impact on firm value.   
Hypothesis 1a1 (H1a1): There is a positive relationship between permanent 
tax differences and firm value in FTSE350 companies. 
Hypothesis 1a2 (H1a2): There is a positive relationship between permanent 
tax differences and firm value in FTSE100 companies. 
Hypothesis 1a3 (H1a3): There is a negative relationship between permanent 
tax differences and firm value FTSE 250 companies. 
Hypothesis 1b1 (H2d): There is no relationship between temporary tax 
differences and firm value FTSE350 companies. 
Hypothesis 1b2 (H2e): There is no relationship between temporary tax 




Hypothesis 1b3 (H2f): There is no relationship between temporary tax 
differences and firm value FTSE250 companies. 
In addition, the negative valuation could be due to revealing the accrual of the 
residual tax expenses in deferred tax liability or via disclosing estimated tax 
liability on permanent reinvested earnings in US companies (Inger, 2014). Bryant-
Kutcher, et al. (2012) prove the negative relationship between foreign effective 
tax rates and firm value demonstrating that tax rates differentials are not offsetting 
by other costs that are related to tax. While, Wilkie (1992) finds that firms 
encounter lower effective tax rates tolerate implicit taxes, and the negative 
relationship between overseas tax rate and pre-tax return indicates market frictions, 
error measurements or transaction costs restrain implicit taxes to not offset 
implicit taxes. Eiler and Kutcher (2014) examine the various possible 
determinants of detecting transparency that concerning the unrecognised deferred 
tax liability on permanently reinvested foreign earnings, which seizes two main 
issues; the capacity to measure tax and the possibility of opportunistic disclosure. 
Therefore, shareholders negatively react to the complexity in disclosing 
unrecognised deferred tax liability on permanent reinvested earnings. This could 
lead to extract that shareholder negatively value overseas investments.  
Statutory tax rate difference refers to overseas taxable income that taxed at a 
different rate from the national statutory tax rate; Abdul Wahab and Holland 
(2015) find that the level of book tax differences persistence varies depend on the 
type of BTDs and industry. In addition, they state that STRDs have the highest 
persistence level, which is associated to tax minimisation activities. 
Hypothesis 1c1 (H2g): There is a positive relationship between overseas 
statutory tax rate differences and firm value in FTSE 350 companies. 
Hypothesis 1c2 (H2g): There is a positive relationship between overseas 
statutory tax rate differences and firm value in FTSE100 companies. 
Hypothesis 1c3 (H2h): There is a negative relationship between overseas 




5.9.2 Tax minimisation, Firm Value and Corporate Governance  
This section seeks to explain the moderating role that corporate governance 
mechanisms play in the relationship between tax minimisation and firm value. 
This relationship between the three characteristics is critical as corporate 
governance mechanisms can provide a better explanation of the relationship 
between the other two characteristics (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009).  
Prior research shows mixed results concerning the relationship between the three 
characteristics as shown in the literature review chapter (Desai and Dhramapala, 
2006; Desai and Dhramapala, 2009; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Abdul Wahab 
and Holland, 2012, Inger, 2014).  Minnick and Noga (2010) state that there is 
association between tax minimisation and corporate governance, however, the 
results of this association in the literature are not consistent and depend on the 
management position that being investigated.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Corporate governance has a moderating impact on the 
relationship between book tax differences and firm value. 
This study utilises two mechanisms of corporate governance institutional 
ownership as external component and top executive remuneration as internal 
component. These two mechanisms of corporate governance are hypothesised to 
moderate the relationship between tax minimisation and firm value on FTSE 350 
and provide a deeper explanation of the relationship by focusing on the two 
groups namely FTSE 100 and FTSE 250.   
Hypothesis 2a1 (H2a1): The relationship between book tax differences 
components; permanent differences, temporary differences and firm value 
are moderated by the levels of institutional ownership in the FTSE350 
companies.  
 
Hypothesis 2a2 (H2a2): The relationship between book tax differences 
components; permanent differences, temporary differences and firm value 





Hypothesis 2a3 (H2a3): The relationship between book tax differences 
components; permanent differences, temporary differences and firm value 
are moderated by the levels of institutional ownership in the FTSE250 
companies.  
 
Desai and Dharmapala (2009) examine the association between tax minimisation 
and high managerial incentives for US companies during the period between 1993 
and 2001. They find a negative relationship between managers’ remuneration 
incentives and tax minimisation. This is because shareholders perceive tax 
minimisation as a mechanism of increasing managers’ opportunism and 
increasing their interest; therefore, shareholders pursue managers to reduce tax 
minimisation activities. This negative relationship is driven mainly from 
companies that classified as poorly governed companies. In contrast, Minnick and 
Noga (2010) provide evidence that incentive remuneration provides the incentive 
to increase performance in the long-term. They suggest that managerial incentive 
compensation encourage managers to invest in long term tax minimisation, which 
leads to improve companies’ performance and increase shareholders value. 
Besides, they refer to tax minimisation as better tax management and find it is 
positively associated with higher shareholders return. 
To test the hypotheses concerning the moderating impacts of executive 
remuneration on the relationship between tax minimisation and firm value, the 
hypotheses that are tested are as follows:  
Hypothesis 2b1 (H2b1): The relationship between book tax differences 
components; permanent differences, temporary differences and statutory tax 
rate differences and firm value is moderated by the levels of executive 
remuneration in the FTSE350 companies.  
Hypothesis 2b2 (H2b2): The relationship between book tax differences 
components; permanent differences, temporary differences and statutory tax 
rate differences and firm value is moderated by the levels of executive 




Hypothesis 2b3 (H2b3): The relationship between book tax differences 
components; permanent differences, temporary differences and statutory tax 
rate differences and firm value is not moderated by the levels of executive 
remuneration in the FTSE250 companies.  
 
The findings of the literature review lead the author to develop the hypotheses and 
conclude that the salient elements related to tax minimisation and firm value are 
balanced between the cost and benefit of firm value and internal drivers of 
corporate governance together with external procedures and pressures as shown in 
the figure below.    
Figure 0-6: Research Model 
 
Source: Author 
From the model above it can be summarising that tax minimisation activities in 
some cases result in a significant tax saving (benefit), which increases firm value, 
and promotes shareholders’ wealth. However, such activities have underlying 
costs such as potential reputation cost, implicit costs, customers’ and other 
stakeholders’ negative responses, agency costs, and the penalties of detecting tax 
saving. Therefore, there is an ambiguity in this relationship, which leads this study 
to investigate it.  Whilst some of the methods of tax minimisation create 
permanent tax savings such as share option tax benefits and residual of foreign 
earnings tax benefits; other tax reduction methods create temporary savings such 




more significant than temporary saving (Koester, 2011). Also, the benefits of tax 
minimisation depend on the application costs, and those costs differ according to 
the complexity of the tax minimisation strategy (Inger, 2014).  
Corporate governance will be examined along with the relationship between tax 
minimisation and firm value. Corporate governance affects both internal and 
external mechanisms. Demirag et al. (2000) state that corporate governance 
mechanisms comprise an internal mechanism which constitutes board 
composition, managerial ownership, and non-managerial ownership (with 
institutional ownership), while external mechanisms are a statutory audit, a 
corporate control market that often involves hostile takeovers, and the company’s 
performance evaluated by the stock market. Prior research provides evidence that 
poor corporate governance weakens the positive impact of tax minimisation on 
firm value (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009, Wilson, 2009, Inger, 2012), since 
shareholders perceive that managers are working in their own interest. Moreover, 
in order to disguise tax minimisation methods from tax authorities, companies 
need to make financial statements more ambiguous. This ambiguity creates 
information asymmetry which eases the process of rerouting the benefits of tax 
minimisation to managers.  Nevertheless, tax minimisation generated from share 
option deductions and accelerated depreciation are allowed by the tax authorities 
and fully acceptable by the law, therefore, they are not related to ambiguous 
information that leads to rerouting. Moreover, tax minimisation generated from 
the above-mentioned methods should not be discounted by investors in their 
valuations. Separating the components of tax minimisation within the 
heterogeneous valuation provides awareness of the reason behind the reduction in 
valuing tax minimisation among investors in poorly governed companies. To 
emphasise, this study concerns only tax minimisation components; permanent 
differences, temporary differences and deferred overseas tax rate differences and 
will not highlight the benefit and cost issues. Also, this study measures corporate 
governance by utilising institutional ownership and executive remuneration, so 
will not concern the whole internal and external mechanisms of corporate 





 5.10 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the research philosophy and research framework and 
explains the concepts of axiology, ontology, epistemology and research paradigm. 
It also, positions the author in the positivist realm and accordingly the authors’ 
adoption of a quantitative approach, and an objective standpoint together with a 
value-free axiology.  
This is followed by describing the process of deductive and inductive research and 
explaining the position of the study into the functionalist paradigm and deductive 
approach, as they are the most suitable methods to answer the research problems.  
Ultimately, this chapter shows the formulating of the approved hypotheses that 





CHAPTER SIX: DATA COLLECTION, SAMPLE SIZE, AND 
VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the nature of the sample, the development of the estimation 
models and the variables conceptualisation. The chapter begins with a brief 
depiction of the sample selection and the provenance of data collection. The next 
section relates to the development of the estimation models used in testing the 
hypotheses. The estimation models are developed to underpin the research based 
on the Scholes-Wolfson framework, which has been variously adopted in value-
related studies along with research into taxation (Bauman and Shaw, 2008; Abdul 
Wahab and Holland 2012, Ariff and Hashim, 2014). In addition, the book tax 
differences (BTDs), both conceptual and measured, developed by Abdul Wahab 
and Holland (2015) are included within this study.  Furthermore, the chapter 
contains an extensive explanation of the measurement of the different variables 
used in this study and an extract of variables estimation is also mentioned in the 
appendices to present a clear picture about independent, dependent and control 
variables. Justification for the application of each estimation model features in this 
chapter.  
The methodological contribution of this study is clarified using a range of 
approaches. Firstly, utilising a bespoke set of data, which is collected and 
subsequently calculated from companies’ annual reports for the period under 
study. This set of data utilises the independent variables, namely book tax 
differences, temporary differences, permanent differences and overseas tax rate 
differences, as it is not available in readable format.  The data under examination 
can provide evidence of the advantage of tax footnote information that is 
disclosed in the annual reports in forecasting the companies’ future performance. 
The model is developed by considering BTDs, TDs, PDs and STRDs and 
corporate governance variables; IOWN, MOWN and REM as independent 
variables. Market value is considered as a dependent variable and calculated using 




comprehensive examination of firm value and tax minimisation whilst considering 
the impact of corporate governance on this relationship. 
6.2 Sample Selection and Data 
The sample of this research concentrates upon the largest UK multinational 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) namly; FTSE 350 in total 
and FTSE100 and FTSE 250 seperately for the period 2014 to 2016. This reflects 
the most recent and available data. More importantly, this data is pertinent in that 
it relates to a period after the introduction of the first general anti-avoidance rule 
for the UK in 2013. This rule aims to prevent tax reduction through the use of 
aggressive but nevertheless, legal provisions (HMRC GAAR Guidance, 2013; 
Publication of the Finance Bill, 2013) to evaluate the effect of these rules on 
companies’ corporate tax and whether this rule reduced the book tax differences 
or not. These new rules have affected the contents of annual reports from 2014 
onwards. In addition, the reason behind limiting the sample for only three years 
period is that the research used a unique dataset, which is hand collected from its 
original source (companies’ annual reports). This data collection and calculation 
was time-consuming, which leads to focus only on this limited period.  
The sample within the study is limited to non-financial companies, since financial 
companies have particular regulations and rules which could impact the research 
undertaken (Hanlon, 2005; McKnight and Weir 2009; Abdul Wahab and Holland, 
2015; Korczak and Liu, 2014, Tauringana, and Mangena, 2014). Prior researchers 
used FTSE 350 and FTSE 250 in their studies and have also omitted financial 
companies from their samples (McKnight and Weir 2009, Korczak and Liu, 2014; 
Tahir, et al., 2018).   
In addition, the accounting differences amongst industries could have an impact 
on the findings because of incidental IFRS impacts across industries (Goodwin, 
ET AL., 2008). The companies within the sample are listed in the main market as 
they meet the strict inclusion requirements of the LSE. Thus, they may tend to 
have a higher effective tax rate (ETR). Companies listed on the main market are 
required to comply with (or explain non-compliances) the framework of 




companies listed under FTSE 350, which comprises the 100 largest UK-domiciled 
leading companies and FTSE 250. The FTSE UK is one of the four globally 
known index series, FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE Small Cap and FTSE Fledgling.  
The FTSE 100 index is the most recognised index, accounting for 7.8 per cent of 
the market value of stock in the world, and representing around 85.5 per cent of 
the UK’s market (LSE, 2010). It is commonly - used as a benchmark for a 
plethora of financial products accessible in LSE and worldwide. The FTSE 250 
comprises medium size companies in term of capitalisation and total assets, which 
represents roughly 15% of UK market capitalisation (LSE, 2019). In addition, the 
FTSE small-cap is smaller than FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 in terms of 
capitalisation and the count for 268 companies, which is considered together with 
FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 as a constituent of the FTSE All-share index with 619 
companies, and figure 6.1 below describes the FTSE UK indices.  
Figure 0-1: The Structure of the FTSE UK Indices 
 
 
Source: pension craft website. 
Therefore, the FTSE small-cap is excluded from the study sample for two reasons. 
First, it includes the small companies, while this research focuses only on large 
and medium-sized companies that have an overseas operation. This can facilitate 
an engagement in tax minimisation. Figure 6‑2 below shows the average of the 
overseas and domestic revenue for both the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 between 
2015 and 2017. Second, including this index makes the study sample count for 
619 companies, which is considered to be very large and difficult to manage in 
terms of the variables calculations and due to the time constraint. This study 
focuses only on the FTSE 350 that comprises both the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250, 




able to engage in an aggressive tax minimisation strategy and pay for tax advisors 
in order to reduce tax liabilities.  In addition, the separation between the FTSE 
100 and FTSE 250 is due to the fact that FTSE 100 companies are the largest 
international companies in the market and are considered more profitable and 
have a higher level of liquidity. This high liquidity enables them to have the funds 
that can be utilised in order to adopt more aggressive tax minimisation strategies 
through price shifting when compared with the FTSE 250. Also, FTSE 100 is the 
most liquid index, which enables it to be less volatile when compared with the 
FTSE 250 and other smaller indices. The separation between those two indices 
can help in providing more information that explains the tax minimisation 
behaviour and its impact on firm value in both indices.  
 
Figure 0-2: FTSE 350 overseas and domestic revenue  
 
 
Companies that have a negative profit before tax have also been omitted to 
prevent the effect of carrying losses forward on BTDs and deferred tax expenses 
due to the difficulty in interpreting effective tax rates (Dyreng, et al., 2014). 
Guenther, (1994) divides the sample under examination into two data subsets, the 
first for net operating income and the second for net operating losses carried 
forward to distinguish between the two findings.    
Substantial data is collected directly from companies’ annual reports. Stock price 
information (capitalisation) is collected from the LSE and governance data from 




bought from private financial information source (Minerva co.). Table 6.1 below 
shows the data sources used in conducting this research.  
For the companies that do not have all of their archival data on their websites, the 
data have been obtained from the Companies House Website. The Companies 
House Website comprises all the UK companies’ archival data, in its original 
version. The author has compared the data from the whole databases and has 
focused on the original companies’ annual reports for taxation information, firm 
performance and control variables for calculation purposes. This means that 
DataStream has some missing data for all of the research variables and to tackle 
this issue the author uses the companies’ annual reports to collect these data.  
Table 0-1: Data Source 
Type of Data Source  Information gathered  
Industry  LSE and FTSE Russell  
Industrial classification Benchmark (ICB), 





Amadeus and annual 
reports  
The whole data used to dependent and 
calculate control variables  
Market Data LSE Capitalisation data  
Tax Data 
Companies’ annual 
reports with using tax 
footnotes, which are 
included in annual 
report.  
The data downloaded from companies’ 
websites and hand calculated for dependent 






reports and Minerva 
co13.  
Remuneration data from DataStream and 
Ownership data from Minerva co.  
 
Source: Author  
There was the opportunity to utilise the confidential tax return information 
obtained from HMRC, and the author had been in contact with the research 
department. However, it was intimated that the process could take a long time, 
 
13  Minerva Analytics provides corporate governance information for a wide verity of groups 






which was not within the period of the research scope. Nevertheless, despite the 
fact that such information would have enhanced the study, this project is by no 
means diminished as a result. Such information, the author considers would have 
been a bonus, but there are sufficient other sources of data to undertake detailed 
analysis. The data for 2013 also has been collected for benchmarking purposes 
concerning previous year’s information. In addition, the period is chosen in order 
to use the best current obtainable data. 
According to Saunders et al. (2012b) there are two classes of data, namely 
primary and secondary, and these data can be collected utilising different methods. 
Primary data is gathered pure and unmediated, and thus generally considered to be 
more authentic and reliable. In contrast, secondary data has already been 
processed through statistical and interpretive manipulation. Methods of gathering 
primary and secondary data differ in that primary data must be gathered from an 
original source, whilst with secondary data, the nature of data gathering work is 
solely that of selection. 
This study uses secondary data, since it is readily accessible to scholars 
conducting research into similar issues to accomplish particular and unique 
objectives (Bell, et al., 2018). In search of secondary data, this study looks at 
different sources in order of precedence such as annual reports, journal articles, 
books, the internet, magazines and newspapers related to the subject of the 
research. These sources are reviewed at length to extract the information needed 





Table 0-2: Data Cleansing 





1 FTSE 350 index (Russell 2014) 351 1053 
2 Total Financial companies (128)  
3 
Number of companies have at least one-
year negative profit 
(42)  
4 
Number of companies have at least one-
year missing data 
(9)  
5 
Number of companies have at least one-
year period more than 12 months 
(3)  
6 Total omitted (182) (543) 
 Companies under investigation 169 507 
Source: The Author 
According to the sample data industrial classification, Benchmark has been 
obtained from FTSE Russell (2019). This classification is well known globally as 
it allows investors and other interests entities to evaluate the international 
economy in a standardised manner (FTSE Russell, 2019). The sample’s industrial 
classification detailed in Table 6.3 classifies the dataset into nine groups after 














Oil & Gas 4 12 2.37 2.37 
Basic 
Materials 
11 33 6.50 8.87 
Industrials 51 153 30.18 39.05 
Consumer 
Goods 
33 99 19.53 58.58 
Health Care 11 33 6.51 65.09 
Consumer 
Services 
42 126 24.85 89.94 
Telecommuni
cations 
3 9 1.78 91.72 
Utilities 7 21 4.14 95.86 
Technology 7 21 4.14 100 
Total 169 510 100 100 
Source: FTSE ICB 2019, designed by the Author 
6.3 Analysis of Data 
The main challenges in the analysis of the data are that tax minimisation variables 
that manually collected from the companies’ annual reports for each year of the 
study period, which could take a much longer time comparing with collecting it 
from any online databases. In addition, access to corporate data has been the 
biggest challenge in conducting this research, because of the absence of these data 
from university’s database and the difficulty of gathering it free of charge. 
Nevertheless, a decision was taken by the author to select one creditable and 
reliable source of corporate governance data namely Minerva Analytics. The 
process of collecting corporate governance data was time consuming in searching 
for the appropriate source in the market in terms of reliability and cost, then in 
negotiating the data and the price with the provider before choosing the acceptable 
quote. Minerva Analytics, provides academic research and institutions with 




results data.  Many academic institutions subscribe to Minerva data and many of 
the world’s top journals reference it in their papers.  
The research utilises main data sets namely, the book tax differences (BTDs), 
temporary differences (TDs), permanent differences (PDs), and overseas statutory 
tax rate differences (STRDs), to measure tax minimisation as proxies for 
independent variables and Tobin’s Q & ROA to measure companies’ market and 
non-market value as the dependent variable.  
6.3.1 Development of Estimation Models 
The models of the research are based on the market valuation and the method of 
measuring book tax differences developed by Abdul Wahab and Holland (2015). 
All these models are based on both agency theory and Scholes-Wolfson 
perspectives. The research develops the model by combining tax variables, 
corporate governance variables and control variables. The following subsections 
explain in detail the variables measurements and the estimation models. The study 
contributes to the existing literature concerning tax information by extending the 
Abdul Wahab and Holland (2015) model by integrating BTDs, TDs, PDs and 
STRDs variables to the examination models to estimate the contribution of those 
variables to firm value measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. This study modifies the 
models expecting to improve the relationship between book tax differences and 
firm value.  
6.3.1.1 Book Tax Differences Measurement  
Prior studies (Hanlon, 2005, Jackson, 2015) have used book-tax differences 
(BTDs) as a measurement of undetectable tax minimisation. This measurement is 
estimated by the difference between accounting profit and estimated taxable profit. 
Sloan (1996) investigates whether share price reflects the persistent differences 
between cash flow components of current earnings and accruals. He finds that the 
stability between cash flow and future accounting earning is greater than between 
accounting accruals and future accounting earnings. In addition, share prices do 
not reflect complete information that is included in the accruals and cash flow 




In his paper, Jackson (2015), states that considerable book tax differences 
represent persistent future earnings. Jackson (2015) finds firms that have engaged 
in tax minimisation have a positive relationship between the components of book 
tax differences and both earnings before tax and tax expenses. However, the study 
does not find significant evidence of the earnings management impact on the 
relationship between book tax differences and future earnings. It is unlikely 
therefore, that for companies with large negative book differences to recognise 
future earnings and consequentially, they will be unaffected. In contrast, in 
companies with positive tax book differences, their future earnings will be 
affected, thereby indicating the inability in fulfilling subjectivity in their financial 
reporting calculation.  
Book tax differences occur due to the difference between accounting income and 
taxable income, which generates temporary differences and permanent differences 
(Hanlon, 2005). This difference in reporting the income arises as a consequence of 
the difference in the concepts and rules in the respective reporting system (Plesko, 
2004).   
 
Temporary differences generated as a result of the timing difference between 
accounting income and taxable income, refers to items of revenue or expenses 
being included in one period of tax but in a different period of books. Good 
examples of temporary differences are depreciation and allowance for doubtful 
accounts (Blaylock et al. 2012). The second component of book tax differences is 
permanent differences, which arise from transactions that are included in 
accounting income but are excluded from taxable income. These would include 
such as the interest on tax-exempt municipal bonds (Wilson, 2009).  
 
The third component of BTDs can be recognised according to IAS 12 (The 
accounting treatment for income taxes) Income Tax disclosure requirement. It 
represents the imposed tax rate in other jurisdictions that differs from the rate in 
the home country. This variation in income tax rate generates a higher or lower 
current tax expense compare with the situation where the profit is taxable only in 




Companies’ tax returns and details of tax minimisation activities are confidential 
information; therefore, proxies are used to measure tax minimisation, which might 
measure taxable income with error. This study measures tax minimisation by 
estimating book tax differences (BTDs), which identifies the difference between 
accounting income and estimated taxable income. Companies annual accrued tax 
income have been used to estimate book tax differences (BTDs), by gathering 
income before tax disclosed to estimated taxable income following Abdul Wahab 
and Holland (2015). According to prior research (Rego 2003; Dyreng et al. 2008; 
Dyreng et al 2010; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Robinson et al. 2010), there are 
two considerable proxies to measure tax minimisation that have been widely used 
in tax research. First, cash effective tax rate (CETR) which is the actual cash taxes 
paid divided by pre-tax book income minus special items. Second, effective tax 
rate (ETR) which is the total tax expense divided by pre-tax book income minus 
special items. ETR is widely uses in measuring companies’ tax cost and reflects 
tax minimisation that influences net income; however, it does not reflect much 
more of permanent differences. A lower value of ETR represents an increase of 
tax minimisation activities from temporary differences component. This increase 
in temporary differences and deferment between actual tax due and cash tax paid 
for only a short period, thus ETR is unchanged in a long-term perspective (Hanlon 
and Heitzman, 2010). On the other hand, CETR represents the thought that 
executives’ intention in engaging in effective tax minimisation is to reduce cash 
tax paid. CETR value is fundamental in representing the strategies that lead to 
permanent differences but does not affect upon tax expense on financial report 
(McGuire et al. 2012). The calculation of companies’ BTDs is shown below 
following Abdel Wahab and Holland, (2015).  
Book tax differences = income before tax – estimated taxable income 
BTDs = IBT – TI         (1) 
Where IBT is income before tax and TI is calculated taxable income. As known 
the information of companies’ tax returns is confidential, therefore, to calculate TI, 
a gross up was made for current tax expenses (CTE) as following;  





STRuk is Statutory Tax Rate in the UK.  
STRos = Statutory Tax Rate Overseas.  
TIUK =  Taxable Income in the UK.  
TIOS = Taxable Income Overseas. 
Separate taxable income (TI) to UK and overseas taxable income, results:  
TIUK = TI – TIOS           (3) 
Replacing (3) in (2) results:  
CTE = TI * STRUK + (STROS- STRUK) * TIOS    (4)  
Replacing (4) in (3) results:  




(STRos – STRuk )∗TIos
STRuk
       (5)  
The numerator in the second part of the equation represents overseas income that 
is taxed at overseas statutory tax rates, which is different from the UK statutory 
tax rate. STRDs present the difference between statutory tax rate STR in the UK 
and statutory tax rate in other jurisdictions where the subsidiaries are operated. 
STRDs could be payable or refundable depend on the rate charged. In another 
word, if the value is positive, it means that overseas statutory tax rate is higher 
than the UK statutory tax rate, in this case the difference will be refundable and 
vice versa.  
STRDs = (STROS - STRUK) * TIOS      (6) 
In practice, (Abdel Wahab and Holland, 2015) the equation above is unobservable, 
as there is no reconciliation disclosed for the current tax expense (CTE), therefore 
timing differences are excluded.  
Replacing equation (5) in (1) presents:  






     (7) 
Tax expenses reconciliation represents only tax expenses (TE) and tax rate charge, 
so there is no disclosing for timing difference. Thus, the inclusions in the statutory 




STRDsDisclosed = (STRos – STRUK) * (IPTOS + PDOS)   (8) 
Foreign income before tax (IPTos) presents income before tax from subsidiaries 
that occurred in foreign jurisdictions. This account is unable to found in practice 
as it excluded in tax expense reconciliation in the financial statements. In this 
equation, temporary differences (TDs) have been omitted. Therefore, if a 
company has positive temporary differences overseas with a statutory tax rate that 
varies from the UK statutory tax rate, the calculated of taxable income (TI) will be 
underestimated by the total value of TDs, and vice versa. The evaluated (BTDs) is 
presented as:  






  (9)  
Following the equation above, BTDs divides to temporary differences (TDs), and 
permanent differences (PDs). Temporary differences interpret the difference in 
considering expenses and the fiscal period when calculating the income. In 
contrast, permanent differences reflect the difference in tax estimation that arises 
from transactions considered as income and accounting expenses that are not 
considered to be trading and economic factors (Satyawati and Palupi, 2017).  
Temporary differences component has been computed by deferred tax expenses 




           (10) 
If the TDs is positive, this shows temporary differences that explain the 
minimising of current year taxable income comparing to accounting income. A 
negative TDs shows otherwise.  
The permanent differences component has been measured as shown in the 
equation below:  
PDs = IBT - TI – TDs         (11) 
A positive PDs shows the settlements that reduce taxable income compared with 
accounting income, thus leading to an increase in future net earnings.  In the 




which emerge from the differences between taxable income and accounting 
income measurements. 
6.3.1.2 Firm Value Measurement  
In line with prior empirical studies (Chung and Zhang, 2011; Hot and Pombo, 
2016) firm value has been estimated using two measurements, namely Tobin’s Q 
and Return on Assets (ROA).  The former measurement indicates market value 
and the latter indicates non-market value. ROA is independent from the 
company’s capital structure compared with other financial performance 
measurements such as return on equity (ROE) (Hot and Pombo, 2016).  
6.3.1.2.1 Tobin’s Q  
Tobin’s Q (Tobin, 1969) provides accurate information about the outcomes of 
companies’ activities, especially details that are related to investment decisions 
(Nugroho and Agustia, 2018). In addition, Tobin’s Q has been used in prior 
research as an indicator of firm performance and growth opportunity since 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) used it in measuring firm value. Moreover, it has 
become common in research concerning the relationship between firm value, tax 
minimisation and corporate governance (Loderer and Peyer, 2002; Desai and 
Dharmapala, 2009; Wang, 2011; Ammann, et al., 2013). In this study, Tobin’s Q 
measurement follows Desai and Darampala, (2009) as shown in the equation 
below, by adding company’s capitalisation after 3 months following the 
publication of the annual report as disclosed by LSE to the difference between 
total liabilities and deferred tax expenses divided by total assets, again following 
Desai and Darampala (2009)14. Thus, the market capitalisation obtained for the 






TA = Company’s Total Assets  
TL = Total Liabilities  
DTE = Deferred Tax Expenses  
 
14  There are various methods of measuring Tobin’s Q adopted in the literature. The one that has 




MVE+3 = Market Capitalisation after three months of the publication of the annual 
reports.  
 
Usually the Tobin’s Q measurement includes deferred tax expenses; however, it is 
excluded from the equation above. This exclusion occurs due to the potential 
mechanical correlation that happens between dependent variable and tax 
minimisation variables as a consequence of including deferred tax expenses. This 
correlation arises from changes in future tax liabilities that could be a result of tax 
minimisation activities (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009).  
6.3.1.2.2 Return on Assets (ROA) 
ROA is considered one of the most effective measurement of companies’ 
performance (Hagel et al, 2013) as it shows how companies use their assets 
efficiently and effectively to create non-market value. A focus upon ROA and an 
understanding its constituents on the part of the board can improve companies’ 
ability to use its resources effectively and to create returns over the long term. 
ROA has been widely utilised in empirical research as a reflection of company’s 
profitability and accounting base performance (Hot and Pombo, 2016; Kim, 2016; 
Dray and James, 2019).  Additionally, Noor and Fadzillah (2010) find for 
example, that Malaysian companies with high ROA tend to have low ETRs, which 
is an explanation for the fact that companies with higher profitability tolerate 
lower corporate tax income burdens. Those companies adopt tax incentives and 
provisions to minimise taxable profit that lead to a lower ETR compared with the 
statutory tax rate of 28% in Malaysia.  
ROA is also utilised in research concerning the relationship between tax 
minimisation as measured by effective tax rate and firm value. For example, 
Delgado, Fernández-Rodríguez, and Martínez-Arias, (2018) in studying this 
relationship utilising a sample of German companies data find a significant 
negative relationship between the ROA and ETR suggesting that German 
companies engage aggressively in tax minimisation. Likewise, Noor, Mastuki and 
Bardai, (2008) find a negative relationship between ETR and ROA in studying 
Malaysian listed companies during the new tax regulation regime imposed on 




companies take advantage of tax incentives that government provided through 
both new regulation and investing the income tax exempt. Additionally, the 
variability in ETR amongst companies suggests that only specific companies are 
benefiting from tax incentives, which indicates aberrations in the corporate tax 
framework. In distingushing between small and large companies in investigation 
of the relationship between tax minimisation and profitability in Romanian 
unlisted companies Afrasinei, Georgescu and Istrate (2016), find that large 
companies have subsidiaries in tax havens which affect their profitability and 
ETR.  Those companies have a lower return on assets compared with small local 
companies, thus, suggesting that large multinational companies have the ability to 
engage in complicated tax strategies that reduce profit before tax via their 
subsidiaries as a result of reducing their current tax expenses.    
 Return on assets as measured in this study, follows prior research (Noor, Mastuki 
and Bardai, 2008; Hot and Pombo, 2016; Kim, 2016; Delgado, Fernández-
Rodríguez, and Martínez-Arias, 2018; Dray and James, 2019). The definition of 
ROA is shown below.  
ROA = (Net Profit before Interest and Tax / Total Assets) * 100 
ROA= NIT/ TA* 100 
6.3.1.3 Corporate Governance Measurement  
The hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter predict that the relationship 
between tax minimisation and firm value is moderated by corporate governance 
practices. Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain that increasing managerial 
ownership and aligning managers’ interests with those of shareholders can reduce 
agency costs. In addition, managerial ownership can be used as a monitoring 
mechanism of managers’ behaviour and designed to be of benefit to shareholders. 
Appel, Gormley, and Keim, (2016) state that the greater passivity of shareholders 
represents betterment in long-term performance in US companies and reduce the 
possibility of acquisition by hedge funds. This view, however, runs contrary to a 
general move towards active shareholding and greater participation by 
shareholders in the affairs of the company. A further tool that can align both 
managers’ and shareholders’ incentives is the remuneration structure. Some of the 




(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Mehran, 1995) suggest links between ownership 
structure and remuneration as factors related to firm performance. Recently, the 
remuneration structure appears as a matter of concern to corporate governance’s 
scholars in the UK (Ferri and Maber, 2013, Gregory-Smith, 2012), particularly 
after the financial crisis in 2008 and the rise of corporate scandals, which have led 
to public protests on excessive executive payments. In theory, executive 
remuneration is considered as a tool that helps in decreasing the agency costs 
through reducing the principal-agent conflicts, due to the fact that remuneration 
can incentivise managers to maximise firm value and align their interest with 
shareholders (Marnet, 2005). However, executive remuneration becomes part of 
the agency problem and results in managerial opportunisms (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2003; Marnet, 2005). Besides, executives are rewarded for luck and this luck 
occurs mostly on the most discretionary components of compensation, bonus and 
salary, which are higher in companies with poor governance (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2001). 
Based on a tax minimisation perspective, as proposed by Desai and Darampala 
(2006), incentive compensations tend to be a fundamental definition of tax 
minimisation, where greater incentives are linked to a lower degree of tax 
minimisation. This relationship is moderated by institutional ownership in 
companies with weak governance and as such does not apply to well-governed 
companies. This result sheds light on the importance of understanding the 
interactions between tax minimisation and managerial incentives, especially when 
the evidence suggests that book tax differences lead to negative abnormal returns 
and shareholders do not benefit from those differences.  
This study uses two measurements of corporate governance, which are 
institutional ownership and top executive remuneration, as mentioned in the sub-
section below. This is to examine the moderating role that those two mechanisms 
could play in the relationship between tax minimisation components and firm 
value. Adopting those mechanisms in this research is due to how they potentially 
reflect the agentic behaviour, which underpins the agency theory. For example, 
institutional ownership in the UK is dispersed in nature, thus shareholders might 
not use their right to vote and be ineffective in their monitoring role (Khurshed et 
al., 2011), which leads to a passive existence of their role. In addition, executive 




higher compensations and control the board; hence, remuneration can be utilised 
as a proxy for self-serving managers and as a model of a weak board.   
6.3.1.3.1 Ownership Structure 
The ownership structure is binary and includes institutional ownership, which is 
the percentage of total shares held as long-term strategic holdings by institutional 
shareholders such as banks and financial companies, willing to wait for long term 
earnings. The second element is managerial ownership and is the percentage of 
the total shares held by companies’ managers. This percentage of shareholding is 
defined as being 3% of total shares issued, and companies are required by law to 
disclose the information about shareholdings above 3% in their annual reports. In 
the study sample, the number of observations of managerial ownership is only 69, 
and as such, this measurement has been omitted from the regression models.  
Ownership structure:  
Institutional ownership: 3% and above of total shares held by outsiders (IOWN). 
The data related to these variables has been obtained from Minerva Analytic Co. 
but annual reports provide the bulk of the data, as the data from Minerva was 
incomplete and the opportunity to confirm the accuracy of this data was limited. 
6.3.1.3.2 Remuneration Structure  
This research differs from previous studies on remuneration on two matters. 
Firstly, it focuses on the total remuneration rather than the structure of 
remuneration. Secondly, it examines the top executive total remuneration’s effect 
upon the relationship between tax minimisation and firm value, in the context of 
companies’ ownership structure.  Remuneration structure refers to total executives’ 
salaries, bonus and share options scaled by the beginning book value of equity. 
Florackis (2008) measures compensation structure, (referred to in this thesis as 
remuneration structure) in two parts, which are total executive salary scaled by 
beginning of book value equity and a dummy variable of options or bonuses.  
Whilst in contrast, Mehran (1995) measures compensation in three ways; firstly, a 
percentage of total compensation in grants of new stock options scaled by the 




percentage of total equity-based compensation, and finally, a percentage of total 
compensation which comprises salary, dividend, bonus, properties, saving plans, 
insurance, and values of new stock options. This thesis expands the work of 
Florackis (2008) by measuring total compensations by the total of the top 
executive remuneration scaled by the beginning of book equity value.  
Executive remuneration data include salaries, values of long-term incentive plans 
(LTIPs), bonuses, share options share awards that are given within a given year. 
This data in a total amount was obtained from DataStream and validated 100% by 
the author. 
6.3.1.4 Control Variables Measurement 
This research employs control variables that are factors used in prior research. 
These variables attach to two main components that concern both the underlying 
theory of tax minimisation and corporate governance critical components of 
which are agency costs and information asymmetry. These variables also control 
for specific characteristics of the company. The control variables that are used in 
this study are those of earnings management, capital intensity, leverage, foreign 
operations, and dividends. The table 6.4 below shows the control variables and 
their measurements.  
Earnings Management (EM) considered by Hosseini, el. (2015) to be one of the 
most important issues for shareholders. In addition, the earnings management 
section in the annual report provides information for tax estimation to measure the 
financial performance of company.  Failure to disclose will lead to information 
asymmetry that is an essential contributor to the agency problem.  Earnings 
management in this research is related to a control mechanism to deter the CEO 
tampering with financial information. According to agency theory, executives 
might tend to mislead investors and to act to their own advantage thus, conflicts 
arise with shareholders wealth and the fiduciary duties of directors (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). In addition, many scholars consider earnings management as a 
control variable to discourage the diversity in tax minimisation and the variables 
that occurs from earnings management (Desai and Dharampala 2009, 




Leverage (L) previous research (Lisowsky 2010, Abdulwahab and Holland 2012, 
Taylor et al. 2015) shows leverage as a firm specific factor that affects cross-
sectional variation in tax minimisation.  Furthermore, leverage could represent the 
tendency of harnessing a higher level of debt in order to gain a higher interest tax 
shield (Derashid and Zhang 2003).  Consequently, there is a positive relationship 
between tax minimisation and leverage according to Dyreg et al. (2008) and 
Atwood et al. (2012).  
Dividend (DI) is considered as an indicator of a company’s performance (Harford 
et al., 2008) and a significant instrument that affects shareholder valuation.  
Dividend applies to control misinterpretation cost that occurs as a result of 
information asymmetry between executives and shareholders (Lindop and 
Holland, 2013). In some countries, for example, UK15, dividends received from 
foreign subsidiaries are tax exempt and those countries could acquire an enhanced 
tax benefit from shifting income to a lower tax territory than countries following a 
global tax system (Hicks et. al., 2009).  Jackson, M. (2015) argues that the income 
from dividend (in countries adopting an exempt dividend system), will not be 
recognised for a tax purpose, which creates a positive permanent book tax 
differences. This tax credit is not included in the difference between taxable 
income and accounting income; however, it leads to reducing tax expenses that 
are used in calculating taxable income. Furthermore, the dividend scale could be a 
reflection of the confidence of managers in term of future earnings projections. 
This might reflect a positive relationship with future earnings or indicate 
investment opportunities.   
Capital Intensity (CI) signals the extent to which the company uses machinery 
and equipment.  Capital intensity relates to tax minimisation in terms of capital 
allowance and capital expenditure’s incentives. Previous scholars (Rego, 2003; 
Derashid and Zhang, 2003; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Shevlin and Porter, 1992, 
Porcano, 1986; Zimmerman, 1983; Stickney and McGee, 1982) state that capital 
intensity is associated with the company’s level of tax minimisation where there is 
a negative relationship between the effective tax rate and capital intensity level. 
However, Mills el al., (1998) demonstrate a positive connection between capital 
 
15 Foreign Dividend is exempt from UK tax since 2009, by virtue of the provisions of CTA 2009, 




intensity and tax minimisation in term of the capital expenditure. Therefore, this 
variable has been used to control the effect of capital expenditure on tax 
minimisation, excluding plant and property from the equation, as its association to 
capital allowances is not included for tax reduction purpose.  
Foreign Operation (FOS) indicates that the level of engagement in multinational 
business activities. In the literature (Sikka, 2010, Desai and Dharmapala, 2009), it 
can be seen that MNCs have a greater opportunity to be involved in tax 
minimisation opportunities compared with local business through price shifting 
polices. Including (FOS) as a control variable follows other tax researchers, for 
example, (Kubick and Lockhart, 2017; Abdul Wahab, and Holland, 2015; Hoi, 
and Zhang, 2013; Lisowsky, 2010; Wilson, 2009). Wilson (2009) indicates that 
there is a positive relationship between tax shelters and foreign income, which 
means that subsidiaries located in a tax haven, could lead to a reduction in overall 
tax payment. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) state that those subsidiaries are able to 
engage in transactions that reduce taxable income or divert tax liability. 





Total Accruals (Income before tax – operating activities’ Cash 
flow)/ Equity Book- value for the beginning period.  
Leverage (LEV) Long-term Borrowing / total assets 
Dividend (DI) Dividends Per one Share/Earnings per one Share*100 
Capital Intensity 
(CI) 
Total machinery and Equipment / Total assets  
Foreign Operation 
(FOS) 
Ratio of foreign sales / Total sales 
6.4 Methodology 
This study utilises panel data analysis estimation models to take advantage of its 
features, such as the combination of cross-sectional and time-series data. Panel 
data is commonly used to examine complex behavioural models as it has the 




dynamics of change, which cross-sectional data failed to identify. In addition, 
panel data helps in providing more accurate predictions for individual results 
(Hsiao, 2014). Examining Panel data sets utilise three different models: Pooled 
OLS model, fixed effects and random effects. As this study, uses only fixed 
effects and random effects models the focus is on these two models only. 
6.4.1 Panel Data 
This study utilises panel data estimation models to measure the development of 
variables over time.  It is also frequently known as longitudinal data.  Panel data is 
used as a combination of cross section and time series and are also named 
longitudinal data. Those longitudinal data include “observations on the same units 
in several different time periods” (Kennedy, 2008, p.281). A panel data set will 
have several entities, with repeating measurements over a number of different 
time periods. These entities (n) which are a series of observations (T) measured 
over time (t).  The panel may be described as long or a short panel, the former 
having many entities but short time periods whereas the latter has long time 
periods but limited entities.  It may also be balanced or unbalanced in that the 
balanced panel data means all the cross-sectional entities have the same number of 
time series observations; otherwise, it is unbalanced. There are a number of 
advantages to panel data namely that it concentrates accurately on the individual 
firm, thus avoiding problems of aggregation bias where the clustering effect of 
groups masks the importance of individual performance. The combination of time 
series and cross section provides a richer vein of data reduces collinearity and 
provides more degrees of freedom.  Panel data is also a better means of measuring 
the dynamics of change and provides a superior detection mechanism for effects 
that remain unobserved in either cross section or time series data – the omitted 
variables problem. It also enables the study of the complexity of technological or 
economic change and transition (Hsiao, 2014). 
 
Panel data models outline the individual behaviour across both individuals and 
time. 
There are three forms of models: the fixed effects model, the random effects 




Basic Regression model is essentially pooled OLS run as a panel data model, 
Greene (2012): 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑋𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑍𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = The dependent variable. 
 𝛽1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽2 = Coefficients. 
X it = Independent variable (changeable over time and individuals). 
𝑍𝑖= An unobserved individual and time-specific effect.  
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = Captures the ‘idiosyncratic errors’ or ‘idiosyncratic Disturbances’. 
𝑖&𝑡 = 𝑖 is an index for the entity and 𝑡 is an index for time.  
According to Greene (2012), the individual effect 𝑍𝑖  comprises a fixed term and a 
series of specific group variables that could be observed such as location and 
gender or unobserved as in specific features of family that are fixed over time. 
Furthermore, if the unobserved individual effect (𝑍𝑖) consists only a fixed term 
then the ordinary least-squares model (OLS) produces both a consistent and 
effective estimation of the slope vector β and the common intercept α. 
Furthermore, this base model makes some strong, possibly unrealistic, 
assumptions that x is non-stochastic and is not correlated with u, the error term (u) 
is not autocorrelated and is homoscedastic and there is strict exogeneity of 
independent variables. Clearly if the assumptions are correct then the Gauss 
Markov Theorem is not violated.  In this study this is unlikely and therefore it is 
likely to have an issue of both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The OLS 
estimator may be consistent but the standard errors are not consistent and bias is 
likely in the estimator. 
On the other hand, there is an ability to analyse panel data utilising fixed-effects 
or random-effects models to allow for the capturing of individual and time-
specific effects (Greene, 2012). Whereas, the fixed effects model tests the 
differences of the individual in intercepts with the assumption of the same 




(𝑍𝑖) refers to the time invariant heterogeneities across entities 𝑖 = 1, …,𝑛 and is 
not required to be independent in the regressions and is considered to be part of 
the intercept allowing it to be correlated with Xit. We now estimate 𝛽1, the effect 
on 𝑌𝑖 of the change in 𝑋𝑖 holding constant 𝑍𝑖 from the equation above.  We now 
allow 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 which gives the equation: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 (𝑋𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝛼𝑖 =   Anonymous intercept for an individual. With i=1,….n and t=1,…T 
Provided the fixed effects regression assumptions stated in the equation above, the 
distribution sampling of the OLS estimator in the fixed effects regression model in 
large samples is normal. The standard errors can be computed and the estimates 
variance can be estimated, t -statistics and confidence intervals for coefficients 
(Hanck et al., 2019). 
The principle of random effects model is that the variation across the entities 
assumes them to be uncorrelated and random with the independent variables 
involved in the model,  
“…the crucial distinction between fixed and random effects is whether the 
unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are correlated with the 
regressors in the model, not whether these effects are stochastic or not” 
(Greene, 2012, p.347).  
If there is any evidence to think that the dependent variable is impacted by any 
differences across entities, then random effects is the best option to be used. The 
benefit of random effects is that time invariant variables can be included (i.e. 
gender). In addition, these variables can be embodied by the intercept in the fixed 
effects model. 
The random effects model is: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = β (𝑋𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼 + µ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 




The assumption in random effects is that the error term entity is not correlated 
with the independent variables, which permits for time-invariant explanatory 
variables to assume a place in the model. The random effects model requires 
specifying those characteristics of individual that might or might not influence the 
independent variables. There is a potential problem with this in that the absence of 
certain variables may lead to omitted variable bias in the model.  
6.4.2 Fixed Effects and Random Effects 
A decision between fixed or random effects can be made through conducting a 
Hausman test (1978) where the null hypothesis is that the random effects model is 
preferred over the fixed effects model (Greene, 2012). It mainly examines whether 
the unique errors (ui) are correlated with the regressors, and the assumption of 
null hypothesis is that they are not. 
The test examines whether the individual effects in the model are uncorrelated 
with other regressors. The primary null hypothesis in the Hausman test is that 
there is no significant difference between the estimation generated by both 
random effects the fixed effects models. Thus, if the null hypothesis is rejected 
then fixed effects model is the appropriate model for the estimation and random 
effects model should be rejected. The Hausman test is applied to the regression 
models and the null hypothesis is rejected in some models and approved in others. 
Tables 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8 represent the result of applying Hausman test on the three 
estimation models in FTSE350, FTSE100 and FTSE250 respectively with 
dependent variable measured by Tobin’s Q and alternatively ROA as the 
dependent variable.  
6.5 Research Models  
The first model of this research tests the different components of tax minimisation 
and their impact on firm value. 
Model 1: The relationship between firm value and tax minimisation components. 
Q or ROA = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 BTDsit+ 𝛽2 TDsit+ 𝛽3 PDsit + 𝛽4 STRDsit+ 𝛽5 EMit+ 𝛽6 CIit+ 
𝛽7 LEVit+ 𝛽8 FOSit+ 𝛽9 DIit+ εit 
Where  




BTDs = Book tax differences 
TDs  = Temporary differences 
PDs  = Permanent differences 
STRDs = Overseas statutory tax rate differences 
EM  = Earnings management 
CI  = Capital intensity  
LEV = Leverage  
FOS = Foreign operation 
DI  = Dividends  
εit   = Error during the period.  
 
To define whether the valuation of tax book differences and its components differ 
upon corporate governance levels the following model is utilised: 
 
Model 2: The relationship between firm value and tax minimisation with the 
moderating role of institutional ownership and executive remuneration. 
Q or ROA = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 BTDsit+ 𝛽2 TDsit+ 𝛽3 PDsit + 𝛽4 STRDsit+ + 𝛽5 IOWNit + 𝛽6 
EREMit +  𝛽7 EMit+ 𝛽8 CIit+ 𝛽9 LEVit+ 𝛽10 FOSit+ 𝛽11 DIit+  εit 
Where;  
IOWN = Institutional ownership.   
EREM = Executive remuneration. 
 
Equation 3: The relationship between firm value and tax minimisation with 
moderating role of institutional ownership and remuneration, and interaction 
variables. 
 
Q or ROA = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 BTDsit+ 𝛽2 TDsit+ 𝛽3 PDsit + 𝛽4 STRDsit+ + 𝛽5 IOWNit + 𝛽6 
EREMit + 𝛽7 BTDsit * IOWNit t + 𝛽8 TDsit* IOWNit + 𝛽9 PDsit * IOWNit + 𝛽10 
STRDsit * IOWNit + 𝛽 11 BTDsit * EREMit + 𝛽 12 TDsit* EREMit + 𝛽 13 PDsit* 
EREMit + 𝛽14 STRDsit * EREMit + 𝛽15 EMit + 𝛽16 CIit + 𝛽17 LEVit + 𝛽18 FOSit + 𝛽19 
DIit +  εit 
Where: 
BTDsit * IOWNit t: The interaction between book tax differences and institutional 




TDsit* IOWNit: The interaction between temporary differences and institutional 
ownership variables.  
PDsit * IOWNit: The interaction between permanent differences and institutional 
ownership variables.  
STRDsit * IOWNit: The interaction between statutory tax rate differences and 
institutional ownership variables.  
BTDsit * EREMit: The interaction between book tax differences and executive 
remuneration variables.  
TDsit* EREMit: The interaction between temporary differences and executive 
remuneration variables.  
PDsit* EREMit: The interaction between permanent differences and executive 
remuneration variables.  
STRDsit * EREMit: The interaction between statutory tax rate differences and 
executive remuneration variables.  
 





6.6 Conclusion  
This chapter connects the previous chapter that details the theoretical framework 
for the hypotheses under examination and the next chapter, and then expands 
upon the testing of those hypotheses. The estimation models are explained in this 
chapter in order to address the research questions. This research makes two 
explicit contributions to the existing body of knowledge. Firstly, the study 
develops a new methodology, based on prior research, on examination of the 
relationship between tax minimisation and firm performance. Secondly, it utilises 
a distinctive set of book tax differences data that is collected from the tax 
footnotes of companies’ annual reports. This unique data calculation allows the 
scrutiny of the reporting standard of tax information in annual reports.  
The chapter specifies the study sample and data collection sources with a brief 
explanation concerning the nature of the data. The chapter then explains the 
variables used in measurement and in formulation of the models. The 
methodology is the underlying framework of the research that enables both the 
investigation of the theoretical and practical elements of the study. Finally, this 
chapter provides an explanation of the methodology used in analysing the findings, 





CHAPTER SEVEN: ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to analyse data and present findings from the models mentioned 
in the previous chapter. This research aims to examine the relationship between 
tax minimisation components thorough book-tax differences and firm value and 
then identify the influence of the internal and external corporate governance 
mechanisms on this relationship by investigating whether theses mechanisms play 
a significant moderating role on this relationship. This empirical examination is 
carried out through utilising three different regression models as follows: the 
influence of book-tax differences components on firm value using two different 
measures of firm value meausres namely, Tobin's Q and return on assets (ROA) as 
dependent variables 
To conduct this examination, the following regressions are carrying out; the first 
model examines the relationship between book-tax differences components and 
firm value utilising the two measures (Tobin's Q and ROA). This model is 
conducted on FTSE 350 sample, then on FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 separately to 
grasp the behaviour change in the relationship more deeply by first, discovering 
whether there is a change or not and second, interpreting the reasons underlying 
this change if found. Thus, this model is repeated six times; three times on the 
three samples using Tobin's Q and the same process is applied for the same three 
samples using ROA, figure 7.1 below explains this process.  
Further investigation is performed to moderate the relationship between book-tax 
differences and firm value by adding the external and internal corporate 
governance mechanisms to the first model, which lead to creating the second 
model of the analysis regression models. Moreover, interaction variables of 
corporate governance and tax minimisation components are added to the second 
model to create the third model and apply the regression on the three samples. 
These three main models are mentioned below in this chapter in the results and 

































































































As a result of potential heteroscedasticity issues, the regressions are applied utilising 
Huber White robust standard errors on the three models and samples using both 
Tobin's Q and ROA as firm value. Whilst, the full sample includes both positive and 
negative book-tax differences the whole process are applied again on positive book-
tax differences sample to obtain some insight in the changing behaviour of the 
relationship between firm value and tax minimisation. Additionally, the relationship 
between firm value and tax minimisation with the moderating role of corporate 
governance proxies followed by the relationship between firm value and tax 
minimisation with the corporate governance proxies and interaction variables.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows: First, it starts with cleansing and 
organising the data by demonstrating the tests for the outliers and influential 
observations utilising OLS regression to show the results before and after omitting 
outliers and then continues with descriptive statistics of the samples and further 
descriptive for the positive book-tax differences samples.  
 Additionally, to run the tests for the regression models a decision is made based on 
Hausman test to decide between fixed effects and random effects models. Thus, some 
robustness tests are also run to ensure that the conclusion is robust and confirm 
whether fixed effects or random effects are the appropriate models for each sample 
under investigation. These are Breusch-pagan tests to decide between random effects 
and OLS and both F-test and time fixed effects to decide whether both OLS and time 
fixed effects or fixed effects are the suitable models for the regressions.  
After choosing random and fixed effects models further specification tests are 
conducted namely, multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity tests, to make sure that the 
models under examination are free of multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity 
problems and to ensure the results are not biased.  
Further examinations are conducted to ensure the robustness of the results and the 
potential existence of endogeneity that can be detected after running the 
multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity tests. Additional three tests are conducted to 




results. Firstly, the test to explore the possibility of endogeneity, which can occur if 
there is a variable explained by other variables, which is not considered in the model.  
Secondly, year dummy tests are applied to examine the stability of the results 
reported over time by estimating the models over the period of the study, hereby 
reflecting the influence of time on the relationships for the three years under 
investigation, namely 2014, 2015 and 2016.  
This annual overview can lead to greater understanding of shareholders’ valuation of 
tax minimisation activities on an annual basis. The findings of these annual 
regressions for the three models using the two measures of firm value with a robust 
test of all regression models, which are reported in Appendix B-8, B-9 and B-10.  
Interpretations of the multivariate findings are provided after testing the models and 
detecting any statistical issue that could lead to a biased result. The discussion on the 
findings is provided on the results after performing the robustness test namely, the 
cross-section clustered Eicker-Huber-White standard errors, as panel data in 
accounting research might include potential serious cross-sectional dependency. This 
issue could be raised as a result of the companies’ data that could share similar 







7.2 Data Cleansing and Organisation.  
7.2.1 Outliers and Influential Variables 
In this section, a residual test is performed for the data subset to discover whether the 
sample has uncommon influences on the estimation models, which includes outliers 
and influential observations. Outliers are observations that have significant 
differences in nature from other observations through including an extreme value 
whether in one or more variables (Hair et al., 2014).  Hence, Outliers are the 
observations that differ significantly in their value from the mean and could, therefore, 
cause the estimator to be biased and inconsistent and the standard deviation to be 
exaggerated (Field, 2018).  
To resolve this potential anomaly, the outliers are identified by utilising a studentised 
residual for the data study to reduce the outliers’ effect (Hair et al., 2014). Some 
research determines outliers by virtue of studentised residual>|2|, claiming that this 
number shows a residual of large observations, which could be a signal of unusual 
value (Belsley et al. 1980; Chen et al. 2005). Whilst, other research identifies outliers 
based on studentised residual>|1.96| to reduce reverse causation (Black et al., 2017). 
In taxation research, outliers based on studentised residual |3| are used (Bauman and 
Shaw, 2008). This excludes more observations and could explain that the sample of 
taxation research has a unique form in terms of calculating tax variables, which tends 
to be smaller than other accounting research samples.  
Following prior research in controlling outliers, the data of this research tests using 
studentised residual (by filtering observations with R of |3|) in order to reduce the bias 
of influential observations (Bauman and Shaw, 2008). The studentised residuals are 
calculated from the full sample and four observations (0.78 per cent of the whole of 
507 observations for 169 companies) from the regression models are deleted. Thus, 
the final sample includes 168 individual companies, with 503 company-years 
observations16. Within this sample, 17 observations are without a Tobin’s Q value; 
 





automatically omitted by STATA. Thus, the total observations under regression after 
omitting outliers are 486.  
The results are presented In Table 7.1 before and after excluding the outliers, column 
1 shows the full sample without the exclusion of outliers and column 2 post omission. 
Column 1 and column 2 of Table 7.1 below shows the OLS regression result for 490 
observations and 486 observations 17  (after excluding the outlier). The reason 
underlying the use of OLS is that it is considered highly sensitive to extreme 
observation whether in dependent or independent variables (Leone, Minutti-Meza, 
and Wasley, 2019). In addition, Leone, Minutti-Meza, and Wasley (2019) suggest 
that the robust regression (RR) and OLS provides similar coefficients and 
conclusions when there is no influential observation.  
  
 




Table 0-1: Book Tax differences components, firm value by Q and CG components 
 
Test Full sample (1) After omitting outliers (2) 
PDs T 3.57 3.48 
P>|t| 0.000*** 0.001*** 
TDs T -1.69 -0.78 
P>|t| 0.091* 0.439 
STRDs T 3.33 3.62 
P>|t| 0.001*** 0.000*** 
IOWN T -2.83 -3.29 
P>|t| 0.005*** 0.001*** 
EREM T -0.78 -0.79 
P>|t| 0.435 0.432 
EM T 2.39 3.29 
P>|t| 0.017** 0.001*** 
CI T -0.34 -0.84 
P>|t| 0.734 0.401 
LEV T 11.07 12.34 
P>|t| 0.000*** 0.000*** 
FOS T 0.23 -0.37 
P>|t| 0.818 0.710 
DIV T -0.52 -0.60 
P>|t| 0.605 0.549 
Cons T 16.75 17.82 







Breusch-Pagan chi2 (1) 2.65 12.10 
prop> chi2 0.1036 0.0005*** 
 
***, **and * significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
PDs: Permanent differences, TDs: Temporary differences, STRDs: Statutory tax rate differences, 
IOWN: Institutional ownership, EREM: Executive remuneration, EM: Earnings management, CI: 




Comparing the two results before and after removing the outliers, the coefficients of 
book tax differences (BTDs) components; permanent tax differences (PDs) and 
statutory tax rate differences are significant before and after excluding the outliers. In 
contracts, temporary tax difference (TDs) is significant at 10% before outliers but not 
significant after, however, statutory tax rate overseas differences has improved in its 
degree of significance degree after excluding the outliers from 3.33 to 3.62 and both 
coefficients amount are significant at 99%.  
 For corporate governance proxies institutional ownership (IOWN) is significant 
before and after removing the outliers and executives remuneration coefficient is not 
significant in the two cases18. In addition, R square has improved from 0.2729 to 
0.3221 after excluding the outliers, which provide a better fit of the data for the 
regression models.  For this reason, the examination of the regression models is run 
after excluding the outliers.  In addition, the Breusch-Pagan test shows a significant 
result after excluding the outliers, which also emphasises the decision.  
Another issue to consider in this data research is controlling for influential 
observations that is defined by Belsley et al (1980) as DFFITs.  This control of the 
influential data can be tested using the leverage of Difference in Fits (DFFITs), when 
|DFFIT| > 2√ (P/N), where P explains the number of independent variables and N 
indicates the number of observations. DFFITS is a diagnostic that explains how 
influential a point is in a statistical regression.  It is identified as the Studentised 
DFFIT, where the latter is the change in the predicted value for a point, gained when 
that point is excluded from the regression; Studentisation is achieved by dividing the 
estimated standard deviation of the fit at that point. The threshold for detecting 
influential data is |0.495| and there are no observations in the sample data that 
exceeded the threshold. Thus, this confirms that there are no influential observations 
that could excessively affect the models estimated.   
The use of Cook’s distance for observations measures the extent of change in 
regression coefficients after excluding influential observations. Kleinbaum et al. 
 




(2013) explain that utilising a cook’s distance threshold of less than (1) in excluding 
observation does not have a significant effect on parameter estimates. Therefore, the 
sample has 489 observations if the dependent variable (firm value) measures by Q 
and 503 observations if it measures by ROA, which are the base for the further 
analysis and tests.  
7.2.2 Descriptive Statistics  
The tables 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 below show the descriptive statistics of  FTSE 350, 
FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 samples utilized to test the market valuation of book tax 
differences components. The size of the samples varies from the total sample 
mentioned in the previous chapter because of the exclusion of outliers that appeared 
in the estimation model tests of the book tax differences components.  Total 
observations are 486 and 500 of FTSE 350 for both dependent variables; Tobin’sQ 
and ROA respectively. The sample of 486 observations that demonstrates Tobin’s Q 
as a dependent variable can be divided into 184 observations for FTSE 100 
companies and 302 observations for FTSE 250 companies. Whilst, the sample of 500 
observations that reflects ROA as a dependent variable can also, be separated to 186 
observations for FTSE 100, 314 observations for FTSE 250 as explains in the table 7-
3 below. 
Table 0-2: The distribution of the observations 
Sample FTSE 350 FTSE 100 FTSE 250 
Tobin’s Q 486 184 302 
ROA 500 186 314 
Table 7-3 represents the total observations for the study sample of FTSE 350 with an 
average of equity market value after three months of releasing the annual reports 
(MVE+3) of £7,551.589 (in £ million). The whole sample has a negative sign for tax 
saving, book tax differences and permanent tax differences of £-6.431, £-113.4542 




differences and 9.3212 statutory tax rate differences. The positive sign of statutory 
tax rate differences indicates that the UK tax rate is lower than the jurisdictions' tax 
rate (Abdul Wahab and Holland, 2015). In addition, ETR is lower than STR, which 
explains the negative sign of tax saving for the whole sample as a result of the 
corporate tax rate reducing in the UK to 20% during the sample of a study comparing 
to the previous 10 years.  
For the corporate governance variables, the average of IOWN is 34.792%, which is 
slightly higher than the value reported in the previous UK research concerning tax 
minimisation and corporate governance, which was at 33.54% (Abdul Wahab and 
Holland, 2012; Florackis, 2008) with considering the changes over years. However, 
managerial ownership MOWN is at 20%, which is higher than the value in the 
previous studies conduct in the UK, which indicates the increase in MOWN over time.  
The remuneration average is £ 6.860 million with EREM/BEt-1 0.226%, which also 
higher than the previous studies such as Abdul Wahab and Holland (2012). This 
difference could lead to different outcomes in term of its significance.   
In table 7-4, the data represents a sample of FTSE 100 the largest trade companies 
listed in LSE (in £ million) with an average of MVEt+3 £17,426.44
19 . Those 
companies have an average ETR of 23.0 per cent, contrary, a negative tax saving TS 
average of 17.41. The average ETR of FTSE 250 in table 7-5 is approximately 
equivalent to FTSE 100; it counts for 23.0 per cent and higher in tax saving with a 
positive amount of 0.01. This shows the appearance of a tax saving strategy amongst 
FTSE 250 companies comparing with FTSE 100 companies. In addition, this 
difference indicates the variance in the scope of book tax differences between both 
indices sample. The average tax saving in FTSE 250 companies is higher comparing 
to FTSE 100 companies by the amount of 17.40.  
 
19  There are some companies published their annual reports in different currency (Euro and Dollar), an 
exchange rate is applied for every company after three months of releasing the annual report with 
considering the end of the fiscal year for every companies. The rates are extracted from Xe currency 





In addition, in both samples, ETR is higher than STR, where STR in the average 
counts for 21 per cent in both FTSE 100 and FTSE 250. This is inconsistent with pre-
tax income being higher than taxable income over the period of study, which 
indicates the narrowness in the scope of book tax differences among the study sample. 
From the mean of the book tax differences (BTDs) and its components for both FTSE 
100 and FTSE 250 sample. In average, FTSE 100 companies have negative BTDs of 
£ 264.96 out of which negative PDs £271.78 and the rest is a positive TDs 6.82.  This 
means most of the tax saving is generated by temporary tax differences and expected 
to reverse in the future. Similarly, for the FTSE 250 companies, the average BTDs is 
negative of £24.56 out of which negative PDs £29.61 and a positive value of TDs 
£5.05.  This can be explained as there are only few companies practising tax 
minimisation strategy, which can be shown in the minimum and maximum figures of 
PDs TDs. In term of overseas tax rate differences, the mean of STRDs of both 
samples has a positive sign, which indicates that companies had to pay an overseas 
tax rate on their overseas income more than the domestic tax rate on their domestic 
income that shows the UK tax rate is lower than overseas tax rates.  
Concerning corporate governance components, the average of managerial ownership 
is 16.16 per cent of total common equity for FTSE 100 and 20.80 per cent of total 
common equity for FTSE 250; however, this variable is dropped from the estimation 
models because it only counts for 68 observations. This indicates a lower level of 
managerial ownership for both indices sample in comparing to institutional 
ownership, which indicates an average of 27.57 and 39.03 of substantial institutions’ 
shareholdings for both indices, respectively. This result shows the significance of the 
institutional ownership in the UK companies in comparison with managerial 
ownership and the role that institutional ownership can play to control tax strategic 
decisions. In terms of executive remuneration, on average, executive directors receive 
from £11.541 and £ 4.112 (in £ million) for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 respectively. 
With linking remuneration with firm market value 17,426.44 and 1,703.378 ( in 
£ million) in the two samples FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 respectively, there is a 




that the increase of remuneration is more liked to firm value rather than the agency 
issues ( Matolcsy and Wright, 2010; Gabaix and Landier, 2008).  
To summarise, FTSE 100 companies have smaller institutional ownership percentage 
than FTSE 250. However, executive remuneration is higher for FTSE 100 compared 
to FTSE 250.  This result is consistent with Ozkan (2007) who states that institutional 
ownership in the UK companies has a significant negative effect on executive 
remuneration. Similarly, Dong and Ozkan (2008) suggest that passive transient 
institutional investors in the UK lead to increase managerial discretion and in 





Table 0-3: Descriptive Statistics of FTSE350 Companies 




7,551.589 163.34 175,651.7 17,305.570 
TI (£m) 440.395 -72.170 20,320.990 1,368.889 
IBT (£m) 326.7476 0.17 10,526 821.9585 
TS (£m) -6.431 -1,366.49 715.72 108.333 
BTDs (m) -113.4542 -9,794.990 2,067.15 695.339 
PDs (£m) -119.158 -7,730.790 2,003.160 546.8775 
TDs (£m) 5.704 -2705 1,652.170 256.819 
STRDs (£m) 9.3212 -35 1035 58.146 
ETR 0.235 -0.80 1.57 0.249 
STR 0.209 0.1 0.23 0.013 
Tobin’s Q 486 0.522 0.01 1.14 0.221 
ROA 500 13.522 -4.92 316.10 24.691 
IOWN 503 34.792 0 87.21 19.281 
EREM (£m) 6.860 0.150 84.158 9.036 
REM/BEt-1 0.226 -0.7 12.01 0.969 
EM -0.001 -2.91 4.73 0.483 
CI 0.236 0 1.45 0.252 
LEV 0.212 0 2.7 0.246 
FOS 50.757 0 100 38.195 
DI 1.598 -0.31 79.35 4.076 
     
 
MVET+3 months: Equity market value after three months of the annual report publication,  TI: 
Taxable income, IBT: Income before tax, TS: Tax saving  BTDs: Book tax differences, PDs: 
Permanent differences, TDs: Temporary differences, STRDs: Statutory tax rate differences, ETR: 
Effective tax rate, STR: Statutory tax rate, ROA: Return on assets, MOWN: Managerial ownership, 
IOWN: Institutional ownership, EREM: Executive remuneration, REM/BEt-1: Executive remuneration 
to equity book value in the prior year, EM: Earnings management, CI: Capital intensity, LEV: 





Table 0-4: Descriptive Statistics: FTSE100 Companies 




17426.44 1076.54 175,651.7 25482.57 
TI(£m) 963.50 0.27 20321 2144.94 
IBT (£m) 698.54 0.17 10526 1265.21 
TS (£m) -17.41 -1366.49 715.72 176.02 
BTDs (£m) -264.96 -9794.99 2067.15 1116.11 
PDs (£m) -271. 78 -7730.79 2003.16 862.13 
TDs (£m) 6.82 -2705 1652.17 417.17 
STRos (£m) 21.21 -35 1035 94.16 
ETR 0.23 -.8 1.57 0.26 
STR  0.21 0.13 0.23 0.012 
Tobin’s Q 184 0.560 0.01 1.14 0.24 
ROA 186 15.83 -4.92 316.10 38.62 
IOWN 184 27.57 0 86.14 17.62 
REM (£m) 11.541 0.479 84.158 12.829 
REM/BVEt-1 0.333 -0.7 12.01 1.18 
EM .02 -1.46 4.73 0.53 
CI 0.25 0 1 0.26 
LEV 0.22 0 0.57 0.15 
FOS 61.49 0 100 35.56 
DI 0.98 -0.28 16.39 1.58 
     
 
1 MVET+3 months: Equity market value after three months of the annual report publication,  TI: 
Taxable income, IBT: Income before tax, TS: Tax saving  BTDs: Book tax differences, PDs: 
Permanent differences, TDs: Temporary differences, STRDs: Statutory tax rate differences, ETR: 
Effective tax rate, STR: Statutory tax rate, ROA: Return on assets, MOWN: Managerial ownership, 
IOWN: Institutional ownership, EREM: Executive remuneration, REM/BEt-1: Executive remuneration 
to equity book value in the prior year, EM: Earnings management, CI: Capital intensity, LEV: 




Table 0-5: Descriptive Statistics: FTSE250 Companies 
 
MVET+3 months: Equity market value after three months of the annual report publication,  TI: 
Taxable income, IBT: Income before tax, TS: Tax saving  BTDs: Book tax differences, PDs: 
Permanent differences, TDs: Temporary differences, STRDs: Statutory tax rate differences, ETR: 
Effective tax rate, STR: Statutory tax rate, ROA: Return on assets, MOWN: Managerial ownership, 
IOWN: Institutional ownership, EREM: Executive remuneration, REM/BEt-1: Executive remuneration 
to equity book value in the prior year, EM: Earnings management, CI: Capital intensity, LEV: 
Leverage, FOS: Foreign sales, DIV: Dividends. 
 
Variables  
Mean Min Max Standard 
Deviation 
MVET+3months (£m) 1703.378 163.34 8769.88 1207.65 
TI (£m) 133.46 -72.17 2186.66 166.63 
IBT (£m) 108.60 2.23 497.87 83.86  
TS 0.01 -130 65.15 19.83 
BTDs (£m) -24.56 -1779.38 275.04 131.78 
PDs (£m) -29.61 -1977.04 275.04 134.97 
TDs (£m) 5.05 -285 254.81 53.79 
STRDs (£m) 2.35 .22.24 61 6.96 
ETR 0.23 -0.57 1.57 0.24 
STR 0.21 0.10 0.23 0.01 
Tobin’s Q (302) 0.50 0.02 0.99 0.21 
ROA 314 12.16 -2.72 79.38 9.23 
IOWN 299 39.03 0 87.21 18.98 
REM (£m) 4.112 0.150 32.238 3.587 
REM/BEt-1 0.16 -0.7 12.01 0.82 
EM -0.01 -2.91 3.57 0.45 
CI 0.22 0 1.45 0.25 
LEV 0.21 0 2.7 0.29 
FOS 44.46 0 100 38.41 
DI 1.96 -0.31 79.35 4.96 




7.2.3 Descriptive Statistics – Positive Book Tax Difference Sample 
To understand tax minimisation behaviour through book tax difference and its effect 
on firm value suggests analysing this variable with its components namely PDs, TDs 
and STRDs in more details to distinguish between book tax difference and its 
components in the effect on firm value. This section furthers the descriptive statistic 
of BTDs and its components (TDs and PDs) as well as STRDs to enhance the 
understanding of the different components of book tax differences and their different 
impact on firm value.   
To examine the effect of book tax differences on performance, the sample is reduced 
to concentrate only on the positive BTDs observations to identify companies that are 
involved in tax reduction and obtain a better understanding of their behaviour. Table 
B-1 shows the descriptive statistic of 179 observations of FTSE 350 that have 
positive BTDs during the period of study. These observations count for 
approximately 60 companies out of 168 companies, which average 35.59% of the 
total sample.  
From the mean of BTDs and its components TDs and PDs, the average BTDs count 
for 89.9 per cent, contributed mostly for TDs with an average of 70.745% with PDs 
counting for only 18.67%. This means only 20.88 per cent of total BTDs are 
permanent differences, which will not reverse in the future, and 79.12 per cent 
express timing difference and this will be reversed in the future.  
In contrast, to the previous sample, this sample has ETR lower than STR, where STR 
is 21% the ETR is only 9%. Overall, based on BTDs and its components of tax saving 
the positive amount of BTDs consequently generate positive TDs and PDs, which 
leads to the conclusion that for positive BTDs sample, BTDs, TDs and PDs increase 
tax saving to 32.36 per cent. Moreover, the difference between IBT 293.68 and TI 
204.28 is equal to BTDs 89.40 per cent.   
Corporate governance and control variables correspond to the previous tables. For 
further explanation of book tax differences with its components TDs and PDs. 




shown in tables B-2 and B-3 respectively. Concerning BTDs in both samples, the 
BTDs in FTSE 100 £172.320 smaller than BTDs in FTSE 250 50.660; however, PDs 
in the latter sample £23.020 is more than in the former sample £9.350. It indicates 
that FTSE 250 companies involved in tax minimisation that will not reverse in the 
future more than FTSE 100.  
The average of both Tobin’s Q and ROA are approximately similar in both samples. 
With linking these results with corporate governance variables, it can be noted that 
the average of institutional ownership (IOWN) in FTSE 100 is 25.05 per cent smaller 
than the institutional ownership in FTSE 250 is 38.96 per cent. This indicates that 
external control in FTSE 250 is higher than in FTSE 100, however, it does not 
prevent companies from engaging in tax minimisation as the results above shown. 
This result concurs with the claim that institutional ownership in the UK is passive 
and ineffective in their monitoring role and in using their voting rights (Khurshed et 
al., 2011). In addition, a high level of institutional ownership could lead the minority 
institutional shareholders to take the opportunity to endorse their own interest without 
considering other shareholders (Hart, 1995).  
In contrast, FTSE 100 remuneration payment to executive directors (in £ million) is 
on average £ 9.917(£ million), which is nearly triple, the mount that FTSE 250 paid 
3.779 (£ million). This is not surprised as the magnitude of the work responsibility 





7.2.4 Model Specifications  
This research utilises panel data to examine the relationship between tax minimisation 
components and firm value with considering corporate governance mechanisms as a 
moderating role in this relationship. There are some specific econometric tests are 
conducted to determine the suitable panel model for each regression including the 
Hausman test, the F-test and the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test (LM) testing 
for time-fixed effects (Gujarati, 2003; Breusch and Pagan, 1979; Hausman, 1978)20. 
Tables 7-6, 7-7 and 7-8 show the summary of the specification tests for all the three 
models using both Tobin’s Q and ROA separately as dependent variables, for the 
three samples FTSE 350, FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 respectively. 
Table 0-6: Model Specification for FTSE 350 
Specification Test Model 1 
 
Model 2  
 
Model 3   
 
Q ROA Q ROA Q ROA 
Hausman Test for 
Fixed Vs Random 
Effects Model [if 
















Test for Random 
Effects Vs OLS [if 
≤0.05 = Random 
Effect is used]  
- Prob > 
chibar2 =   
0.000 
- Prob > 
chibar2 =   
0.000 
- Prob > 
chibar2 =   
0.000 
F-Test for Fixed 
Effects Vs OLS [if 
prob>F ≤0.05= Fixed 
Effect is used] 
Prob>chi





2 =      
0.000 
- Prob>chi
2 =      
0.0251 
- 
Testparm (Effects) [if 
≤0.5 → Time Fixed 
Effect is used] 
Prob > F 
=    
0.6268 
- Prob > F 
=    
0.6046 
- Prob > F 
=    
0.5306 
- 














20 To conduct the analysis of multiple regressions some specific tests are carried out on the panel data 
to choose the most appropriate regression models.  





7.2.4.1 Hausman Test. 
Hausman test in econometrics is a statistical hypothesis test (Hausman, 1978). This 
test is used to make a decision whether to utilise fixed effects or random effects test 
to ensure that, if necessary, the effects of specific heterogeneities of firms and time 
are captured. The Hausman test equation is as follows (Baum, 2006):  
𝐻= (?̂?𝑐-?̂?𝑒)'D- (?̂?𝑐-?̂?𝑒) 
?̂?𝑐 = An estimator consistent with both null and alternative hypothesis  
?̂?𝑒 An estimator fully efficient with the null, but inconsistent if the null is false.  
The Hausman test is applied on the three models utilising Tobin’s Q and, separately 
ROA as a dependent for FTSE 350 sample. The results reject the null hypothesis for 
the three models with Tobin’s Q, as their results are less than 0.05, thus, fixed effects 
model is the most suitable for them. However, for all models with ROA, the results 
are more than 0.05, thus; the random-effects model is the most suitable model in this 
instance.  
 
As a consequence, for fixed-effects models, two tests are required namely the F-test, 
which confirms that fixed effects are more suitable than the pooled ordinary linear 
model (OLS), and Time fixed effects for determining if the time dummies for the 
years are equal to zero or not. In contrast, for random effects, the Breusch-Pagan test 
is required to confirm it is more suitable than the pooled ordinary linear model (OLS).  
 
7.2.4.2 Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test (LM) 
For random-effects models, the Lagrange Multiplier test (LM) is conducted to select 
between panel regression (random effects) and ordinary least squares regression 
(OLS). If the result is less than 0.05, it implies that there is a significant difference 
across units, the null hypothesis is rejected and random-effects model is needed to run 





F-test is utilised to make the comparision between statistical models that were 
selected and a data set to determine the model that is considered the most sutible for 
the population of the data sample.  F- test is a statistical test that has F distribution 
through the null hypothesis if the prob > F result is less than  or equal 0.05, indicates 
that fixed effects model is not zero and the combined error terms are correlated (𝑢𝑖 +
 ℰ𝑖𝑡) then the null hypothesis is rejected and fixed effects model is chosen over OLS.  
The supposed fixed effects model is as follows (Lomax and Hahs-Vaughn, 2007):  
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽 𝒳𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(𝜇𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 ) = Observed and unobserved fixed effects are equal to zero.  
 The F- test is used to test the three models with Tobin’s Q and the results show that 
fixed effects are required. 
7.2.4.4 Time-Fixed Effects Test (Testparm)  
To identify the most appropriate model between fixed effects and time fixed effects, a 
common test is carried out to examine if the time dummies for all the period under 
investigation is equal to zero, and if so, time fixed effects are not required. This is can 
be understood if prob>F is equal or less than 0.05, then the null hypothesis is rejected 
and time fixed effects are required. The Testparm applies to the three models with 
Tobin’s Q for time fixed effects with adding year dummies, the results do not reject 
the null hypothesis, and thus, fixed effects model is required.  
The same tests are conducted for the two-samples FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 and the 






Table 0-7: Model Specification for FTSE 100 




Q ROA Q ROA Q ROA 
Hausman Test for 
Fixed Vs Random 
Effects Model [if 
≤0.05 = Fixed 
Effect] 
Prob>chi2 
=      
0.0000 
Prob>chi2 
=      
0.0254 
Prob>chi2 
=      
0.0000 
Prob>chi2 
=      
0.0995 
Prob>chi2 
=      
0.0000 
Prob>chi2 
=      
0.1069 
Breusch-Pagan LM 
Test for Random 
Effects Vs OLS [if 
≤0.05 = Random 
Effect is used] 
- - - Prob > 
chibar2 =   
0.0000 
- Prob > 
chibar2 =   
0.0000 
F-Test for Fixed 
Effects Vs OLS [if 
prob>F ≤0.05= 
Fixed Effect is 
used] 
Prob>chi2 
=      
0.0000 
Prob>chi2 
=      
0.0582 
Prob>chi2 
=      
0.0000 
- Prob>chi2 





Effects) [if ≤0.5 → 
Time Fixed Effect 
is used] 
Prob > F 
=    
0.1728 
Prob > F 
=    
0.4803 
Prob > F 
=    
0.2171 
- Prob > F 
=    
0.7609 
- 
















Table 0-8: Model Specification for FTSE 250 
Specification Test Model 1 Model 2  
 
Model 3  
Q ROA Q ROA Q ROA 
Hausman Test for 
Fixed Vs Random 
Effects Model [if 
≤0.05 = Fixed 
Effect] 
Prob>chi
2 =      
0.0277 
Prob>chi2 
=      
0.3172 
Prob>chi2 
=      
0.0611 
Prob>chi2 
=      
0.2442 
Prob>chi2 




 0.3183     
Breusch-Pagan LM 
Test for Random 
Effects Vs OLS [if 
≤0.05 = Random 
Effect is used] 
- Prob > 
chibar2 =   
0.0000 
Prob > 
chibar2 =   
0.0000 
Prob > 
chibar2 =   
0.0000 
Prob > 
chibar2 =   
0.000 
Prob > 
chibar2 =   
0.000 
F-Test for Fixed 
Effects Vs OLS [if 
prob>F ≤0.05= 
Fixed Effect is 
used] 
Prob>chi
2 =      
0.0011 
- - - - - 
Testparm (Testing 
for Time-Fixed 
Effects) [if ≤0.05 
→ Time Fixed 
Effect is used] 
  Prob > F 
=    
0.1730 
- - - - - 

















7.3. Diagnostics and Robustness Checks 
In order to satisfy the validity of the panel data models that will be utilised in this 
research hypothesis tests will be conducted to identify potential problems of 
multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Multicollinearity means 
there are two or more independent variables in correlation with each other (Hair et al., 
2014). Thus, it is essential to identify and solve any multicollinearity issue before 
carrying out the multivariate analysis in order to determine robustly the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables (Hair et al., 2014).   For the study 
purpose, these tests are carried out before conducting the most appropriate panel data 
regression models as following.   
7.3.1 Correlation Matrix  
In the analyses of the correlation matrix, high coefficients of the independent 
variables 0.9 and more, indicates considerable collinearity (Hair et al., 2014). The 
Pearson’s coefficients are evaluated and are shown in tables B-4, B-5 and B-6 in the 
appendix B for FTSE 350, FTSE100 and FTSE250 respectively.  
From the tables below, the independent variables are not correlated as the coefficients 
are less than 0.9 for all samples instead of the coefficient of the correlation between 
PDs and BTDs more than 0.9 (0.9423, 0.9434, 0.9253) in FTSE 350, FTSE 100  and 
FTSE 250. For that reason, BTDs is omitted from the three models, which indicates 
potential extreme multicollinearity.  However, this issue can be solved by further tests 
to control any possible appearance of multicollinearity in the robustness analyses.  
7.3.2 Multicollinearity Test (VIF) 
In addition, multicollinearity investigates using variance inflation factors (VIF) for 
testing the independent variables as explained in Multicollinearity test subsection. 
The results of testing the hypotheses are reported in three subsections: First Firm 
value and tax minimisation components and second, firm value, tax minimisation 




components and the interaction variables of tax minimisation components and 
corporate governance for the three samples ( FTSE 350, FTSE 100, FTSE 250).  
To detect the existing of multicollinearity by investigating whether two or more 
variables are correlated at a higher degree or not, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is 
applied to the estimation models. The significant multicollinearity between 
independent variables can be identified when the VIF is more than 10 that high 
existing of multicollinearity might impact the estimation of the regression parameters 






𝑅𝑖2 = The unadjusted R2 if 𝑋𝑖 is regressed against all the independent variables in the 
estimation models.  
Thus, if the result of VIF is greater than 10, there is multicollinearity between 
variables (Kleinbaum et al. 2013; Hair et al., 2014).  From the tables 7-9, 7-10 and 7-
11 below the highest VIF score is 6.42, thus, multicollinearity is not problematic in 





Table 0-9: Multicollinearity Test for FTSE 350 
Model  Multicollinearity Test (VIF) 
(𝑖𝑓𝑉𝐼𝐹 < 10 => 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦) 
Model 
1 
Q Mean VIF =  1.91 
ROA Mean VIF = 1.89 
Model 
2 
Q Mean VIF =  1.74 
ROA Mean VIF =  1.73 
Model 
3  
Q Mean VIF =  4.97 
ROA Mean VIF = 4.92 
Table 0-10: Multicollinearity Test for FTSE100 
Model  
Multicollinearity Test (VIF) 
(𝑖𝑓𝑉𝐼𝐹 < 10 => 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦) 
Model 
1 
Q Mean VIF =  1.98 
ROA Mean VIF = 1.97 
Model 
2 
Q Mean VIF = 1.83 
ROA Mean VIF = 1.82 
Model 
3 
Q Mean VIF = 6.41 
ROA Mean VIF = 6.42 
Table 0-11: Multicollinearity Test for FTSE250 
 
Model  Multicollinearity Test (VIF) 
(𝑖𝑓𝑉𝐼𝐹 < 10 => 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦) 
Model 
1 
Q Mean VIF =   1.24 
ROA Mean VIF =   1.25 
Model 
2 
Q Mean VIF =   1.21 
ROA Mean VIF =   1.21 
Model 
3  
Q Mean VIF =   3.85 




7.3.3 Heteroscedasticity Test  
Heteroscedasticity test concerns the relationship between the cross-section error term 
and dependent variables. Heteroscedasticity can cause unequal scatter, in which the 
distribution of the value of the dependent variable is non-constant among the values 
of the independent variables (Hair et al., 2014).   
Furthermore, the existence of heteroscedasticity explains that the variation of the 
dependent variable is not similarly defined by every independent variable, which 
leads to limiting the explanation of the regressors impacts. This can cause inaccurate 
estimation of the standard error; thus, the findings of hypotheses testing will be 
biased. Utilising modified Wald Test, in which the results of prob>chi2 should be 
>0.05 in order to accept the null hypothesis that there is no heteroscedasticity in the 
regression model (Hair et al., 2014). 
  The tables 7-12, 7-13 and 7-14 below show the results of the modified Wald Test, 
which indicates there is an existence of heteroscedasticity in the three models as the 
prob>chi2 are less than 0.005, utilising Tobin’s Q and ROA as the dependent variable 
for the three samples (FTSE 350, FTSE 100, FTSE 250). Solving this issue is 
performed through applying cluster robust standard errors at the panel data level, 
which leads to clustering standard errors that can be heteroscedastic and 
autocorrelation (Hair et al., 2014). 
Table 0-12: Heteroscedasticity Test for FTSE 350 
Model 
Modified Wald Test for Groupwise Heteroscedasticity (𝑖𝑓 < 0.05 =>
𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝐻𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) 
Model 
1 
Q Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
ROA Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
Model 
2  
Q Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
ROA Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
Model 
3 
Q Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 




Table 0-13: Heteroscedasticity Test for FTSE 100 
Model  Modified Wald Test for Groupwise Heteroscedasticity (𝑖𝑓 < 0.05 =>
𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝐻𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) 
Model 
1 
Q Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
ROA Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
Model 
2 
Q Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
ROA Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
Model 
3 
Q Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
ROA Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
Table 0-14: Heteroscedasticity Test for FTSE 250 
Model  
Modified Wald Test for Groupwise Heteroscedasticity (𝑖𝑓 < 0.05 =>
𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝐻𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) 
Model 
1 
Q Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
ROA Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
Model 
2  
Q Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
ROA Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
Model 
3 
Q Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
ROA Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
 
7.3.4 Autocorrelation Test  
The appearance of autocorrelation in linear panel data estimation models can lead to 
bias in the standard errors, which in turn lead to inefficient results (Wooldridge, 
2010). To detect the serial correlation in the estimation models the Wooldridge test is 
conducted on the three models and there is no autocorrelation issue existed upon 
FTSE 350 and FTSE 250 regression models as the results of prob>F are all less than 
or equal 0.05 (Wooldridge, 2010). However, the FTSE 100 sample has a serial 
correlation in model 1, 2 and model 3 when dependent variable measures with ROA, 




Tables 7-15, 7-16 and 7-17 below show the results of the serial correlation test for the 
three samples.  
Table 0-15: Autocorrelation Test for FTSE 350 
Model  
Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data (𝑖𝑓 <
0.05 => 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑠) 
Model 1 
Q Prob>F  =      0.0008 
ROA Prob>F  =      0.0003 
Model 2  
Q Prob>F  =      0.0011 
ROA Prob>F  =      0.0002 
Model 3 
Q Prob>F  =      0.0017 
ROA Prob>F  =      0.0004 
 
Table 0-16: Autocorrelation Test for FTSE 100 
Model  
Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data (if < 0.05 =
> 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖al Correlation upon varaibes) 
Model 1 
Q Prob>F  =   0.0000 
ROA Prob>F  =   0.0606 
Model 2  
Q Prob>F  =   0.0000 
ROA Prob>F  =   0.0517 
Model 3 
Q Prob>F  =   0.0001 
ROA Prob>F  =   0.0769 
 
Table 0-17: Autocorrelation Test for FTSE 250 
Model  
Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data (𝑖𝑓 <
0.05 => ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑠) 
Model 1 
Q Prob>F  =       0.0032 
ROA Prob>F  =       0.0000 
Model 2  
Q Prob>F  =       0.0029 
ROA Prob>F  =       0.0000 
Model 3 
Q Prob>F  =       0.0024 





7.3.5 Endogeneity Test.   
Endogeneity occurs when an explanatory variable is correlated with the error term. 
Regards to Baum (2006) this issue may lead to infringement of the zero conditional 
mean hypothesis of the linear regression model. Identifying the endogeneity issue 
amongst tax minimisation variables can be through considering a lag tax 
minimisation variable to instrument for lagged dependent variables (Loretz and 
Moore, 2013).   The lag variable is assumed to be an exogenous variable, which 
explains only tax minimisation without firm value. This is derived from the 
hypothesis that the scale of tax minimisation can be influential across time; however, 
this assumption is inapplicable on firm market value. This is as a result of the short 
periodic nature of the tax-saving and the trigger of some specific economic situation 
that may happen during the year (Minnick and Noga, 2010). This study utilises 
simultaneous equation approach to identify the potential endogeneity issue, which 
considered as the most appropriate explanation in the tax research context (Minnick 
and Noga, 2010; Annuar et al., 2014). 
Testing this assumption on the research first equation model by re-estimating the 
model utilising a dynamic panel estimator, which monitors for simultaneity namely 
2SLS, in which lag tax minimisation components are adopted as estimator variables 
of tax minimisation components. According to Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of the 
endogeneity, the table in the appendix B-7 shows that the findings reject the 
endogeneity of the tax minimisation variable (chi-squard value = 5.01 with p value = 
0.1708). Thus, the conclusion is that the present tax minimisation scale is exogenous 
from its lag.    
7.3.6 Year Dummy  
It is advantageous to examine the constancy of the results reported over time by 
estimating the models over the period of study to reflect the effect of time on the 
relationship for the three years under investigation; 2014, 2015 and 2016. This annual 
examination can lead to more understanding of shareholders’ valuation of tax 




three models using the two measurements of firm value are reported in the appendix 
B; tables B-8, B-9 and B-10.  
7.4 Result and Discussion 
Multivariate analyses are carried out after excluding the outliers (Chen et al., 2005) 
and influential observations (Belsley et al., 1980). This section represents the main 
findings extracted from the eighteen estimation regression models. The coefficient 
values and P-values are exhibited, explained and utilised to evaluate the variables in 
all models. The coefficient value illustrates the average change in the dependent 
variables with any change in one of the predictor variables, whilst leaving the other 
predictors consistent. In addition, the value of P-value is considered statistically 
highly significant at 1%, significant at 5% and relatively significant at 10%.  
The regression models are mainly six, in which three main models utilise Tobin’s Q 
as a dependent variables and classify as; firm value and tax minimisation components; 
firm value, tax minimisation components and corporate governance variables and 
firm value; tax minimisation components, corporate governance variables and 
interaction variables.  
The other three main models are with firm value measures by ROA. These 
regressions conduct on three different samples namely FTSE 350, FTSE 100 and 
FTSE 250 as shown in the figure 7.2 below.  
In addition, the models and results are stated based on the three mentioned models in 
three main sections and these sections break down to two subsections based on the 
two measures of firm value: Tobin’s Q and ROA.  
In addition, as the robustness tests detect that the three models suffer from 
heteroscedasticity, which might lead to an inadequate estimation of the standard error 
(Hair et al., 2014). This issue can cause biased hypotheses testing results; therefore, 
the models are tested using robust standard errors, which is based on White (1980). 
Moreover, Panel data in accounting studies, can underlie possible serious cross-




cross-time such as the same fiscal year-end (Bernard, 1987). Hence the estimation 
models are carried out utilising cross-section clustered Eicker-Huber-White standard 
errors consistent with previous research (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Baum, 2006). 
This can be done in STATA by utilising the command:  xtreg y x, vce (cluster 
clustvar) which is equivalent to xtreg y x, vce (robust) (Wooldridge, 2010). 
Cross-section Clustered Eicker-Huber-White method can control for autocorrelation 
or the dependency of residual error occurring with the firm-specific effects and is 
superior to other possible methods (Petersen, 2009).  
 For the samples FTSE 350, FTSE 100 and FTSE 250, Cross-section Clustered 
Eicker-Huber-White are applied in the three main models concerning the relationship 
between tax minimisation, firm value, tax minimisation, firm value and corporate 
governance and the models that included interaction variables. This is for the purpose 
of correcting both heteroscedasticity and non-normal distribution of the data and to 
establish whether this alters the results in any substantive way (Hair et al., 2014). 
7.4.1 Model 1: Firm Value and Tax Minimisation Components 
This section presents the results of the first estimation model that tests the 
relationship between tax minimisation components (TMC) and firm value (FV) 
measures by both Tobin’s Q and ROA. This main model is applied on FTSE 350 and 
extended to report the results for FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 samples.  The reason 
underpins this split of the sample is to explore the different outcomes and to explain 
the reason and cause of these differences. Table 7-18 below represents the main 
regression results for Firm value measured by both Tobin’s Q and ROA, and Tax 
minimisation component; permanent differences PDs and temporary differences TDs 
and statutory tax rate differences STRDs. As shown in the table 7-18 below, different 
findings are exhibited in the samples. In addition, figure 7-2 below explains how 





Figure 0-2: Explanation of the First Model Structure 
 
21Source: Author 
7.4.1.1 Firm Value Measures by Tobin’s Q  
This subsection outlines the results of the first estimation model with Tobin’s Q as a 
dependent variable on FTSE 350 sample and then extends the results to FTSE 100 
and FTSE 250 in order to explore the differences that underpin these samples and to 
explain the reason underlying them.  In addition, the models (utilising Tobin’s Q as a 
dependent variable for FTSE 350, FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 are fixed effects as 
confirmed by the Hausman test and the other robustness tests that are mentioned 
previously in this chapter.  
7.4.1.1.1 Tobin’s Q and Tax Minimisation Components on FTSE 350  
This sub-subsection focuses on the first estimation model application on FTSE 350 
and as shown on the previous result of Hausman test in table 7-6, the model for this 
sample is fixed effects as follows: 
Model (1) FTSE 350 (Fixed Effects) 
𝑄𝑖𝑡= 𝛽0  + 𝛽1  𝑃𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2  𝑇𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  + 𝛽4   𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5   𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽6   𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7   𝐹𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8   𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 +∝𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
 
21 F.v = Firm value 






Qit : Dependent variables 
PDs, TDs, STRDs : Independent Variables  
𝛽0  : The Intercept term 
𝛽1  − 𝛽3 : Coefficients for independent variables 
∝𝑖: Specific constant term for a group 





Table 0-18: Firm Value and Tax Minimisation Variables 
 
FTSE 350  FTSE 100  FTSE 250  













































































































N 483 497 184 186 299 311 
R-squared 
(within) 
0.3480 0.1873 0.6497 0.5644 0.4050 0.0994 
R-squared 
(between) 
0.1037 0.000 0.0023 0.0074 0.2365 0.0025 
R-squared 
(overall) 
0.1138 0.0010 0.0005 0.0042 0.2488 0.0124 
F (8,100) 










Wald chi  
Prob > Chi2 
 110.83 
(0.000) 
   25.380 
(0.0013) 
     *Coefficient value and P-value in (brackets) ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively.  
PDs: Permanent Differences, TDs: Temporary Differences, STRDs: Statutory Tax Rate Differences, 






Generally, from the table 7.18 above the model is significant (P<0.01) with F value of 
9.54, which means that all the coefficients of this model are not equal to zero and the 
model is well fitted. The first column shows the results of Tobin’s Q for FTSE 350, 
which demonstrates there is no significant relationship between tax minimisation 
components; PDs, TDs and STRDs and firm value measures by Tobin’s Q.  This 
result can be viewed as valid, as the tax rate in the UK has been reduced to 20% over 
the last decade, which is considered as a competitive corporate tax rate compared to 
other counterpart countries such as the US. This result is aligned with Desai and 
Dharmapala, (2006) who suggest that considering the effect of tax minimisation on 
firm value solely in a simple view of transferring resource from tax authority to 
shareholders can be incomplete without considering other factors such as corporate 
governance mechanisms.  
However, there is a significantly positive relationship between CI with Q at 91% 
confidence, which exhibits the level of cash invested in fixed assets and is measured 
by dividing fixed assets on total assets. This positive finding is consistent with 
Shahean & Malik, (2012) who explain that companies with a high level of capital 
intensity is positively valued by investors, which is perceived as the increase in the 
company’s quality and time production. 
Leverage also, has a statistically significant positive relationship with the market 
value measured by Tobin’s Q at 99.9% confidence, which means investors value the 
companies that rely on debts in their capital structure more than the equity-based 
companies. This may increase the risk related to borrowing such as the shortage in 
cash flow and meeting the requirement of liabilities and accrual of claims, however, it 
increases tax saving through increasing the interest expenditure (Modigliani and 
Miller, 1963).  In addition, this finding is consistent with the theory that the increase 
in leverage can lead to a reduction in information asymmetry as a result of creditors’ 
monitoring of the company (Andrikopoulos, et al, 2017).  
Moreover, Gertler and Hubbard, (1993) suggest that leverage can be both negative 




of cash flow, however, it has a negative effect if it perceived as a potential increase in 
bankruptcy and financial risk. 
In addition, the relationship between DIV and Q is statistically positive and 
significant at 99% confidence. This can be explained that institutional shareholders 
do not directly monitor the firms; instead, they tend to encourage managers to pay 
higher dividends to enhance capital market monitoring, which lead to increase the 
market price (Kilincarslan and Ozdemir, 2018; Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990). 
7.4.1.1.2 Tobin’s Q and Tax Minimisation Components on FTSE 100  
This subsection presents the extent of the FTSE 100 results for the first estimation 
model that tests the relationship between tax minimisation components and firm 
value measures by Tobin’s Q, the result of Hausman test in the table 7-7 above shown 
that the estimation model for this sample is an appropriate with fixed effects as it is 
shown below:  
Model (1) FTSE 100 Fixed (Fixed effects) 
𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1  𝑃𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2  𝑇𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  + 𝛽4   𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5   𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽6   𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7   𝐹𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8   𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 +∝𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
 
Table 7.18 above represents the results for the main regression for firm value 
measures by both Tobin’s Q and tax minimisation components; permanent 
differences PDs and temporary differences TDs and statutory tax rate differences 
STRDs. The table 7.18 above , shows the model is statistically significant with P-
value <0.001 and Wild chi value 110.83, which explain that the coefficients are not 
equal to zero and the regression model fits the data better than considering the model 
without independent variables. 
There is no relationship between tax minimisation components and firm value in the 
FTSE 100. As mentioned above, the findings suggest that simple view of corporate 
tax minimisation as a transfer of financial resource from the government to 
shareholders is not completed without taking the agency problems into consideration 




Dharmapala (2006). In addition, and similar to the previous result for FTSE 350, 
there is a positive significant relationship between both capital intensity and leverage 
and Tobin’s Q. However, there is no significant relationship between all of earnings 
management, foreign sales and dividend and firm value measures by Tobin’s Q. 
FTSE 100 has similar results as FTSE 350 in term of capital intensity and leverage, as 
both have significantly positive relationship at 1% and 10% levels respectively. There 
is no other explanatory result for this model with FTSE 100. 
7.4.1.1.3 Tobin’s Q and Tax Minimisation Components on FTSE 250  
This subsection presents the extent of the FTSE 250 results for the first estimation 
model that tests the relationship between tax minimisation components and firm 
value measures by Tobin’s Q as it is shown below:  
Model (1) FTSE 250 (Fixed Effects) 
𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1  𝑃𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2  𝑇𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  + 𝛽4   𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5   𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽6   𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7   𝐹𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8   𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 +∝𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
The results in table 7.18 above show that there is a statistically positive relationship 
between the two tax minimisation components namely PDs and STRDs and Tobin’s 
Q in the FTSE 250 at 93% confidence. This result concurs with the agency theory 
that suggests tax reduction leads to transfer the financial resource from the tax 
authority to shareholders, this is also, concurs with the results of prior research 
(Drake et al. (2019); Desai and Dharmapala (2009); Wilson, (2009), Rego, (2003)), 
who suggest shareholders positively value tax minimisation. In addition, the resource 
of this positive relationship arises from permanent differences (PDs), which is the 
difference between taxable income and accounting income that comprises the tax 
reduction that will not be reversed in future. This result is consistent with Inger (2014) 
who suggests shareholders positively value permanent tax differences. Moreover, The 
positive result of foreign statutory tax rate differences is inconsistent with Inger (2014) 
who find a negative relationship between deferral of residual tax on foreign income. 
Furthermore, there is no relationship between TDs and firm value, which is consistent 




due to the temporary nature of the benefits and their timing saving will reverse in the 
future. 
In addition, the control variables CI, LEV are statistically significant in this model 
similar to the results of FTSE 350 and FTSE 100 at 10% and 1% levels respectively. 
Likewise, LEV is significantly positive at 1% level, which is similar to the result in 
FTSE 350. This is consistent with Desai and Hines (2002) who indicate that in the 
high leveraged companies the share price is positively connected to diversion 
comparing with the low leveraged companies. The interpretation of this is that 
shareholders value tax-saving upon interest expenditure that occurs through liabilities. 
However, Cuong and Canh (2012) suggest that the level of leverage should not 
exceed 59.27 per cent; otherwise, it will have a negative effect on firm value. 
Likewise, Obradovich and Gill (2012) state that leverage has a positive impact on the 
US firm value, nevertheless, a high level of leverage could lead to bankruptcy.  
To conclude, the three samples results show that there is no significant relationship 
between firm value measures by Tobin’s Q and tax minimisation components namely: 
PDs, TDs and STRDs in both FTSE 350 and FTSE 100 when considering these 
components solely in regression models. This explains that while these proxies 
provide formative data to investors, however, they do not appear to impact on 
investors’ valuation. This result is consistent with Abdul Wahab and Holland (2015) 
who study the persistence of BTDs and the behaviour of their components amongst 
the UK quoted companies and find that not all quoted companies have positive BTDs 
signs in all years under investigation, which could affect the results. The BTDs and 
their components’ positive consistency signs are limited in some industry groups and 
those signs do not have a dominant trend. In addition, it concurs with Desai and 
Dharmapala (2009), who state that the relationship between tax minimisation and 
firm value is incomplete without considering corporate governance mechanisms in 
the relationship. Besides, the similarity in the results in both FTSE 350 and FTSE 100 
is because FTSE 350 reflects FTSE 100 and consist of approximately 80% of the 
market capitalisation. This result provides evidence that investors value different tax 




Whereas, there is a statistically positive relationship between firm value measured by 
Tobin’s Q and PDs and STRDs in FTSE 250. This result is inconsistent with Abdul 
Wahab and Holland (2012), whilst, it concurs with Desai and Dharmapala (2006).  
This result is also consistent with the traditional view of agency theory that the role of 
tax saving leads to increasing of after tax return. It might explain that studying all the 
UK quoted companies could not lead to significant results as not all companies have 
positive BTDs in all the years as explained above. Thus, the result could lead to an 
insignificant relationship between tax minimisation components and firm value; 
however, breaking down the sample into different categories might lead to significant 
results as the findings in this study.  
In addition, the positive significant relation between capital intensity and Tobin’s Q 
in FTSE 350 is derived mainly from both FTSE 100 and FTSE 250. The result 
underpins hypothesis H1, which predicts the presence of the relationship between tax 
minimisation components and firm value. 
Similarly, the positive significant relationship between leverage and Tobin’s Q in 
FTSE 350 reflects both the positive significant sign in FTSE 100 and FTSE 250. This 
explains that both indices have a similar proclivity towards having a high level of 
leverage. However, the degree of significance in CI is higher in FTSE 100 compared 
to FTSE 250, which can be explained that FTSE 100 sample includes only two 
companies (6 observations) from the technology sector that deems to have a low level 
of capital intensity.   
In addition, the control variable DIV is only positive and significant in FTSE 250, 
which, reflects in FTSE 350.  
7.4.1.2 Firm Value Measured by ROA  
This subsection includes three subsections to present the results of the three samples 
namely FTSE 350, FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 respectively with ROA as a dependent 
variable. The table 7.18 above shows the results with including cross-section 
clustered for standard errors. The result for ROA has a different dimension towards 




results with Tobin’s Q, in which PDs, TDs and STRDs have a significant positive 
relationship with ROA in all samples. The result underpins the hypothesis H1a, which 
predicts the presence of the relationship between tax minimisation components and 
firm value. 
7.4.1.2.1 ROA and Tax Minimisation Components on FTSE 350  
 
The model for this sample is random affects as mentioned in the result table 7-6 of 
the Hausman test above and the model sets as follows: 
Model (1) FTSE 350 (Random Effects)  
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1  𝑃𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2  𝑇𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  + 𝛽4   𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5   𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽6   𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7   𝐹𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8   𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+∝ +𝜇𝐼 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
Where, 
ROAit: Dependent variables 
PDs, TDs, STRDs : Independent variables  
𝛽0  : The Intercept term 
𝛽1  − 𝛽3 : Coefficients for independent variables 
∝𝑖 : Specific constant term for a group 
𝜇𝐼 : Specific random element 
𝜀𝑖𝑡  : Error term for entity and time.  
The result with ROA as dependent variable is positively significant in FTSE 350, in 
which tax minimisation components; PDs, TDs and STRDs have a significant 
positive relationship with ROA. This means that non-market value of companies’ 
increases with the increase in the adoption of various tax strategies.  
This result consists with Delgado et al. (2018), Noor et al. (2010) and Noor, et al. 
(2008), who state that companies with a higher level of profitability measured by 
return on assets tend to engage in tax minimisation and pay lower corporate tax 
income. This positive relationship between tax minimisation components and return 
on assets can be explained as book tax differences are derived by the company’s 




 For earnings management, it is significantly positive at 95% confidence, whilst, the 
results for capital intensity are similar in both models (Q & ROA) in which it is 
statistically significant and positive at 90%, which reflects mainly the results of FTSE 
100 sample.  
Leverage shows an insignificant result, which is different from the result in Tobin’s Q 
model. In addition, foreign sales also, insignificant and dividends have the opposite 
result in both models with Q and with ROA. The foreign sales result means that 
foreign operations do not have any effect on profitability; however, dividend leads to 
a decrease in the company’s profitability at approximately 90% of significance level, 
which reflects mainly the FTSE 250 result. 
7.4.1.2.2 ROA and Tax Minimisation Components on FTSE 100  
The model for this sample is fixed affects as mentioned in the table 7-7 of the 
Hausman test above and the model sets as follows: 
Model (1) FTSE 100 (Fixed effects) 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1  𝑃𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2  𝑇𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4   𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5   𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽6   𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7   𝐹𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8   𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 +∝𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
Where, 
 ROAit: Dependent variables 
PDs, TDs, STRDs : Independent Variables  
𝛽0  : The Intercept term 
𝛽1  − 𝛽3 : Coefficients for independent variables 
∝𝑖 : Specific constant term for a group 
𝜀𝑖𝑡  : Error term for entity and time.  
Similar to the FTSE 350 sample, there is a positive relationship between tax 
minimisation components namely PDs, TDs, and STRDs and firm profitability. This 
indicates that implementing various tax minimisation strategies lead to increase in 
companies’ profitability through return on assets, and the motivation for the manager 
to engage in tax strategy is to increase profitability (Herron and Nahata, 2018) as 




capital intensity and firm value through return on assets, which indicates the increase 
in total operational fixed assets contribute positively to the return on assets. However, 
this is not the case for all industries, as some industries such as in the technology 
sector can increase their profitability without having a huge amount of assets. In 
addition, as mentioned above FTSE 100 sample included only (2) companies (6 
observation) from technology sector, which leads to present this significant positive 
result. Moreover, some empirical studies suggest that it is not the company’s size that 
determines the reduction of the effective tax rate (ETR), it is how higher leverage and 
capital intensity are the company adopted (Holland, 1998).  
Tax minimisation components in FTSE 100 sample have similar results as FTSE 350; 
therefore, the interpretation is similar to the previous. Moreover, LEV is significant 
and negative at 5% level.   
7.4.1.2.3 ROA and Tax Minimisation Components on FTSE 250  
The model for this sample is random affects as mentioned in the table 7-8 of the 
Hausman test above and the model sets as follows: 
Model (1) FTSE 250 (Random Effects) 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1  𝑃𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2  𝑇𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  + 𝛽4   𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5   𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽6   𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽7   𝐹𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8   𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡+∝ +𝜇𝐼 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
The table 7.18 above shows a significant positive relationship between both tax 
minimisation components PDs and TDs and ROA in FTSE 250, which is equivalent 
to the other samples FTSE 350 and FTSE 100. Both PDs and TDs are significant at 
1%, whilst, the results for STRDs could be consider as significant as the degree of 
confident is nearly 90%. The only control variable that has significant result is 
Dividends, which is negative at 95% reflected in FTSE 350.  
To conclude the findings for the first model in the three samples is that firms’ tax 
minimisation strategy seems to increase firm performance through increasing return 
on assets. In contrast, overseas tax differences in FTSE 250 companies appear to not 




managers might outweigh the benefit of engaging in tax saving through profitability 
and the measurement that is used for this purpose is ROA.   
The result for capital intensity is significant in both FTSE 350 and FTSE 100 and it is 
insignificant for FTSE 250 as explained above in FTSE 100 subsection. Leverage, 
however, is only significant and negative in FTSE 100 and dividend is significant and 





7.4.2 Model 2: Firm Value, Tax Minimisation and Corporate Governance  
Concerning the moderating role that corporate governance variables play on the 
relationship between tax minimisation and firm value, first, the below estimation 
models are further estimated to include corporate governance variables namely; 
Institutional ownership (IOWN) and executive remuneration (EREM). The results are 
shown in Table 7.19 below, in which column 2 and 3 represent FTSE 350 sample 
using the two measurements of firm value, column 4 and 5 represent FTSE 100 and 
column 6 and 7 represent FTSE 250. The figure 7.3 explains the distribution of the 
variables and different models for all samples. 
This subsection shows the results including cross-section clustered for standard error, 
for the relationship between firm value measured by both Tobin’s Q and ROA and 
tax minimisation components namely PDs, TDs and STRDs with considering two of 
corporate governance mechanisms one is an external namely IOWN and another is an 
internal namely EREM as a moderating role for this relationship.  
 








7.4.2.1 Firm Value Measures by Tobin’s Q 
This subsection outlines the results of the second estimation model with considering 
Tobin’s Q as a dependent variable on FTSE 350 sample and then extends the results 
to FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 to explore the differences underpinning these samples 
and explain the reason underlying these differences.  In addition, the models utilise 
Tobin’s Q as a dependent variable for FTSE 350 and FTSE 100 are fixed effects and 
FTSE 250 is random effects as confirmed by Hausman test and the other robustness 
tests that are mentioned in this chapter. 
7.4.2.1.1 Tobin’s Q, Tax Minimisation Components and Corporate 
Governance on FTSE 350  
This subsection is focus on the second estimation model application on FTSE 350 
and as shown on the previous result of Hausman test in the table 7-6 above, the model 
for this sample is fixed effects as follows: 
𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1  𝑃𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2  𝑇𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐼𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6   𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7   𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8   𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9   𝐹𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10   𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + ∝𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖   
 
IOWN: Institutional ownership. 
EREM: Executive remuneration.  
The table 7-19 below shows there is no significant relationship between tax 
minimisation components and Tobin’s Q in FTSE 350.  This indicates that Tobin’s Q 
does not have any explanatory power on tax minimisation components in its own 
(Desai and Drampala, 2009). 
Furthermore, the external corporate governance mechanism (IOWN) is insignificant 
for this sample; however, executive remuneration (EREM) as an internal mechanism 
is significantly negative in FTSE 350 at 99% confidence, which reflects from both 
other samples; FTS 100 and FTSE 250. This indicates the negative perception of 
investors towards executive remuneration, which supports the agency view that 




with dominant managers (Jensen and Neckling, 1976; Dah et al., Bebchuk and Fried, 
2003; 2012; Tarkovska, 2017; Emmanuel Iatridis, 2018).  
Hence adopting a high remuneration strategy in order to align the two parties’ 
interests and to prevent managers from involving in a higher opportunism propensity 
does not lead to the intended outcomes. As a result, shareholders do not believe that 
tax minimisation decisions are to their benefit and lead investors have a negative 
perception of this strategy. Therefore, the negative perception of shareholders is 
associated with the agency problems and negative entrenchment effects.   
In contrast, this result is inconsistent with Weir and Laing (2000) who study the 
effects of Cadbury Compliance on the UK Quoted companies; find a positive 
relationship between remuneration committee and market returns for the year of 1995. 
However, studying one year might still not reflect the real effect.  
Concerning capital intensity, the result is similar to the previous results for the first 
model, in which the relationship between capital intensity and firm market value is 
significantly positive at 90%. These result indicates that investors believe that capital 
intensity reduces risk and increases performance through cost savings gained from 
obtaining fixed assets (Barton, 1988). However, this advantage can only apply to 
manufacturing firms. In addition, capital intensity can support firms in financial 
efficiency as the commitment to the cost of the fixed asset contributes to firms’ 
productivity during its life (Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994). An important point to 
add is that the reason underpins companies’ motivation to become more capital 
intensive is that the changes in tax regulation might lead firms to consider increasing 
their capital intensity to reduce their effective tax rate (Stickney and McGee, 1982). 
This result concurs with some prior research that utilise Tobin’s Q as a firm value 
measurement (Lubaktkin and Chatterjee, 1994; Lee and Xiao, 2011) and with Harris 
(1988) who measures firm performance by utilising the operation profit margin ratio. 
With regards to leverage, interestingly, it has a positively significant relationship with 
Tobin’s Q in FTSE 350 at 99% confidence level. This concurs with the theory that a 




of the high level of monitoring by creditors (Andrikopoulos, et al., 2017). The high 
level of leverage can be used as a joining tool and the constant repayment of the 
obligated debt prevent management from accessing free cash flow and investing in 
unprofitable or less valuable projects. This can lead to reducing agency conflict as it 
constraints managerial hedging and raising their productivity, thus, reducing 
managerial discretion in consuming too much bonus, which enhancing firm value 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
In addition, firms can benefit from tax savings generated by leverage, thus, the 
market valuation of leverage can be positive (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Leverage 
can be a positive influence on the use of cash flow by managers or a negative 
influence with the increasing risk of bankruptcy and the potential financial risk of 
pressure on liquidity (Gertler and Hubbard, 1993).  The positive sign of leverage with 
Tobin’s Q is also, consistent with   De-La-Hoz, and Pombo (2016) who find that a 
one standard deviation increase in leverage increases Tobin’s Q by 5.9 points when 
they studied the firm valuation of six Latin American countries for the period of 1997 
to 2011.  In addition, it is consistent with Short and Keasey (1999), who find a 
positive relationship between leverage and equity market in the UK firms. Moreover, 
firms tend to engage more in tax minimisation through obtaining a higher level of 
leverage and capital intensity (Stickney and McGee, 1982).  
Dividend has a positive significant relationship with Tobin’s Q in FTSE 350 at 5%. 
This can be explained that the shareholders of the large companies in the UK have the 
incentive to include in a stock market listing by ensuring an appropriate dividend 
policy to assure the occurring of regular trading activity (Cheffins, 2006). In addition, 
institutional shareholders do not directly monitor the firms; instead, they tend to 
encourage managers to pay higher dividends to enhance capital market monitoring 






Table 0-19: Firm Value, Tax Minimisation and Corporate Governance Variables 
VARIABLES MODEL 350  
Q  
MODEL 350  
ROA 
MODEL 100  
Q 
MODEL 100  
ROA 
MODEL  250 
 Q 






































































































































N 483 497 184 186 299 311 
R-squared 
(within) 
0.3573 0.1898 0.6548 0.5592 0.4047 0.0989 
R-squared 
(between) 
0.1071 0.0001 0.0014 0.0009 0.2522 0.0063 
R-squared 
(overall) 
0.1174 0.0013 0.0001 0.0001 0.2636 0.018 
F  





   
Wald chi  










           *Coefficient value and P-value in (brackets) 
***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
PDs: Permanent Differences, TDs: Temporary Differences, STRDs: Statutory Tax rate Differences, 
IOWN: Institutional Ownership, EREMEM: Executive Remuneration, EM: Earnings Management, CI: 




7.4.2.1.2 Tobin’s Q, Tax Minimisation Components and Corporate 
Governance on FTSE 100  
This subsection outlines the second estimation model application on FTSE 100 and as 
shown on the previous result of Hausman test, the model for this sample is fixed 
effects as follows:  
𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1  𝑃𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2  𝑇𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐼𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6   𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7   𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8   𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9   𝐹𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10   𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 +∝𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
It can be noted from the table 7.19 above that the results of the FTSE 350 sample 
mainly reflects the results of the FTSE 100. Thus, similar to the FTSE 350 result, the 
table shows there is no significant relationship between tax minimisation components 
and Tobin’s Q.  
For corporate governance mechanisms, there is a negative relationship between 
executive remuneration and Tobin’s Q at 95% in the FTSE 100, which reflects the 
result in the FTSE 350 as explained previously. This indicates the negative perception 
of investors towards executive remuneration, as mentioned in the previous FTSE 350 
sample.  
Similar to the previous result in the FTSE 350 for capital intensity and leverage, both 
have positive significant relationship with Tobin’s Q at 99% and 95% confidence 
respectively. The 99% significant of capital intensity is because the FTSE 100 sample 
consist companies mostly from industrial sector and only two companies from 
technology sector as explained previously in this chapter. 
 
7.4.2.1.3 Tobin’s Q, Tax Minimisation Components and Corporate 
Governance on FTSE 250  
This subsection outlines the second estimation model application on FTSE 250 and as 
shown on the previous result of Hausman test, the model for this sample is random 




𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1  𝑃𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2  𝑇𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐼𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6   𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7   𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8   𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9   𝐹𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10   𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 +∝𝑖+ 𝜇𝐼 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
The table 7.19 above shows STRDs has a significantly positive relationship with firm 
value at 95% confidence, which indicates the investors’ positive perception of the 
overseas operation. In addition, it might explain that FTSE 250 overseas revenue has 
a positive impact on firm value, as a result of investors positive valuation of saving 
that generates from overseas operation which emphasises the result in the first model 
with Tobin’s Q in the FTSE 250 mentioned above. However, the other tax 
minimisation components; PDs and TDs both have insignificant relationship with 
fime value.  
Similar to the results for the FTSE 350 and FTSE 100 IOWN is insignificant for this 
sample; however, executive remuneration is significantly negative at 95%, which 
reflects on the FTSE 350 sample as explains above. This emphasises the negative 
perception of investors towards executive remuneration, which supports the agency 
view that higher executive remuneration might exists due to agency problem in the 
companies with dominant managers (Jensen and Neckling, 1976; Dah et al., Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2003; 2012; Tarkovska, 2017; Emmanuel Iatridis, 2018). 
CI, LEV and DIV have similar results as the result of the FTSE 350. Concerning 
capital intensity, the relationship between capital intensity and firm market value is 
significantly positive at 90%. In addition, leverage has a positive significant 
relationship with Tobin’s Q at 99% and dividend has a positive significant 
relationship with Tobin’s Q in the FTSE 250 at 99%. 
In understanding why the FTSE 100 has an insignificant relationship between firm 
value and dividend while the FTSE 250 has a significant and positive relationship, 
from the table 7.19 for the FTSE 100, the average mean of dividend is 0.98 percent 
and for the FTSE 250 is 1.96. This means that the FTSE 250 payout is double the 
average dividend of the FTSE 100, which may indicate one of the two scenarios. First, 




encouraging managers towards paying dividends to increase capital market 
monitoring (Kilincarslan and Ozdemir, 2018; Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990). 
Second, those companies with passive shareholders in term of their voting rights tend 
to pay more dividends compared with companies with active shareholders. The same 
case for companies with strong rights and higher managerial ownership (Harford et 
al., 2008), which apply on the FTSE 250 where the number of companies that have 
managerial ownership is 22 companies more than the FTSE 100 that have only 5 
companies in the sample under investigation. In addition, in the existence of 
information asymmetry, shareholders consider dividends as a fundamental tool to 
measure managers’ performance and believe it supports the reduction of agency cost 
that can result from shareholders’ misinterpretation of accounts and can lead to an 
increase in firm value (Berkman et al., 2002). From an institutional ownership 
perspective, institutional investors have a significantly positive effect on dividend 
pay-out, supporting the view that UK institutional shareholders are effectively urging 
companies to distribute dividends (Al-Najjar and Belghitar, 2014). From a risk 
perspective, and consistent with agency theory, firms with a low risk are more likely 
to distribute their income, which leads to an increase in dividend pay-out to 
shareholders (Chang and Rhee, 1990). 
 
To conclude, the results of the relationship between tax minimisation and firm value 
did not improve after adding the external and internal corporate governance 
mechanisms on al samples. However, the positive impact of PDs on firm value 
measured by Tobin’s Q has attenuated after considering theses mechanisms, which 
provide evidence that corporate governance mechanisms play a moderating role on 
the relationship between tax minimisation and firm value (Desai and Dharmapala, 
2006).   
7.4.2.2 Firm Value Measures by ROA  
This subsection outlines the results of the second estimation model considering ROA 
as a dependent variable on the FTSE 350 sample and then extending the results to the 




explain the reason underlying these differences.  In addition, the models utilising 
ROA as a dependent variable for the FTSE 350, FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 are random 
effects as confirmed by Hausman test and the other robustness test that are mentioned 
in this chapter.  
7.4.2.2.1 ROA, Tax Minimisation Components and Corporate Governance on 
FTSE 350  
This subsection shows the result for the second model, which considers the 
relationship between tax minimisation components namely; PDs, TDs and STRDs 
and ROA with consideration of the two indicators of corporate governance 
mechanisms namely; IOWN and EREM on the FTSE 350.  
The analysis model for this sample is random effects as follows: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1  𝑃𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2  𝑇𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐼𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6   𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7   𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽8   𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽9   𝐹𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽10   𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 +∝𝑖+ 𝜇𝐼 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
Similar to the result of the first model for the three samples, tax minimisation 
components have significantly positive relationship with ROA in FTSE 350, which 
reflects on both FTSE 100 and FTSE 250. 
In contrast, there is an absence of external and internal corporate governance effect 
on the relationship under investigation when considering ROA as a dependent 
variable for all study samples. This result is consistent with Akbar el at., (2016) who 
find that compliance with corporate governance regulations do not have any 
relationship with firm performance measured by ROA in the UK non-financial 
companies for the period of 1999 and 2009. In addition, they suggest that studies that 
find any positive relationship might be biased as they ignore the potential for 
endogeneity. 
Earnings management has a positive relationship with ROA only in the FTSE 350 
sample, which is similar to the result for the FTSE 350 in the first model that 
explained above. Also, CI is significant and positive AT 90%, similar to the previous 





7.4.2.2.2 ROA, Tax Minimisation Components and Corporate Governance on 
FTSE 100  
This subsection sketches the results for the second model, which examines the 
relationship between both tax minimisation components (PDs, TDs and STRDs) and 
corporate governance proxies; (IOWN and EREM) and ROA using FTSE 100 sample. 
The result of this relationship shows a statistically positive between tax minimisation 
components namely PDs, TDs and STRDs and ROA at 99% confidence. This result 
might confirm the discussion mentioned above suggested by Akbar et al., (2016) that 
the purpose of engaging in tax reduction is to increase profitability and adopting good 
corporate governance mechanisms and compliance with their regulations are not 
determinant of firm performance. 
 In addition, CI has a positive relationship with ROA, which reflects the positive 
relationship in FTSE 350 and the interpretation of this result is similar to the 
previously mentioned above.  
However, leverage is significantly negative when the firm value is measured by ROA 
in FTSE 100 only similar to the result in the first model, which is opposite to the 
other samples results for the two models.  
7.4.2.2.3 ROA, Tax Minimisation Components and Corporate Governance on 
FTSE 250  
This subsection draws the results for the second model, which examines the 
relationship between both tax minimisation components (PDs, TDs and STRDs) and 
both corporate governance proxies IOWN and EREM, and ROA for FTSE 250 
sample. This sample shows a statistically significant result between tax minimisation 
components PDs, TDs and STRDs, and ROA, which is consistent with the result and 
suggestion of the previous samples.  
On the other hand, the dividend has controversial results with ROA compared with 
Tobin’s Q results, in terms of using the different measurements of firm value, similar 




empirical studies that find a positive relationship between ROA and tax minimisation 
(Delgado et al., 2018; Delgado et al., 2012; Fernández-Rodríguez and Martínez-Arias, 
2011; Chen et al., 2010; Noor et al., 2010; Noor, et al., 2008), which indicates that 
profitable companies encounter a higher tax burden than companies with less 
profitability, therefore, those companies are more likely to engage in tax minimisation 
than others.  
The conclusion for the second model utilising two different measurements for firm 
value in the three samples is that there is no statistically significant relationship 
between tax minimisation components and Tobin’s Q in the three samples, although 
with adding corporate governance proxies to the model there is only one improving 
result with STRDs in FTSE 250. There is a significant positive relationship between 
the three tax minimisation components and ROA in the three samples at 99 % 
confidence.  
Institutional ownership has no significant results in all samples with both firm value 
measurements, which concurs with Navissi and Naiker (2006) who find no 
relationship between passive institutional investors and firm value. This suggests that 
passive institutional shareholders are not compatible with interest alignment and 
entrenchment assumptions. In contrast, executive remuneration has a significantly 
negative relationship with Tobin’s Q in all samples, which indicates the assumption 
that executive remuneration is associated with agency issues. This result is consistent 
with Bechuk, et al (2011) who find a negative relationship between CEO pay slice 
and firm value measures by Tobin’s Q.  
Earnings management has only one significant result with ROA in FTSE 350 similar 
to the results in the first model. 
Capital intensity is significantly positive with both measurements of firm value 
Tobin’s Q and ROA in both sample FTSE 350 and FTSE 100; however, it is not 




Leverage is significantly positive with Tobin’s Q in the three samples FTSE 350, 
FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 at 99 percent confidence; however, it’s significantly 
negative with ROA only in FTSE 100 at 99 percent confidence.   
Finally, Dividends is significant and positive with Tobin’s Q in both FTSE 350 and 
FTSE 250 and significant negative with ROA only in FTSE 250. Foreign sales have 
no significant results.   
To conclude this subsection that shows the examination of the relationship between 
tax minimisation components and firm value measured by ROA with considering 
corporate governance mechanisms in this relationship in the three samples; FTSE 350, 
FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 respectively.  The result shows that the three components of 
tax minimisation have a significantly positive impact on firm performance, which 
explains that the purpose of engaging in tax minimisation strategies by managers is to 
increase firm performance. Although companies tend to comply with corporate 
governance regulations, this compliance is not a determinant of the firm performance 




7.4.3 Model 3: Firm Value Tax Minimisation and Corporate Governance with 
the Interaction Variables.   
With regards to the moderating role that corporate governance variables play in the 
relationship between tax minimisation and firm value. First, the below estimation 
model is further estimated including corporate governance variables namely; 
Institutional ownership (IOWN) and executive remuneration (EREM) and with 
adding the interaction variables of corporate governance with tax minimisation 
components (PDOWN- TDOWN-STRDOWN- PDEREM- TDEREM- 
STRDEREM) to the previous second estimation model. These variables are utilised 
to examine whether the relationship between tax minimisation components and firm 
value is contingent on the intensity of the corporate governance structure. The 
results are shown in Table 7.20 below, in which columns 2 and 3 represent FTSE 
350 sample using the two measurements of firm value, columns 4 and 5 represent 
FTSE 100 and columns 6 and 7 Represent FTSE 250. Figure 7.4 explains the 
distribution of the variables and different models for all samples.  
Figure 0-4: Explanation of the Third Model Structure 
Source: Author22 
This section presents the results of the third model, which analysing the relationship 
between firm value, tax minimisation components, corporate governance and the 
interaction variables to examine whether the internal and external corporate 
governance mechanisms play a vital role in this relationship or not. Similar to the 
 




structure of the previous two models, this section outlines the findings in table 7.20 
for both firm value measures, Tobin’s Q and ROA separately for the three samples. In 
this interaction variables results, the assumption is that the individual variables that 
are included in the interaction variables are equal to zero (Wooldridge, 2010). 
7.4.3.1 Firm Value Measures by Tobin’s Q. 
This subsection includes three subsections to present the results of the three samples 
namely FTSE 350, FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 respectively. Table 7.20 below shows 
the results with including cross-section clustered for standard errors. 
7.4.3.1.1 Tobin’s Q, Tax Minimisation Components, Corporate Governance 
and the interaction variables on FTSE 350 
This subsection is focused on the third estimation model application on FTSE 350 
and as shown on previous result of the Hausman test and other robustness tests, the 
model for this sample is fixed effects as follows: 
𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1  𝑃𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2  𝑇𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝐼𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6  𝑃𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7  𝑃𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8  𝑇𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9  𝑇𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10  𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗  𝐼𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11  𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐷𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12   𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽13   𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽14   𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽15   𝐹𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽16   𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + ∝𝑖+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
IOWN: Institutional Ownership. 
EREM: Executive Remuneration.  
 Table 7.20 below shows the result of FTSE 350 sample with Tobin’s Q in the first 
column. The assumption is all individual variables that are included in the interaction 





Table 0-20: Firm Value, Tax Minimisation, Corporate Governance and Interaction 
Variables 


























































































































































































































N 483 497 184 186 299 311 
R-squared 
(within) 
0.3656 0.2371 0.6943 0.6202 0.4071 0.1513 
R-squared 
(between) 
0.1094 0.0004 0.0007 0.0005 0.2644 0.0070 
R-squared 
(overall) 
0.1205 0.0024 0.000 0.000 0.2752 0.0230 
F  





   
Wald chi  









 *Coefficient value and P-value in (brackets). ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. PDs: Permanent Differences, TDs: Temporary Differences, STRDs: Statutory Tax rate 
Differences, IOWN: Institutional Ownership, EREMEM: Executive Remuneration, PDOWN: 
Permanent Differences*Institutional ownership, TDOWN: Temporary Differences* Institutional 
Ownership, STRDOWN: Statutory Tax Rate Differences* Institutional ownership, PDEREM: 
Permanents Differences* executive Remuneration, TDEREM: Temporary Differences* Executive 
Remuneration, STRDEREM: Statutory Tax Rate differences* Executive Remuneration, Earnings 




The result of interaction variables shows that there is only one interaction variable 
that has a significant positive relationship with Tobin’s Q in FTSE 350, which is 
TDOWN. It is consistent with the prediction of agency theory of tax minimisation, 
which suggests a positive relationship between tax minimisation and firm value for 
firms with high levels of institutional ownership (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009; 
Wilson, 2009). This also, confirms the moderating role of corporate governance in 
this relationship that suggests the impact of tax minimisation on the firm’s after tax 
value is greater for companies with powerful institutional ownership. This significant 
relationship is derived from the FTSE 100 result. In addition, this result considers 
only temporary tax differences, which is a timing difference that means the tax saving 
generated from such a component will reverse in the future. This can be interpreted 
from the benefit and risk point of view as shareholders value tax minimisation 
strategy that generated by timing difference and resulted from the difference in 
regulations applied by firm, thus, the benefit of this component exceeds its risk.  
The result in this model also, confirms the statistic significant of most of the control 
variables namely; CI, LEV and DIV, and the explanation for this result is as follows;  
Capital intensity has a significant positive relationship with firm value in FTSE 350 
at 90%. This positive relationship is driven from only the FTSE 100 that has a 
positive significant relationship with both Tobin’s Q and ROA at 99%; however, this 
relationship for FTSE 250 is insignificant. This is in alignment with US studies that 
find a positive relationship between capital intensity and firm performance, for 
example, Lee and Xiao (2011) find a U-shape relationship in the period of 2000s for 
hotels and restaurants, however, this relationship was insignificant before applying 
the robustness test.  
This positive signal can be explained also, as the high level of the capital intensity of 
a company can be as a result of increasing quality and productivity, thus, positively 
valued by investors (Shahean & Malik, 2012). Besides, Zhang et al., 2018 find a 
positive relationship between capital intensity and firms utilising high-commitment 




Leverage and Dividend both have a positive relationship with Tobin’s Q. The 
positive sign of leverage can be interpreted by signalling theory, which assumes that 
debt is positively associated with firm value especially in the existence of information 
asymmetry (Ibhagui, and Olokoyo, 2018).  Also, the determination of the positive 
sign of leverage with firm value relies on firm size, where large companies can 
borrow as much as they wish as they have a better reputation (Halov, 2006; Ibhagui, 
and Olokoyo, 2018). According to Bradley et al. (1984), companies will have a high 
level of leverage when the current value of tax benefits is high and/ or the current 
level of expected leverage cost is low. Thus, the optimal capital structure of a 
company will include a trade-off between debt tax benefit and several leverage costs 
such as debt agency cost and bankruptcy; hence the relationship is positive if the 
leverage costs are low. 
 In addition, Bradley et al. (1984) find that the leverage ratios level varies across 
industries more than within industries. This finding also aligns with Jensen (1986) 
who states that leverage can be considered as a monitoring tool to reduce agency 
problems, which enhances firm value. Leverage can also, increase firm value via tax 
deduction (Modigliani and Miller, 1963) and as a positive sign to the capital market 
(Fama and French, 1998). 
Dividends has a significant positive relationship with Tobin’s Q for FTSE 350 at 99% 
that relationship is driven mainly from FTSE 250 at 95%. This references agency 
theory that paying dividends can help in reducing the conflicts of interest between 
managers and owners (Jensen, 1986). This positive relationship is consistent with 
previous studies that find dividends send a positive sign to the institutional investors 
about the high level of performance that the company is achieved (Al-Najjar and 
Belghitar, 2014). In addition, according to Lysandrou and Stoyanova (2007), UK 
institutional investors are more likely to release cash out of the collective portfolio 
and re-equilibrium resolutions.   
Moreover, FTSE 350 companies’ average leverage attributes to both indices, in which, 
average leverage is 0.22 for FTSE 100 and 0.21 for FTSE 250. This might reflect on 




that pays a high level of dividend, which is consistent with the debate that UK 
institutional investors can insist companies distribute cash even if they are low in 
profitability. In addition, the imperfect external market control and the deficiency of 
effective monitoring that categorises the corporate sector in the UK  (Ozkan and 
Ozkan, 2004) can lead to two defaults in which institutional ownership is dispersed 
and ineffective in exercising their monitoring rights and are not being keen on 
extending this further.  
For foreign sales, there is an insignificant relationship between firm value and foreign 
operation for all samples.  
7.4.3.1.2 Tobin’s Q, Tax Minimisation Components, Corporate Governance 
and the interaction variables FTSE 100  
Table 7.20 above shows the result of the relationship between tax minimisation 
components and firm value measured by Tobin’s Q for the FTSE 100, in which PDs 
and TDs are significantly negative at 95% and 99% respectively, which is consistent 
with Abdul Wahab and Holland (2012). Those individual variables that are included 
in the interaction variables are assumed to equal zero following Wooldridge, (2010) 
as explained above. 
The result also is reversed after considering the external and internal mechanisms of 
corporate governance namely institutional ownership (IOWN) and executive 
remuneration (EREM). The Interaction between tax minimisation components PDs 
and TDs with Institutional ownership (PDOWN, TDOWN) are significantly positive 
both at 99% confidence for FTSE 100 as predicted by agency theory of tax 
minimisation. It suggests a positive relationship between tax minimisation and firm 
value for firms with high levels of institutional ownership (Desai and Dharmapala, 
2009). This confirms the moderating role of corporate governance in this relationship, 
which suggests the impact of tax minimisation on the firm’s after tax value is greater 
for companies with high level of institutional ownership. In addition, it explains that 
considering FTSE 100 separately from the FTSE 250 can present significant results 
as the two indices have different characteristics and levels of onerous regulations. In 
addition, the interpretation of this result for the FTSE 100 could be for two reasons. 




operations are oversea, less affected by the UK policies and economics and are 
subject to a more rigorous information disclosure so they are less affected by the 
regulations’ change. Besides, the FTSE 100 has more restrictive corporate 
governance and compliance regulations  (LSE, 2016).  
Therefore, it may be that the FTSE 100 firms are regarded as risk-free whereas 
institutional investors believe that as the pecking order rises, so does the risk. Thus, 
from an agency perspective, investors could value the engagement of FTSE 100 
companies’ in tax minimisation strategy as it is considered as value-added to 
shareholders’ wealth. In respect of this, investors perceive institutional ownership as 
are playing a vital role in monitoring the management’s activities and are increasing 
the level of scrutiny for managerial actions, which is interpreted by Desai and 
Dharmapala (2009) as good governance. Moreover, FTSE 100 are the top largest 
companies that have the ability to pay for highly experienced accounting companies 
that help them in more complicated tax saving strategies that lead to increase firm 
value. 
Second, FTSE 100 companies have a lower risk profile, also, the UK is considered as 
a country with strong investor protection, so from a risk and benefit perspective, 
those companies might be valued by investors with regards to their tax strategy as 
investors could perceive tax activities as value-added and lead to an increase in 
shareholders’ value. The institutional ownership, in this case, is active and playing 
their monitoring role in managers' activities, thus increasing the quality of companies’ 
earnings (Zhong et al., 2017). Finally, although, TDs considers as timing differences 
and will be reversed in the future, PDs is permanent differences and will not be 
reversed in the future, thus, is considered as tax savings. 
Concerning, the interaction between permanent differences and the internal corporate 
governance mechanism namely; executive remuneration. There is only a significant 
relationship with Tobin’s Q for FTSE 100 and its negative at nearly 90% confidence, 
although the coefficient is considerably small. It is consistent with prior research 
(Nissim, 2004; Desai and Dharmapala, 2005; Hanlon 2005) from executive 




created by managers, despite the after-tax return preference, as they perceive this 
return as a greater opportunity for managerial value diversion, which will not increase 
shareholders value. For example, Bebchuk and Fried (2003) provide an overview of 
the agency problem between shareholders and the board, suggesting that the effective 
occupation of the board by CEO, which leads to ease the diversion of rent in shape of 
excessive remuneration. This view leads to increasing concern about the potential 
negative aspects of adopting high-powered incentives to encourage improving firm 
performance (Desai and Dharmapala, 2005).  
 In addition, this result resonates with the perception of the agency issue through 
executive remuneration and concurs with Florackis (2008), who studies the UK 
companies and finds a positive relationship between a low level of executive salary 
and asset turnover. Nevertheless, this relationship turns negative when the salary is at 
a higher level; which, concurs with the research that perceives the agency problem 
through executive remuneration. Moreover, this explains the negative sign of the 
interaction variable PDEREM in FTSE 100 with both measurements of firm value. In 
addition, there is no significant relationship for the other two interaction variables 
TDEREM and STRDEREM in FTSE 100. For TDEREM,it may be because investors 
are aware of the timing differences nature and do not consider it as a tax reduction, 
hence, engaging in timing tax difference is not for the taxation purpose. Likewise, 
investors know that those timing differences will reverse in the future and the firm 
has to pay the tax owed when it becomes dues. Therefore, the timing tax differences 
component has no impact on executive remuneration.  
The other significant relationship is revealed between both CI and LEV and Tobin’s 
Q similar to the previous results in both models.   
Capital intensity has a significant positive relationship with firm value in FTSE 350 
for both Tobin’s Q and ROA at 90%. This positive relationship is driven from the 
FTSE 100 that has a positive significant relationship with both Tobin’s Q and ROA at 
99%. This is in alignment with US studies that find a positive relationship between 
capital intensity and firm performance, for example, Lee and Xiao (2011) find a U-




This positive signal can be explained also, as the high level of the capital intensity of 
a company can be as a result of increasing the quality and productivity, thus, 
positively valued by investors (Shahean & Malik, 2012). Besides, Zhang et al., (2018) 
find a positive relationship between capital intensity and firms utilising high-
commitment work systems (HCWS).  
7.4.3.1.3 Tobin’s Q, Tax Minimisation Components, Corporate Governance 
and the interaction variables on FTSE 250  
The result of the relationship between tax minimisation components; PDs and STRDs 
and firm value measured by Q, is also significant and positive for FTSE 250 at 95% 
and 90% respectively. It is opposite to FTSE 100 result, however, the assumption is 
that they are equal to zero as explained above at the beginning of this subsection.  
Considering the interaction between permanent tax differences and the external 
mechanism of corporate governance namely institutional ownership, the PDOWN 
result is significantly negative for FTSE 250; the interpretation of this specific result 
could be for three reasons. First, FTSE 250 companies reflect the UK economy and 
policies as most of their operations are in the UK, so they are more affected by 
taxation economic and policy reforms. As a consequence, the interaction between 
permanent differences and institutional ownership (PDOWN) is significant and 
negative. The agency theory explains that tax minimisation strategy can lead to tax 
risks and/or managerial opportunism, du to shifting firm value privately to managers 
(Desai and Dharmapala, 2009, Desai et al., 2007), which is especially in companies 
with some levels of managerial ownership (Morck et al., 1988). The view is 
supported in various recent studies (Abdul Wahab and Holland, 2012; Chen et al., 
2010; Desai Dharmapala, 2009), which consider tax minimisation activity not only 
involves high costs but also, those costs might exceed any benefits shareholders can 
receive. In addition, FTSE 250 companies are more diverse than FTSE 100 with a 
mixture of both institutional and managerial ownership, which could have three 




First, a separation between owners and control, according to agency theory, this 
separation between managers and shareholders leads to information asymmetry as a 
result of the ambiguity of tax strategy information that is available for shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, the information asymmetry in tax minimisation 
leads managers to divert tax saving benefit to their wealth, so tax minimisation is not 
considered as wealth creation for shareholders as any benefit might accrue to 
activities that involve risks ( Chen et al., 2010; Desai and Dharmapala, 2009; Slemrod, 
2005).  
Second, the negative significance of the interaction variable PDOWN could be as a 
result of the shareholders’ perception of permanent differences as aggressive 
activities towards minimising tax compared to other tax minimisation components 
(Frank et al., 2009). This could result in some underlying additional risks such as 
reputation costs and penalties (Chen et al., 2010; Slemrod, 2005). 
Third, the controlling shareholders’ interest at the expense of other shareholders’ 
interests, which is known as the principal-principal problem (Young et al., 2008). 
Dominant shareholders; in concentrated shareholding structured companies; tend to 
monitor management and have the incentives to behave in the company’s interest; 
however, this could seriously affect minority shareholders when the private benefits 
of control exceed the losses from this position of power (Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera, 
2016).  
Concentrated ownership means the controlling shareholders can be individuals, 
families, financial institutions and other different corporations. Thus, there is a 
conflict between managerial control and any dispersion to outside shareholders, 
likewise, between majority controlling shareholders and those in the minority. In the 
UK, the nature of ownership favours dispersion however, they still encounter hostile 
takeovers, in which when the dispersed shareholders accept the tender offer, the 
bidder acquires control of the company and thus, controls the management, therefore, 
a takeover can be considered as rapid-fire mechanisms for blockholders seeking to 




Moreover, the expropriation dilemma influenced by blockholders can be more 
significant when other shareholders are dispersed and have various types of cash flow 
claims and blockholders have an incentive towards taking excessive risks, which 
could result in other minority shareholders being subject to the cost of losses (Jensen 
and Mckling, 1976). As FTSE 250 companies have more managerial ownership 
percentage and shareholders are dispersed with different patterns of cash flow claims, 
also, investors may be aware of the controlling behaviour of managers as well as their 
tendency towards risk, hence, they might negatively perceive tax minimisation 
strategy behaviour by managers, when they take in their consideration the nature of 
ownership structure. This can be as a result of investors’ fear of potential risks 
underlying this type of strategy.  
This negative result of PDOWN is consistent with the agency cost theory of tax 
minimisation that information asymmetry linked to tax minimisation can lead to 
either ethical risks or fear of ethical risks. The negative sign of permanent difference 
is aligned with Abdul Wahab and Holland (2012) who find a negative relationship 
between PDs and firm value, which explains that there are some sources of income 
included in accounting income but excluded from taxable income. This type of tax 
minimisation is the most beneficial source; however, it underlies the highest of both 
risks and costs (Abdul Wahab and Holland, 2012). 
Interestingly, earnings management has a positive significant relationship at 90% 
with Tobin’s Q in the FTSE 250, which might have number of explanations. First, 
companies could manage their earnings to meet the targets and thresholds set, which 
could attract potential investors and provide a positive picture of company’s 
performance as well as prevent negative earnings surprises (Gore et al., 2007). For 
example, Caneghem, (2002) finds that  UK listed companies have a behavioural 
tendency of rounding up income before tax, reported in the annual report by 
increasing the first digit to a one-digit when managers face a nine-digit in the second 
position.  
Second, In addition, earnings management is not only about rounding up earnings, it 




al., 1999), mange debt agreement (Roychowdhury, 2006), taxation (Adhikari et al., 
2005) and CEO changes (Wilson and Wang, 2010). This positive sign is consistent 
with Haga et al., (2018) who study the real earnings management in both public and 
private companies in the UK and provide evidence that public companies tend to 
engage in real earnings management via real operation activities than private 
companies as a result of stock market pressure. This positively significant result can 
be interpreted, as public companies are more likely to manage their earnings in 
aggressively anticipating future trends. The well-known billionaire investor Waren 
Buffett quotes “managers that always promise to make the numbers will at some 
point be tempted to make up the numbered”.   
Leverage has a significant positive relationship with Tobin’s Q, similar to the results 
for FTSE 350 and FTSE 100. Dividend also has a significant positive relationship 
with Tobin’s for FTSE 250 at 95% that relationship is reflected on FTSE 350.  
7.4.3.2 Firm Value Measures by ROA  
This subsection outlines the results of the third estimation model considering ROA as 
a dependent variable on FTSE 350 sample and then extending the results to FTSE 
100 and FTSE 250 to explore the differences underpin these samples and explain the 
reason underlying these differences. In addition, the models utilise ROA as a 
dependent variable for FTSE 350, FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 are random effects as 
confirmed by the Hausman test and the other robustness tests that are mentioned at 
the beginning of this chapter.  
7.4.3.2.1 ROA, Tax Minimisation Components, Corporate Governance and the 
interaction variables on FTSE 350  
With regards to the FTSE 350 and firm value measured by ROA, when the 
interaction terms related to institutional ownership and executive remuneration are 
included the results become significant. For example, the relationship between ROA 
and the three interaction variables, PDOWN, TDOWN and STRDOWN is 





In contrast, the only significant relationship between interaction variables of tax 
minimisation components and the internal corporate governance mechanism EREM, 
is that PDEREM has a negative and significant relationship with ROA at 99% 
confidence. This finding emphasises the previous results’ interpretation for FTSE 100 
with Tobin’s Q. 
 
For the control variables, there is a positive significant relationship between capital 
intensity and ROA at 90% similar to the FTSE 350 results with Tobin’s Q. there is no 
significant result for the other control variables EM, LEV, FOS, and DIV. 
 
7.4.3.2.2 ROA, Tax Minimisation Components, Corporate Governance and the 
interaction variables on FTSE 100  
When ROA becomes the dependent variable, the positive significance of the result 
covers all the three interaction terms, PDOWN, TDOWN and STRDOWN.  The 
explanation of the significance of the three institutional ownership interaction terms 
for FTSE 350 reflects the FTSE 100 significance result. The result confirms also the 
external corporate governance structure has a major impact on ROA and tax 
minimisation components in particular PDs, TDs and STRDs. In addition, PDEREM 
has a negative relationship with ROA, which similar to the result for FTSE 350.  
 
Capital intensity has a positive relationship with ROA AT 99% that is similar to the 
previous results for FTSE 100 with Q and FTSE 350 with Q and ROA. In contrast, 
the negative sign of leverage is consistent with the previous research (Abdul Wahab 
and Holland, 2012) who find a significant negative relationship between firm value 
and leverage utilise a sample of UK firms from 2005 to 2007.   
7.4.3.2.3 ROA, Tax Minimisation Components, Corporate Governance and the 
interaction variables on FTSE 250  
The result in this sample has more significance in the interaction variables with ROA 
than with Tobin’s Q, in which PDOWD has a positive relationship with ROA at 95% 
confidence that is opposite to the results with Tobin’s Q. This means investors’ 




In addition, PDEREM has a positive relationship with ROA at 90% confidence, 
although this variable is not significant when the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q and 
it is negative with FTSE 100 sample. That could mean the executive salary is at a 
higher level for FTSE 100 compared to FTSE 250 and investors observe permanent 
differences as an opportunity for managers to shift the resource to themselves through 
remuneration.      
The negative sign of dividend with ROA for FTSE 250 might be interpreted as firms 
during the period under investigation distribute pay-out dividends even with a 
negative return on assets (ROA), which can be noted from the average dividend of 
FTSE 250 (1.96) that is double the average dividend of FTSE 100 (0.98).  
To conclude, internal and external corporate governance mechanisms can be 
perceived as a moderating tool in tax minimisation strategy, as they might influence 
tax strategy in direct and indirect ways. This moderating role is achieved utilising 
various methods including ownership structure and executive remuneration. It is 
crucial to consider that the basis of corporate governance intervention is highly 
correlated with agency problems. The conflict between shareholders and managers’ 
interests is continuous, due to the separation of the two parties of right and control, 
which creates information asymmetry that is in managers’ favour. As a result, the 
relationship between tax minimisation and corporate governance might go in different 
directions; positive or negative depending on the perceptions of both shareholders 
and managers. According to dividend policies, it can be utilised as corporate 
governance mechanisms, therefore, it can consider as a proxy to remuneration in 
reducing the agency conflict between the two parties; the agent and principle (Dong 






This research uses a unique set of tax reconciliation data, which was collected 
manually from the annual reports of FTSE 350 non-financial companies for the most 
recent data available for the period from 2014 to 2016. This data provides the most 
comprehensive details of book tax differences and is not available in a ready format. 
This involves the collecting of information related to profit before tax, taxable income, 
current UK and overseas tax expenses, the UK statutory tax rate, overseas tax rate, 
deferred tax expenses. The reason behind using this unique type of data is to provide 
a deeper intuitive understanding and explanation of the relationship between book tax 
differences’ components and investors’ reaction towards these components in their 
firms’ valuation. Furthermore, this study also provides further insight into the reason 
underlying engaging in tax minimisation activities by managers, even though, these 
activities might be negatively valued by investors. These different perceptions 
between managers and investors are illustrated by using both Tobin’s Q and return on 
assets as a dependent variable and then comparing their results. 
Analysing the whole sample FTSE350 and then splitting it to FTSE100 and FTSE 
250 to obtain a more insightful view concerning the findings for every group, as they 
might act differently in a way that can affect the results of the overall sample. This is 
considered as a contribution to knowledge in a tax research context.   
The findings also, provide a deeper understanding of the moderating role of the two 
variables of both internal and external corporate governance mechanisms and the 
effect of their interaction with tax minimisation on investors’ and managers’ 
valuation alike.  
Finally, the findings offer an explanation, how book tax differences provide valuable 
information for investors and managers alongside all stakeholders. Hence, this shows 
that considering the information that results from measuring book tax differences can 
add useful information to the investors in the stock market.  
To summarise, the results of this research provide awareness about the importance of 




positively value tax minimisation activities in FTSE 250 when considering tax 
minimisation components solely, which indicates that tax minimisation is regarded as 
a source of wealth creation for investors. This finding could be due to investors 
positively value tax minimisation (Drake, Lusch and Stekelberg, 2019, Inger, 2014). 
Although Abdul Wahab and Holland (2012) find a negative relationship between tax 
minimisation and firm valuation, this research completed the picture by stating that 
the relationship can vary within the different indices.  This positive relationship is 
observed to be mainly related to permanent tax differences (PDs) and statutory tax 
rate differences (STRDs) and both are not significantly different from each other as 
both are significant at the ten percent level, which indicates that there is no different 
valuation effect between them. This result supports the first hypothesis that there is a 
positive relationship between tax minimisation components and firm value.  
Examining the embodiment of external and internal corporate governance 
mechanisms on the firm valuation and tax minimisation components relationship 
grants higher STRDs significant degree compared from the initial results stated above 
for FTSE 250 at 90% to 95% with IOWN and EREM. Whilst, this suggests that in 
considering corporate governance mechanisms, investors seem to positively value tax 
minimisation generated from overseas tax rate differences, the coefficient estimates 
of STRDs is not significantly different from the particular coefficient in the first 
model without corporate governance. Furthermore, considering corporate governance 
weakens the PDs results as it becomes insignificant. This result partially supports 
Desai and Dharampal’s (2009) assumption on the significance of corporate 
governance efficiency to investors, in particular, the role that corporate governance 
mechanisms play to identify investors’ apprehension concerning managerial 
opportunisms in tax minimisation decisions. 
The interactions between corporate governance mechanisms and tax minimisation 
components emphasise the relationship and enhance it even further, confirming that 
there is a statistically significant relationship between tax minimisation components 
and both measures of firm value. However, the relationship differs depending on the 




corporate governance mechanism namely institutional ownership and the three tax 
components shows that there is a significantly positive relationship between 
permanent tax differences interaction and Tobin’s Q in FTSE 100. However, this 
relationship becomes significantly negative with FTSE 250. This difference in the 
outcomes might be as a result of the different perceptions of the investors in both 
indices as explained in the chapter above. In addition, there is a significant positive 
relationship between temporary tax differences interaction with institutional 
ownership and Tobin’s Q in both FTSE 350 and FTSE 100; however, this 
relationship has no significance in FTSE 250. Again, this emphasises that both 
indices have different perceptions, which influence the outcomes.   
The internal corporate governance mechanism namely executive remuneration has 
only a significant relationship in the case of the interaction between executive 
remuneration and permanent tax difference, which also differs in both indices FTSE 
100 and FTSE 250. Whilst the relationship is significantly negative in FTSE 100,  it 
is significant and positive in FTSE 250; in cont, there is no impact on FTSE 350.  
The results of this research show that it is important to examine the indices separately 
to understand the behaviour of the trends as every index has different characteristics 





CHAPTER EIGHT: RESEARCH CONCLUSION, 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS   
8.1 Introduction  
The corporate tax rate in the UK has been reduced since 2009 from 30% to 20%; 
although, this massive reduction companies continue in engaging in tax minimisation 
or/and creating new techniques for tax reduction. Tax minimisation and book tax 
differences figure continuingly as an important topic amongst researchers in different 
areas, media and politicians. In addition, book tax differences represent various 
dimensions; they can reflect the interaction between accounting principle and tax 
rules in one and/or tax minimisation and earnings management in another.  This 
research utilises UK data for the period from 2014 to 2016 to examine whether 
investors distinguish between different methods of tax reduction namely permanent 
tax differences, temporary tax differences and overseas tax rate differences in their 
firms’ valuation. In addition, this research examines the different perceptions of 
investors and managers towards current and future earnings by implementing two 
different measurements of firm value namely; Tobin’s Q and return on assets. The 
result of this examination is achieved through developing book tax differences 
calculations’ models following Abdul Wahab and Holland (2015). The three main 
hypotheses are developed and tested to achieve the purpose of this research. This 
chapter represents the summary of the research results and some recommendations 
for potential future research. The chapter begins with a summary of the research 
results and conclusion. Then it states the contribution of the knowledge and limitation 
with some suggestions for future research.   
8.2 Research Overview  
The literature review in this research provides an insight into the increase of the tax 
breach and highlights the corporate tax gap magnitude over decades. In addition, it 
discusses the two different measures of accounting and taxation incomes and the 




meet the investors need not tax authority. The alignment between accounting 
standards and the embracing of International Financial Report Standards (IFRS) 
reinforce bringing tax accounting and accounting standards together. Much work 
needs to be done in order to make accounting standards serve both investors and tax 
authorities, which can be through developing regulations to provide information to 
the two different interests.  
In addition, the literature review (Chapter 2) represents an explanation of book tax 
differences with its components and highlights how they can be generated and the 
information that can include in these components. Book tax differences reflect the 
difference between accounting income and taxable income, which are both generated 
to provide two different information for users for a different purpose, namely 
accounting and taxable information. Managers tend to increase accounting income by 
adopting earnings management strategies, meanwhile, decrease the taxable income 
through engaging in tax minimisation strategies, which lead to book tax differences. 
Whilst, the permanent part of book tax differences cannot be reversed in the future 
and leads to tax saving, temporary tax differences can be reversed in the future and 
might not be for a tax saving purpose. Distinguishing between the two different parts 
of tax book differences can be crucial and lead to understanding their behaviour. Tax 
minimisation is considered as a corporate long-term strategy, which intends to create 
long-term tax savings through book tax differences. A comprehensive view of book 
tax differences and its components is presented in the literature review chapter, which 
is essential for understanding tax saving strategies and their beneficial outcomes. 
Chapter three highlights corporate governance external and internal mechanisms and 
their impact on firm value and discuss the debate in wider details. The review 
explores the contribution of different types of corporate governance mechanisms 
towards firm value and to investigate the efficiency of these mechanisms in providing 
a brighter future forecasting for current and future investors.  
Chapter four reviews and discuss in detail the debate concerning the relationship 
between firm value and tax minimisation with consideration of corporate governance 




the various forms of tax minimisation through book tax differences regarding firm 
value and their usefulness for investors’ valuation. To examine the contribution of 
book tax differences (BTDs) and its components; PDs, TDs and STRDs, the 
calculation of book tax difference and its components used in Abdul Wahab and 
Holland (2015) is adopted. This allows for examining the relationship between firm 
value and each individual component and investigating whether investors distinguish 
between them in their valuation. The results of the analysis are crucially significant to 
understand the value that each component can add to the firm through tax saving and 
explore their importance for shareholders in their valuation.  
Chapter five explains the research philosophy and develops hypotheses grounded in 
the literature review; thus, this research is positivist in nature and adopted a 
quantitative approach. Chapter six represents the data collection and variables’ 
measurements with an explanation of the development of the research models and the 
report and discussion of the estimation models’ results are exhibited in chapter seven.  
8.3 Summary of the Hypotheses, Findings and Discussion 
A summary of the hypotheses developed in chapter five is reviewed in this section 
along with the findings that are concluded from the research methodology. Moreover, 
this section debates the findings as detailed in chapter seven and answer the research 
questions as stated in chapter one.  
8.3.1 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses are developed in two stages: first, the relationship between firm value 
and tax minimisation components and second the moderating role that corporate 
governance mechanisms play in this relationship. The UK literature review is sparse 
in this relationship and its pattern; thus, the hypotheses are developed based on a 
mixture of both UK and US literature and with an explanation of the difference 
amongst both (Abdul Wahab and Holland, 2015; Abdul Wahab and Holland, 2012; 




Investors value different tax minimisation methods differently (Inger, 2014). 
Therefore, the first hypothesis is developed to test if there is a statistically significant 
difference between different components of tax minimisation and their contribution to 
firm valuation. Furthermore, book tax differences as a measure of tax minimisation, 
comprises two components, temporary and permanent differences (Abdul Wahab and 
Holland, 2015).  The temporary difference is anticipated to reverse in the future 
(Hanlon, 2005), thus; it does not have any impact on investors' valuation (Inger, 
2014). In contrast, the permanent differences is reflecting substances that are 
considered in one report (accounting income or taxable income) and not considered in 
the other. Prior research suggests that Permanent difference is reflecting aggressive 
tax reduction (Inger, 2014; Wilson, 2009; Desai and Dharmapala, 2009).  
Therefore, the first hypothesis is developed to examine whether there is a significant 
difference between temporary, permanent and statutory overseas tax rate differences 
contribution on firm value model.  
Finally, there is a controversial debate on whether corporate governance mechanisms 
play a vital role in improving shareholders’ valuation of the company and whether 
they underpin firm efficiency or not.  This motivates the development of the second 
hypothesis that investigates whether corporate external and internal mechanisms play 
a vital moderating role in this relationship between tax minimisation components and 
firm value. 
The sample used in testing the hypotheses comprises of non-financial companies 
listed on FTSE 350 and covers three years period from 2014 to 2016, the sample for 
2013 is also collected and utilised in calculating the beginning book value of equity. 
The final sample uses to test the relationship between tax minimisation and firm 
value after excluding the outliers is 486 observations in which 486 observations when 
utilising Tobin’s Q as a dependent variable and 500 observations when utilising ROA 
as a dependent variable. This panel dataset is after excluding outliers and influential 
observations; also, the panel dataset is split into two other samples for FTSE 100 and 




8.3.2 Findings and Discussion 
The descriptive statistics in chapter seven do not disclose the presence of tax 
minimisation activities amongst FTSE 350; however, it is represented in both FTSE 
100 in which income before tax (IBT) 698.54 (£m) and tax saving (TS) negative 
17.41 (£m), through permanent differences (PDs) negative 271.78 (£m), temporary 
tax differences (TDs) average is 6.82 (£m) and statutory overseas tax rate differences 
(STRDs) 21.21 (£m), and FTSE 250 sample through the average income before tax 
(IBT) 108.6 (£m) and tax saving (TS) 0.01 (£m), permanent differences (PDs) 
negative 29.61 (£m), temporary differences (TDs) 5.05(£m), statutory overseas tax 
rate differences (STRDs) 2.35(£m).  
In addition, the existence of tax minimisation is clear across the descriptive statistics 
of positive book tax difference samples. The average income before tax (IBT) is 
293.68 (£m) and tax saving (TS) 32.36 (£m) for FTSE 350, which both differ in 
FTSE 100 and FTSE 250. This articulates overall variances in the level of tax 
minimisation across the samples, for example, the highest tax saving component in 
FTSE 350 sample is temporary differences with an average of 70.74(£m), follows by 
permanent differences with an average of 18.67 (£m) and then statutory tax rate 
differences with average 1.28 (£m). Likewise, for FTSE 100 the highest tax saving is 
for temporary with an average of 162.97(£m), follows by permanent differences with 
an average of 9.35 (£m) and finally statutory tax rate differences with an average of 
4.99 (£m).  For FTSE 250 the highest tax saving is for the temporary differences with 
an average of 27.67 (£m), follows by permanent differences with average of 23.02 
(£m), however, the statutory tax rate differences is negative 0.46 (£m).  
The descriptive statistics also show the general variance upon the average of 
corporate external and internal mechanisms in terms of institutional ownership and 
executive remuneration. Whilst, the average of institutional ownership for FTSE 350 
is 34.792 per cent, the FTSE 100 average is 27.57 per cent and FTSE 250 39.03 per 
cent. The average company spending for executive remuneration in FTSE 350 is 




In FTSE 100, only 10 observations have managerial ownership with a percentage of 
more than 3%, whilst, in FTSE 250 58 observations that have a percentage of more 
than 3%. As the number is small, the managerial ownership variable is ignored in the 
regressions.  
8.3.2.1 Tax Minimisation Components and Firm Value  
The multivariate results state in the previous chapter for the relationship between tax 
minimisation components and firm value measure by both Tobin’s Q and ROA are 
based on three different samples namely; FTSE 350, FTSE 100 and FTSE 250. The 
findings suggest that for firm value measures by Tobin’s Q there is no relationship 
between tax minimisation components namely PDs, TDs and STRDs and Tobin’s Q 
in FTSE 350. Likewise, there is no relationship between tax minimisation 
components PDs, TDs, STRDs and Tobin’s Q in FTSE 100. This finding suggests 
that these components have no impact on investors’ valuation of tax minimisation 
strategies. However, there is a significant positive relationship between both PDs and 
STRDs and Tobin’s Q in FTSE 250. This indicates tax minimisation strategy through 
permanent tax difference and overseas tax rate difference positively valued by the 
investors, which is inconsistent with Abdul Wahab and Holland (2012), who find a 
negative relationship between permanent difference and firm valuation. Whilst, it 
concurs with Darke, et al. (2019); Desai and Dharmapala (2006) who find a strong 
positive relationship between tax minimisation and firm value measures by Tobin’s Q, 
furthermore, Guenther et al. (2017) and Darke, et al. (2019) Support the hypothesis 
that tax minimisation is not influenced by tax risks and suggest that lower effective 
tax rate (ETR) is not associated with higher tax risk or higher firm’s risk.  In contrast, 
similar to the other two samples, investors in FTSE 250 companies do not value 
temporary tax difference compared with the other tax components; it might be 
because they know that temporary difference only reflects timing difference and will 
reverse in the future, thus, it will not be an important element in their valuation, 




This might explain that studying all the UK quoted companies could not lead to a 
significant result as not all companies have positive BTDs in all years, which could 
lead to an insignificant relationship between tax minimisation components and firm 
value measures by Tobin’s Q. Nevertheless, breaking down the sample into different 
categories might lead to significant results. Consequently, the results support the 
hypothesis that predicts the existence of the relationship between tax minimisation 
components and firm value. Moreover, the results support the hypothesis that 
investors value each tax minimisation components differentially, as both significant 
results of PDs and STRDS are positive and TDs is not significant in FTSE 250. This 
indicates that investors value PDs and STRDs but not PDs as explained in the 
previous paragraph.  
In addition, the results of the relationship between tax minimisation components and 
firm value measures by ROA show that there is a significant positive relationship 
between the three tax minimisation components; PDs, TDs, STRDs and ROA in both 
FTSE 350 and FTSE 100. This result supports Frank et al.’s (2009) suggestion on the 
strong positive influence of tax minimisation components on investors’ valuation. 
However, the positive influence on investors’ valuation in FTSE 250 comes from the 
only two tax minimisation components PDs and STRDs. This result concurs with 
Delgado et al. (2018), Noor et al. (2010) and Noor, et al. (2008), who state that 
companies with a higher level of profitability tend to engage in tax minimisation and 
pay lower corporate tax income. This positive relationship between tax minimisation 
components and return on assets can be explained as the book tax difference is 
derived by the company’s profitability purpose (Herron & Nahata, 2018). 
8.3.2.2 Tax Minimisation Components, Firm Value and Corporate Governance   
The multivariate findings on the moderating role that corporate governance 
mechanisms play on the relationship between tax minimisation components and firm 
valuation are mentioned in the previous chapter. In addition, the chapter states the 
findings of analysing whether this relationship is conditional over the strength on 




The findings suggest that corporate governance mechanisms have different influences 
on the three different samples. For example for FTSE 350 and FTSE 100 corporate 
governance mechanisms are not moderating factors in the relationship between tax 
minimisation components and firm value measures by Tobin’s Q, as after adding both 
external and internal mechanism namely; institutional ownership and executive 
remuneration did not improve the results or even change them. However, in FTSE 
250 adding corporate governance variables weaken the relationship between 
permanent tax difference and Tobin’s Q and it becomes insignificant, however, it 
improves the significance level of overseas tax rate difference as it becomes 
significant at 95% confidence. Hence, considering corporate governance mechanisms; 
IOWN and EREM raise the level of the probability, but lowers the coefficient 
parameter for STRDs in FTSE 250.  These results do not support Abdul Wahab and 
Holland's (2012) and Henderson Global Investors' (2005) argument that corporate 
governance mechanisms have a significant effect on shareholders’ tax minimisation 
valuation in both FTSE 350 and FTSE 100. In addition, it might be explained as the 
UK companies have a good practice of corporate governance, as listed companies 
have to meet the requirements standard of compliance with corporate governance 
practice, thus, it is not perceptive factors for shareholders (Bauer et al., 2004).  
In contrast, the results of FTSE 250 support the hypothesis that confirms the 
importance of corporate governance practice to shareholders tax minimisation 
valuation, in which it weakens permanent tax difference and strengthen statutory tax 
rate difference. This result might support the assumption that shareholders value tax 
minimisation, but do not value tax risks involved (Dark, et al. (2019).  
Overall, the findings succeed in supporting the hypothesis that predicts the 
moderating role of corporate governance mechanisms on the relationship between 
both permanent tax difference and overseas tax rate difference and firm value 
measures using Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable.  
Subsequently, in the analysis of the implementation of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the relationship between tax minimisation components and firm value 




tax components for both models with and without corporate governance variables. 
This indicates the suggestion that corporate governance mechanisms do not influence 
the relationship between tax minimisation components and firm value measures by 
ROA. Furthermore, it might indicate that corporate governance mechanisms have no 
influence on firm performance measured by ROA.  
8.3.2.3 Tax Minimisation Components, Firm Value, Corporate Governance and 
the Interaction variables   
The results of adding the interaction variables between tax minimisation components 
and corporate governance proxies to the main estimation model creating the third 
model and then conducting the regression on the three samples indicate a significant 
relationship between the interaction variables and firm value measures by both 
Tobin’s Q and ROA. The results advocate the moderating role that corporate 
governance play in this relationship concurs with some prior research (Desai and 
Dharmaphala, 2009) and suggest a positive relationship between tax minimisation 
and firm value for firms with high levels of institutional ownership. However, each 
sample and each dependent variable has a different result, for example, concerning 
Tobin’s Q as a dependent variable, the only interactive variable that has significant 
results with Tobin’s Q for FTSE 350 is TDOWN. It might be because investors are 
aware that temporary tax difference involves a lower level of tax risk and the liability 
underlining it will be due in the future. This result supports the effective monitoring 
role that institutional ownership plays within the companies (Desai and Dharmapala, 
2009). In contrast, in the same sample with ROA as a dependent variable, all the 
interaction variables between tax minimisation components and institutional 
ownership; PDOWN, TDOWN, and STRDs have significant impact on ROA. This 
can explain that considering institutional ownership as a moderating role can lead to a 
positive relationship between tax minimisation components ROA, which suggests the 
impact of tax minimisation on the firm’s after tax value is greater for companies with 




Concerning the interaction between tax components and institutional ownership in 
FTSE 100, PDOWN and TDOWN have a significant positive impact on firm value 
measured by both Tobin’s Q and ROA; however, all three PDOWN, TDOWN and 
STROWN are positively significant with ROA. This result suggests that tax 
minimisation strategy in FTSE 100 is viewed by investors as a set of value-increasing 
activities. The interpretation of the findings could be that tax minimisation activities 
can be valued positively by investors upon the status of corporate governance 
(Wilson, 2009; Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009; Desai and Dharmapala, 2009). 
Furthermore, it may be due to the FTSE 100 that firms are regarded as risk free, 
whereas institutional investors believe that as the pecking order rises, so does the risk. 
Thus, from an agency perspective, investors could value the engagement of the FTSE 
100 companies in a tax minimisation strategy, as it is considered as value added to the 
shareholders’ wealth. In respect of this, investors perceive institutional ownership as 
playing a vital role in monitoring the management’s activities and are increasing the 
level of scrutiny for managerial actions, which is interpreted by Desai and 
Dharmapala (2009) as good governance. Moreover, the FTSE 100 are the top largest 
companies that have the ability to pay for highly experienced accounting companies 
that help them in more complicated tax saving strategies that lead to an increase in 
firm value. 
FTSE 250 has the opposite result with the interaction between institutional ownership 
and tax minimisation components, in which PDOWN has a negative impact on firm 
value that advocates the suggestion that tax minimisation generated by permanent 
difference is viewed by investors as value- decreasing activities (Abdul Wahab and 
Holland, 2012). It could be because FTSE 250 companies reflect the UK economy 
and policies as most of their operations are in the UK, so they are more affected by 
taxation economic and policy reforms. As a consequence, the interaction between 
permanent differences and institutional ownership (PDOWN) is significant and 
negative. The agency theory explains that tax minimisation strategy can lead to tax 
risks and/or managerial opportunism, due to shifting firm value privately to managers 
(Desai and Dharmapala, 2009, Desai et al., 2007), which is especially in companies 




supported in various recent studies (Abdul Wahab and Holland, 2012; Chen et al., 
2010; Desai Dharmapala, 2009), which consider tax minimisation activity not only 
involves high costs but also, those costs might exceed any benefits shareholders can 
receive. Nevertheless, this interactive variable has a positive result when considers 
ROA as a dependent variable, which confirms that utilising different measures for 
firm value might result in different findings and shareholders valuation might be 
different to managers valuation of firm value.  
The interaction between tax minimisation components and executive remuneration 
has the only significant result with permanent tax difference, in which PDEREM in 
FTSE 350 has a negative result when the independent variable is ROA; however, the 
result is insignificant when Tobin’s Q is the dependent variable. In general, this can 
be explained as increasing executive remuneration linked to increasing of permanent 
tax differences, which leads to an increase in firm performance.  
 
PDEREM has a negative impact on firm value measures by both Tobin’s Q and ROA 
in FTSE 100. Remuneration is designed to align both shareholders’ and managers’ 
interests (Florackis, 2008), though, the efficiency of remuneration in decreasing 
agency costs could be confronted. From the shareholders point of view, shareholders 
do not value companies’ engagement in a tax strategy, despite the after-tax return 
preference, as they perceive this return as a greater opportunity for managerial 
opportunism, which will not increase shareholders value. For example, in an 
overview of the agency problem between shareholders and the board, it can be 
suggested that the effective occupation of the board by a CEO leads to facilitating the 
diversion of rent in the form of a greater remuneration (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). 
This view leads to an increasing concern about the potential negative aspects of 
adopting high-powered incentives to encourage the improvement of a firm’s 
performance (Desai and Dharmapala, 2005). 
FTSE 250 has different results to its counterpart FTSE 100 in which the interaction 




significant positive impact on firm value measures only by ROA. This could be as 
explained above investors’ valuation of firm value varies from managers’ valuation. 
To conclude, this research finds strong evidence that corporate governance plays a 
moderating role in shareholders' valuation of firms’ tax minimisation activities in 
FTSE 100. This is through the interaction between the external corporate governance 
mechanisms, namely institutional ownership and both permanent differences and 
temporary differences, however, the moderating role of internal mechanism can only 
be seen on the permanent differences.   
In contrast, in FTSE 250 there is evidence that only the external corporate governance 
mechanism has a moderating influence on shareholders’ valuation through permanent 
difference component. As a result, it can be summarised that corporate governance 
practices moderate the relationship between tax minimisation components and firm 
value in FTSE 100. Furthermore, investors positively value tax minimisation 
activities when considering institutional ownership as a moderating factor but 
negatively value these activities through executive remuneration. Contrarily, 
investors negatively value tax minimisation activities in FTSE 250 when considering 
institutional ownership as a moderating factor, but remuneration does not have a 
moderating role in the relationship under investigation.  
8.4 Research Contributions 
Tax minimisation strategies decisions made through the different components lead to 
increase firm value and as consequences, shareholders' wealth mainly in FTSE 100, 
however, these strategies are value decreasing in FTSE 250. This section highlights 
the methodological and theoretical contributions and the suggestions to practice and 
policymakers.  
8.4.1 Contributions to Knowledge  
This study is the first that focuses on different methods of tax minimisation on FTSE 




FTSE 350 companies’ performance. The agency theory and Scholes-Wolfson 
assumption are the main theory and framework underpins hypotheses development 
and testing them. The theoretical contribution of this research is providing further 
understanding of taxation and corporate governance literature from shareholders’ 
perspective towards evaluating tax minimisation strategy in the UK FTSE 350.  
This research incorporates agency problem upon the analysis of tax minimisation 
activities leads to the theoretical and empirical contribution that predict tax 
minimisation activities by managers differ upon their attitude towards risk. In 
addition, the results of this research state that shareholders’ valuation of tax 
minimisation differs upon different methods of tax reduction and different corporate 
governance mechanisms. This provides further empirical evidence on the significance 
of aligning shareholders with managers’ interests to ensure companies' prosperity and 
growth in particular in FTSE 350.   
Furthermore, the results show that investors value tax minimisation strategy conduct 
by firms, however, they do not value tax risk involves in this strategy, which could 
lead to an increase of the cost-related. Thus, this could raise the investors’ uncertainty 
on the beneficial outcomes of engaging in such a strategy that can lead to imposing 
unintended and unwanted outcomes, whether through managers’ opportunisms or 
reputation outcomes.  This can be seen through the negative impact of executive 
remuneration on the firm valuation of tax minimisation strategy via investors.   
The empirical contribution that this research provides to the knowledge of taxation 
and corporate governance is driven from prior studies in the UK (Abdul Wahab and 
Holland, 2012) and the US (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009; Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009, 
Wilson). Although the tax regulation and corporate governance practice differ 
between the UK and US could lead potentially to different consequences (Abdul 
Wahab and Holland, 2012), this research provides empirical evidence that investors’ 
behaviour and reaction towards the tax benefit and cost defer based on their 
perception towards these two factors, not only tax regulation. Therefore, this research 
widens the understanding of investors’ valuation behaviour towards tax minimisation 




result, investors’ firm valuation seizes through tax minimisation strategy 
implemented by companies and varies upon both FTSE100 and FTSE 250 indices 
and base on different tax minimisation components. 
Scholes-Wolfson assumption states that there are three significant standards when 
making tax minimisation decisions by managers. The decision should consider all of 
the contract parties, costs and taxes to achieve tax minimisation objectives effectively, 
which leads to increase firm value and as a consequence boosts shareholders’ wealth. 
The findings of this research provide evidence that shareholders have different 
behaviour towards tax minimisation decisions made by managers in different indices. 
This result indicates that shareholders have different awareness levels concerning the 
risks of involving in tax minimisation activities in the UK context, which leads to 
having different costs for different tax minimisation components in each index. 
Therefore, the benefit expectation for shareholders varies across each different tax 
minimisation component and each index.  This finding and analysis provide 
additional empirical evidence and further insights into the framework.  
To summarise the above-mentioned discussions, this research contributes to the 
agency theory by expanding the tax minimisation knowledge and providing insight 
on tax minimisation activities conduct by managers, corporate governance practice 
and prove its moderating factor in mitigating the aggressiveness of these activities. 
Besides, Scholes-Wolfson assumption that concerning all parties, costs and taxes, 
which are related to tax minimisation decisions since those decisions impact market 
capitalisation, which leads to affect shareholders value. Finally, this research 
considers value relevance literature that associates with tax minimisation activities 
and provides evidence that shareholders value different tax minimisation method 
differently in the different indices.  
8.4.2 Contributions to Methodology 
This research contributes to the methodology in various manners. For example, the 
research sample collection includes non-financial companies in the FTSE 350 index 




Thus, this research considers the first research conducts in the UK context that studies 
tax minimisation activities and their impact on firm value by focusing on FTSE 350 
sample and splitting it to FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 to analyse them separately.  This 
research contributes to the taxation knowledge by extending the literature and 
providing empirical evidence on the relationship between different methods of tax 
minimisation and firm value measures by two measurements Tobin’s Q and ROA in 
the UK. This contribution considers significant to the knowledge by providing 
evidence that tax minimisation strategy exists even with the reduction of corporate 
tax rate and investors’ valuation of this strategy is determined by their perception of 
corporate governance implementation by firms. Thus, investors’ valuations are 
determined by their attitude towards trading off between benefit and risk and not tax-
related regulation as stated by Abdul Wahab and Holland (2012).      
In addition, this research provides a methodological contribution in terms of utilising 
a unique set of data samples. This is through collecting the data from the tax 
reconciliation section in companies’ annual reports and calculating tax minimisation 
components manually using an Excel file. This calculation allows for the measuring 
of different components of tax minimisation, namely permanent tax difference, 
timing difference and statutory overseas tax rate difference. Tax minimisation 
components combine with the collection and calculation of both external and internal 
corporate governance data and five control variables. This method of calculation 
provides insights into the shareholders' valuation of different tax minimisation 
components and is considering the different corporate governance mechanisms on 
different samples. This is the first research that has been conducted in the UK context 
that applies this methodology and compares their results. Although, it has been shown 
that prior studies that were conducted in the UK (Abdul Wahab and Holland, 2014; 
Abdul Wahab and Holland, 2012) and the US utilise the different components of tax 
minimisation (Zhou, 2016; Inger, 2014; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). This study has 
its uniqueness by utilising different corporate governance mechanisms, focusing on 
the FTSE 350 and extending the analysis to the FTSE 250 and FTSE 250, and is also 
utilising two different measures of firm value and then compares their results. This 




contribution by closing the research gap in reviewing the difference between the UK 
and US shareholders valuation.  
 Furthermore, this research provides a methodological contribution through the choice 
of external and internal corporate governance mechanisms. To the author’s 
knowledge, this is the first research in the taxation context that utilises a combination 
of the two different mechanisms of corporate governance, namely institutional 
ownership and executive remuneration. Though, prior research determines corporate 
governance mechanisms by various means; for example, in the UK by utilising both 
institution ownership and the percentage of non-executive directors in the board 
(Abdul Wahab and Holland, (2012) and in the US through institutional ownership 
(Desai and Dharmapala, 2009) and compensation (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). 
This research combines the different collections of corporate governance proxies of 
prior research in both the UK and the US by providing its uniqueness in this selection. 
8.4.3 Contributions to Practice 
Further to the contribution to literature and methodology, also, this research has a 
practical contribution that can serve professional policymakers alike, which 
highlights briefly in this section the potential practical implications and the possible 
value-added related.  
The research utilises book tax differences as a measure of tax minimisation and 
identifies the different resources of book tax differences as permanent and temporary 
differences to examine the impact of these different resources on firm value. This 
identification allows providing useful information to investors, managers and tax 
authorities, in which permanent differences can reflect the long-term tax minimisation 
strategy and consequently long-term earnings for the firms, however, underlying 
high-risk costs. In contrast, temporary differences reflect short-term earnings that 
underlying low-risk cost. Understanding these different resources of book tax 
differences can help in providing valuable information about future earnings stability 
for firms, which is significant for supporting investors, decisions makers and 




there is some level of tax minimisation across the FTSE 350 companies; shareholders 
view these activities differently depending on the index and corporate governance 
mechanisms angles. This conclusion also provides evidence to the policymaker to 
improve the quality of tax information reporting and call for aligning tax and 
accounting information reports for tax purpose. In addition, although tax 
minimisation could lead to after tax returns and increasing shareholders wealth, the 
ethicality of this practice is an important concern to many other stakeholders. Tax 
minimisation activities can show a socially irresponsible practice that contradicts with 
companies’ obligations to society. Therefore, it is not only the government’s 
responsibility to ensure fairness in the corporation tax, there is also the companies’ 
responsibility towards society through the decisions made by the board, as endorsed 
by the OECD Guidelines for multinational companies, which set tax within corporate 
governance.  Hence, this is another call for increasing transparency about the tax 
related information of multinational companies through exchanging reporting 
information between countries and emphasising the HMRC requirements for the 
publication of companies’ tax strategies. Moreover, to improve the solutions for tax 
minimisation issues at an international level and to ensure that it is including all 
countries, another principle should be added to the United Nations Global Compact 
concerning fair taxation, which related to the involvement of the non-resort to tax 
minimisation schemes as suggested by Scheffer (2013). 
Corporate governance compliance is a concern since the issue of the corporate 
governance code in 1992 that set out to reduce corporate governance risks and 
failures, and to enhance how the companies and board functions. According to PIRC 
2007 review of the combined code, there were only 62 % of FTSE 350 listed 
companies in full compliance with the code provisions in 2016 as mentioned in Grant 
Thornton review (2018) and then the percentage further increased to 72 percent in 
2018. However, those companies do not explain clearly how they implement the code 
principles and do not discuss their application explicitly. While 78 % of companies 
keen on outline details into a succession plan for compliance, only 6 %, provide 
conducive details about the process towards such succession (Lowe, 2018). This 




information disclosure and the importance of combining both compliance corporate 
governance code and tax information disclosure. Thus, this is a platform to call for 
financial reporting authorities to consider requiring more beneficial details from 
managers about the succession plan that companies take, to be more transparent for 
different information users.  The negative perspectives of investors on executive 
remuneration might be because of the investors’ fear of managerial diversion that can 
lead to information asymmetry issues related to tax minimisation activities. Thus, the 
managers should consider the negative effect of investors’ firm valuation, when 
making tax minimisation decisions. 
8.4.4 Researcher’s Reflection  
This research journey inevitably has a huge contribution to the researcher’s personal 
development. The Ph.D. journey involved various challenges for the researcher, 
however, involved a plethora of rewarding at different levels and dimensions.  Some 
of the reflections are stated as follows:  
Stress management is a result of uncertainty. The stress can be caused by one or some 
known components and a build-up of small pressures, where there is too much work 
with thinking too far ahead. Scientifically some stress is valued in order to be on the 
operating track, overstress could cause severe illness. The stress that any Ph.D. 
research could experience caused by uncertainty whether from the journey itself or 
the results of the research. The researcher has been through stress at different stages 
of the journey to the point fearing the result might not be significant and thus, the 
efforts and the hard work might be lost. The researcher had to bravely face all these 
limiting beliefs in order to stand-alone towards completion. This period of 
transformation was super beneficial for personal development and understanding the 
hidden enemy that lives inside oneself.  Although there are some support and 
guidance from the supervisory team, the journey is characteristically described as 
isolated work, where the researcher has to make his own decisions, directions and 
justification, which could be quite challenging and triggers the self-belief system. Just 
having a snapshot back put me in deep emotions similar to the emotion of relief after 




improving the self-belief and taking control of one’s destiny, which can be through 
improving the confidence of continuing no matter what the uncertainty that involves 
the journey, the reward is invaluably precious. Thus, do it and face the fear anyway.  
Balancing between the deep details and the bigger picture. The researcher tends to 
feel lost while looking for deep details about the research through snowballing in the 
literature and conceptual framework that might be unlimited. Although, it is 
significant to dig deeper into the details, keeping the control of the overall picture is 
important to create a momentum of focus and prioritise daily productivity. This 
technique helps in dealing with issues that we face in our daily life, improve our 
perspective towards daily routine issues, and enhance our focus while surrounded by 
a world full of distractions.   
 
Identify the problem. The research expedition helps in setting the foundation 
framework of how to critically identify any dilemma, discover methods to collect 
information and data, analyse them and allow for the initial answers reach to 
assumption and conclusion. This improves problem-solving skills in our real-life 
scenarios that we face and have to solve on a daily basis, where we patiently deal 
with the challenge with deeper participation and comprehension.  
Adopting different approaches. Research philosophy helps in improving our 
perceptions of the truth and the nature of it, which improves one's ability in detaching 
him/herself from human values in dealing with the situation to provide neutral 
information and analysis. This ability of detachment is an incredibly powerful tool 
that improves our professional skills. This can be through understanding the specific 
approach fits within the research method, the researcher utilises a descriptive 
approach, which helps in describing reality as it is. This is without overlooking the 
prescriptive approach as both can help in improving the ability to apply different 
approaches for different scenarios in real life.  
Succession plan and resilience. It is significant to create plans and sustain the vision 
and path of the research in order to keep momentum flow that can though plan the 
aim, objectives, theoretical framework, research method and approach and also, 




flexible as flexibility helps in adopting any outcomes. This improves our ability in 
dealing with uncertainties in real life. 
Duplicate the process. The data analysis of this research is based on quantitative 
research which adopts positivism point of view that relies on an objective approach. 
This approach is quite challenging as requires detachment from the data analysis as I 
mentioned above and require improving statistical skills to achieve the outcomes. 
Improving the statistical skills involves the tendency of repeating the analysis a 
hundred times before approving them. This helps in developing the research model 
and improving the analysis structure and presentation to ensure they highlight the 




8.5 Research Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research   
The uniqueness of this research underlies in the combination of different subjects 
namely, tax minimisation, firm value utilising different measures, corporate 
governance external and internal mechanisms and FTSE 350 and it’s both 
components.  To the researcher's knowledge, this research is the first that discuss tax 
minimisation, firm value and corporate governance mainly in FTSE 350 and analyse 
the results of different indices.  Although each of these subjects is a subject by itself, 
there is a scarcity of research combining them in different sectors and areas especially 
in the UK and at different time scales. An attempt is made by the researcher to grasp 
as many subjects in the analysis as possible, however, it remains limited, as a 
consequence, further research could investigate specific topics deeper and for 
different time scale, for example; 
1. Examining the tax minimisation behaviour during Brexit and the transition 
period after, also, the period of coronavirus and examine its impact on tax 
minimisation. As these events might lead to aggressiveness on tax 
minimisation to prevent losses and might have both a positive or negative 
impact on firm value. 
2. The generalisation of FTSE 350 results on all the UK large companies could 
be constrained, however, the results of this research provide some lessons to 
learn and compare with other similar contexts whether in the UK or in other 
countries that share similar economics and corporate governances regulations 
such as European countries.  Moreover, it would be beneficial to consider 
different sectors such as banking and financial companies and compare the 
results with this research results to identify the similarities and variances.  
3. Although this research attempts to take a holistic approach in identifying the 
relationship between tax minimisation components and firm value with 
considering corporate governance as a moderating factor in FTSE 350 non-




Hence, further research may extend the scope of the examination to include 
different sectors and indices.  
4. The theory and framework that underpins this research are agency theory and 
Scholes-Wolfson framework where the relationship is examined and analysed 
and the results are interpreted, which could be a limitation of the research. 
Further research may be required to adopt another theory or a combination of 
different theories and frameworks.  
5. There are some issues that could be limiting factors in this research such the 
research relies upon secondary data in collecting the data of control variable 
that may disguise material matters of concern. However, verification upon 
sample crosschecks to data was made between data from the secondary and 
original sources to ensure their validity, such as companies’ annual reports.  
6. This research is a positivist in nature and adopted a quantitative approach, 
further research is required to focus on this subject from different approaches 
such as qualitative approach or mixed approach to understand in-depth human 
behaviour towards tax minimisation and grasp the characteristics of managers 
that might be more driven to engage in tax minimisation. Besides, a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches could be more 
beneficial as can lead to understanding the relationship from different angles.  
7. This research adopts two external and internal corporate governance 
mechanisms, namely institutional ownership and executive remuneration as 
proxies of corporate governance, which may not be the ideal mechanisms, and 
future research could adopt different codes and measures of corporate 
governance.  
8. This study did not conduct any test for diagnosing the potential of an 
endogeneity issue on the second and third models. Thus, this is considered as  
one of the study’s limitations, and a recommendation for future research is to 
deal with the endogeneity issue by adopting one of the advanced approaches, 




differenced generalised method of moments (GMM), and  system generalised 






8.6 Conclusion  
The consideration of relevant variables and the utilisation of a sample of FTSE 350 
companies have provided the opportunity to utilise the data collected and analysed to 
explain the relationship between different components of tax minimisation and firm 
value. A large positive value of book tax differences affects future earnings and 
represents non-subjectivity in calculating financial statements. This research provides 
guidance information that consists of investors’ perceptions of the manager’s 
engagement in tax minimisation activities.   
This research examines the relationship between different components of tax 
minimisation measured by book tax differences, namely permanent differences, 
temporary differences and overseas statutory tax rate differences on the FTSE 350. 
Although the results show that there is no significant relationship between tax 
minimisation components and firm value measured by Tobin’s Q, the relationship is 
significantly positive between these components and ROA. In addition, after splitting 
the FTSE 350 sample to the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 samples, only permanent 
differences and overseas statutory tax rate differences show a positive and significant 
relationship with Tobin’s Q. The explanation of that could be because the FTSE 250 
comprises medium size companies, thus any reduction in tax liabilities can lead to 
increasing firm value and achieving the growth plan, which is positively valued by 
investors. In addition, the relationship between tax minimisation components and 
ROA continued in the same direction, which can indicate that investors’ valuation 
could have different dimensions when compared to managers’ valuation and decision.  
Furthermore, adding both the external and internal corporate governance mechanisms 
to the previous main relationship model did not change the results of the FTSE 350 
and FTSE 100; however, it weakened the significance of the permanent difference in 
the FTSE 250. This can illustrate that while considering both mechanisms, they can 
have no moderate impact on the relationship under examination in both the FTSE 350 
and FTSE 100 but they have an impact on the relationship in the FTSE 250, which 




In order to understand the impact of each of the corporate governance mechanisms 
individually and to identify their moderating role on the relationship under 
investigation, a third model is created by adding the interaction variables to the 
second model. The results are different for each sample, which confirm the 
importance of splitting the FTSE 350 sample to both the FTSE 100 and FTSE 250, as 
the two indices have different features and characteristics that might generate 
different outcomes and investors may value both indices differently. For example, the 
influence of institutional ownership interaction with tax minimisation components 
varies upon the different indexes and differs from the influence of the executive 
remuneration. This can indicate that external corporate governance mechanisms have 
an influential role that are various when compared to internal mechanisms; hence, a 
solid combination of both of them could lead to intended outcomes and align between 
principle and agent interests. 
The research provides evidence that contributes to the knowledge of the investors’ 
valuation of different components of tax minimisation activities in the UK.  Besides, 
this research provides a methodological contribution to the knowledge in terms of 
measuring tax minimisation components and combining them with both measures of 
firm value along with corporate governance mechanisms.  
Moreover, the research provides a theoretical contribution to the current theory that 
institutional ownership in the FTSE 100 has a positive influence on the relationship 
under examination, in which investors positively value tax minimisation activities 
through the permanent and temporary differences components. In contrast, they 
negatively value tax minimisation activities through the permanent in the FTSE 250. 
This could be as a result of the FTSE 100 firms that are regarded as risk free 
companies, and because investors perceive institutional ownership as playing a vital 
role in monitoring the management’s activities and increasing the level of scrutiny for 
managerial actions, which is interpreted by Desai and Dharmapala (2009) as good 
governance. In contrast, The agency theory explains that a tax minimisation strategy 
can lead to tax risks and/or managerial opportunism, due to shifting the firm’s 




which is found especially in companies with some levels of managerial ownership 
(Morck et al., 1988), such as is the case in the FTSE 250. The view is supported in 
various recent studies (Abdul Wahab and Holland, 2012; Chen et al., 2010; Desai 
Dharmapala, 2009). 
Executive remuneration has a negative impact on the relationship between tax 
minimisation components and firm value in the FTSE 100 and it is absent in the 
FTSE 250. These provide evidence of the significant control effect of corporate 
governance on the shareholders' tax minimisation valuation for different components. 
This can indicate that investors do not favour tax minimisation strategies that are 
based on permanent differences despite the after tax savings preference, as a result of 
managerial value diversion or fear of managerial opportunisms, which will lead to an 
increase in managers value rather than shareholders value. This result is consistent 
with prior research that concerns the relationship between tax minimisation and firm 
value while considering managerial incentives (Nissim, 2004; Hanlon, 2005; Desai 
and Dharmapala, 2005). 
The results shed light on the practical and policy implication by highlighting the 
importance of providing more details into a succession plan concerning compliance 
and disclosures of taxation expenses, tax reconciliation and corporate governance in 
the annual reports.  
The limitations also are provided in this chapter in terms of the sample of this 
research and the extent of its validity amongst the sample check solution. Besides, 
some further research is recommended. The recommendations include applying the 
research on different sectors and time scale, also, considering other types of research 
approaches such as qualitative and mixed approaches and compare the results. In 
addition, adopting different theories in examining the data and interpreting the results 
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Appendix A: Tax Rate Reconciliation 





Recognised in the Income 
statement Current tax: 
  
UK corporation tax on profits 
of the period  
0.1 - 
Oversees corporate tax on 
profits of the period 
(0.1) 0.1 
Adjustments in respect of prior 
periods 
0.1 - 
Total Current Tax 0.1 0.1 
   
Deferred Tax   
Origination and reversal of 
temporary differences 
- - 
  - 
Total Deferred Tax  -  











Profit before tax  
 
11.9 12.1 
Effective tax charge at the UK 
tax rate of 20% (2015: 20.3%) 
Effect of: 
2.4 2.4 
Utilisation of brought forward 
losses 
- (0.6) 
Permanent differences 1.8 1.7 
Difference in overseas tax 
rates  
0.6 - 
Temporary differences on 
which no deferred tax 
recognised 
(4.8) (3.4) 
Prior year adjustments 0.1 - 








Appendix B: Further Tests 
Table B-1: Descriptive Statistics: Positive BTDs FTSE 350 Companies 
 
Variables Mean Min Max Standard Deviation 
MVET+3months(£m) 5427.89 293.02 62162.1 9593.69 
TI (£m) 204.28 -72.17 2500 360.23 
IBT (£m) 293.68 1.53 2933 454.72 
TS(£m) 32.36 -86.13 715.72 80.29 
BTDs(m) 89.40 0.13 2067.15 211.23 
PDs(£m) 18.67 -889.3 2003.163 210.23 
TDs(£m) 70.74 -491.75 1652.17 202.57 
STRDs(£m) 1.28 -35 93 12.07 
ETR 0.09 -0.57 0.49 0.16 
STR 0.21 0.2 0.23 0.01 
Tobin’s Q 174 0.53 0.03 0.99 0.20 
ROA 179 11.59 0.18 43.13 7.50 
IOWN 179 34.53 0 80.46 18.19 
REM(m) 5.733 0.536 29.633 4.820 
REM/BEt-1 0.30 -0.70 12.01 1.15 
EM 0.03 -2.91 4.73 0.69 
CI 0.25 0 1.14 0.28 
LEV 0.23 0 1.97 0.26 
FOS 43.97 0 100 39.80 
DI 1.69 0 79.35 6.10 
     
 
MVET+3 months: Equity market value after three months of the annual report publication,  TI: Taxable income, 
IBT: Income before tax, TS: Tax saving  BTDs: Book tax differences, PDs: Permanent differences, TDs: 
Temporary differences, STRDs: Statutory tax rate differences, ETR: Effective tax rate, STR: Statutory tax rate, 
ROA: Return on assets, MOWN: Managerial ownership, IOWN: Institutional ownership, EREM: Executive 
remuneration, REM/BEt-1: Executive remuneration to equity book value in the prior year, EM: Earnings 





Table 0-2: Descriptive Statistics - Positive BTDs FTSE 100 Companies 
 
Variables  Mean Min Max Standard 
Deviation 
MVET+3months(£m) 12978.36 1076.55 62162.1 13976.05 
TI (£m) 482.39 0.46 2500 530.18 
IBT (£m) 654.71 1.53 2933 667.82 
TS(£m) 71.21 -86.13 715.72 132.74 
BTDs(£m) 172.32 0.13 2067.15 353.90 
PDs(£m) 9.35 -889.30 2003.163 360.91 
TDs(£m) 162.97 -491.75 1652.17 332.94 
STRDs(£m) 4.99 -35 93 20.19 
ETR 0.11 -0.28 0.49 0.15 
STR 0.21 0.2 0.232 0.01 
Tobin’s Q 57 0.58 0.06 0.97 0.19 
ROA 57 11.82 3.18 36.38 6.80 
MOWN 5 34.03 33.73 34.62 0.51 
IOWN 186 25.05 0 80.46 14.28 
REM(£m) 9.917 0.617 29.633 5.741 
REM/BEt-1 0.75 -0.02 12.01 1.89 
EM 0.20 -1.37 4.73 0.85 
CI 0.30 0 0.96 0.34 
LEV 0.24 0 0.56 0.17 
FOS 55.39 0 100 37.60 
DI 0.84 0 6.31 1.13 
 
MVET+3 months: Equity market value after three months of the annual report publication,  TI: 
Taxable income, IBT: Income before tax, TS: Tax saving  BTDs: Book tax differences, PDs: 
Permanent differences, TDs: Temporary differences, STRDs: Statutory tax rate differences, ETR: 
Effective tax rate, STR: Statutory tax rate, ROA: Return on assets, MOWN: Managerial ownership, 
IOWN: Institutional ownership, EREM: Executive remuneration, REM/BEt-1: Executive remuneration 
to equity book value in the prior year, EM: Earnings management, CI: Capital intensity, LEV: 




Table 0-3: Descriptive Statistics - Positive BTDs FTSE 250 Companies 
 
Variables  Mean Min Max Standard Deviation 
MVET+3months(£m) 1751.14 293.02 8769.89 1170.89 
TI (£m) 74.35 -72.17 478.85 85.72 
IBT (£m) 125.01 7.32 497.87 87.63 
TS 14.20 -19.21 65.15 16.90 
BTDs(£m) 50.66 0.28 275.04 54.03 
PDs(£m) 23.02 -231.3 275.04 68.35 
TDs(£m) 27.64 -142.86 254.82 56.42 
STRDs(£m) -0.46 -17.4 18 4.01 
ETR 0.08 -0.57 0.47 0.16 
STR 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.01 
Tobin’s Q 117 0.50 0.03 0.99 0.20 
ROA 122 11.49 0.18 43.13 7.84 
MOWN 22 21.39 2.6 53.05 16.10 
IOWN 122 38.96 0 78.53 18.17 
REM(£m) 3.779 0.536 15.720 2.613 
REM/BEt-1 0.09 -0.69 2.52 0.36 
EM -0.05 -2.91 3.23 0.58 
CI 0.23 0 1.14 0.25 
LEV 0.23 0 1.97 0.29 
FOS 38.63 0 100 39.82 
DI 2.1 0 79.35 7.29 
 
MVET+3 months: Equity market value after three months of the annual report publication,  TI: 
Taxable income, IBT: Income before tax, TS: Tax saving  BTDs: Book tax differences, PDs: 
Permanent differences, TDs: Temporary differences, STRDs: Statutory tax rate differences, ETR: 
Effective tax rate, STR: Statutory tax rate, ROA: Return on assets, MOWN: Managerial ownership, 
IOWN: Institutional ownership, EREM: Executive remuneration, REM/BEt-1: Executive remuneration 
to equity book value in the prior year, EM: Earnings management, CI: Capital intensity, LEV: 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B- 7 Endogeneity Measurement 
 











Wald chi  










B-8 Year Dummy for the first model 
 FTSE 350 FTSE 100 FTSE 250 

































































































































































N 483 497 184 186 299 311 
R-squared 
(within) 
0.3522 0.2042 0.6670 0.5706 0.4210 0.1132 
R-squared 
(between) 
0.1044 0.000 0.0020 0.0094 0.2344 0.0025 
R-squared 
(overall) 
0.1151 0.0007 0.0003 0.0057 0.2483 0.0151 
F  










Wald chi  
Prob > Chi2 
 84.19 
(0.000) 
-   31.38 
(0.0010) 
           *Coefficient value and P-value in (brackets) 
***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
PDs: Permanent Differences, TDs: Temporary Differences, STRDs: Statutory Tax rate Differences,  







B-9 Year Dummies for the Second model  
VARIABLES MODEL 








250  Q 
MODEL 









































































































































































N 483 497 184 186 299 311 
R-squared 
(within) 
0.3619 0.2058 0.6718 0.5653 0.4213 0.1128 
R-squared 
(between) 
0.1074 0.0000 0.0011 0.0015 0.2507 0.0053 
R-squared 
(overall) 
0.1181 0.0009 0.0000 0.0003 0.2640 0.0194 
F  





   
Wald chi  









           *Coefficient value and P-value in (brackets) 
***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
PDs: Permanent Differences, TDs: Temporary Differences, STRDs: Statutory Tax rate Differences, 
IOWN: Institutional Ownership, EREMEM: Executive Remuneration, EM: Earnings Management, CI: 





B-10 Year Dummies for the Third model  
VARIABLES MODEL  Q  MODEL  
ROA 
MODEL Q MODEL 
ROA 


















































































































































































































































N 483 497 184 186 299 311 
R-squared 
(within) 
0.3712 0.2478 0.7040 0.6218 0.4237 0.1639 
R-squared 
(between) 
0.1085 0.0001 0.0008 0.0008 0.2618 0.0059 
R-squared 
(overall) 
0.1201 0.0020 0.000 0.000 0.2745 0.0241 
F  





   
Wald chi  












*Coefficient value and P-value in (brackets). ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. PDs: Permanent Differences, TDs: Temporary Differences, STRDs: Statutory Tax rate 
Differences, IOWN: Institutional Ownership, EREMEM: Executive Remuneration, PDOWN: 
Permanent Differences*Institutional ownership, TDOWN: Temporary Differences* Institutional 
Ownership, STRDOWN: Statutory Tax Rate Differences* Institutional ownership, PDEREM: 
Permanents Differences* executive Remuneration, TDEREM: Temporary Differences* Executive 
Remuneration, STRDEREM: Statutory Tax Rate differences* Executive Remuneration, Earnings 
Management, CI: Capital Intensity, LEV: Leverage, FOS: Foreign Sales, DIV: Dividends.  
